There is no intelligence agency in the Western world like Israel's Mossad for tales of quick wits and spectacular derring-do. Posner reveals some new tales and closes the lacunae in some old ones. Especially interesting is the story of Dina al-Man, a Muslim Circassian woman who sympathized with the Palestinians' plight but abhorred the PLO's methods. She provided key data that led the Israelis to discover a 1977 plot by Libyan operatives to kill Anwar as-Sadat of Egypt. Posner argues, reasonably, that Menachem Begin's decision to turn this evidence over to Sadat led to the Egyptian attack on Libya in July 1977 and helped set the mood for Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November of that year.
But for all his new information, Posner lacks 350 pages worth; his book could be condensed to two or three fast-paced articles. So he resorts to some rather obvious and tiresome padding. The chapter on Begin's decision to give Sadat the information about the Libyan plot has exactly two paragraphs on this decision and six pages on Begin's biography. When the Israelis intercept an airliner hoping to catch George Habash, the narrative - suddenly stops and Habash's biography takes up the next five pages. Someone familiar with Middle East politics will probably skip 90 percent of the book. Someone not familiar will have difficulty making his way through the haphazard presentation of information.
