The "great game" of the nineteenth century has changed in many ways — Communists rule Russia; Americans have replaced Britons; and the -Persian Gulf, not India, now constitutes the prize. But in some key respects, the conflict remains constant. The Soviets, for example, adhere closely to older Russian ambitions, a point emphasized in nearly every one of this book's thirteen chapters.
The chapters deal with Soviet long-term planning toward Afghanistan between 1917 and the 1979 invasion; Soviet economic interests in Afghanistan (which include hundreds of mineral deposits, all sorts of fuels, and much else); Soviet strategic interests; military operations; cultural policy; and human rights abuses.
In contrast to those many multi-authored volumes that offer no more than disjointed essays between hard covers. Klass has produced a work of clear vision and great importance. Three chapters especially stand out. Klass's introduction provides perhaps the most persuasive case in print why decent people should make the Afghan cause their own. Yossef Bodansky sheds new — and disturbing — light on the Soviet war effort in Afghanistan. "The Soviet military," he says, "appears to be delighted with its strategic and tactical gains resulting from the seizure of Afghanistan, and unconcerned about the costs."
But Alexandre Bennigsen expects the Afghan war will lead to serious troubles within the USSR. As a high-ranking Communist party official of Muslim origin told him, "the resistance of the Afghan is for us the first gleam of hope since the Russian conquest."
May 1, 1988 update: For a more detailed review of this book, see "Afghanistan: Respect the Pessimists But Heed the Optimists."
