Although "we have learned a good deal about the economic consequences of the oil weapon, we remain largely ignorant of its political impact," Licklider maintains. To correct this imbalance, he scrutinizes closely the behavior of five oil-consumer states (the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, and the United States) in the mid-1970s. The result is a fascinating, subtle, and well-argued review.
The Arabs' goal in 1973-74 was a change in policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, but this the oil embargo did not get them. Indeed, Licklider can find "almost no policy change on the Arab-Israeli dispute" by the five states, confirming the nearly universal conclusion that economic sanctions do not work.
But something else happened in 1973-74 — the oil boom. If the embargo was not effective, the vast increase in the wealth of some Arab countries was. Increased Arab purchasing power, not the fear of future oil shortages, did indeed lead to changes in the way that the five industrial states approached Middle East politics. Specifically, all of them eventually moved in the Arabs' direction. Where the threat of embargo failed, the threat of boycott worked.
Licklider draws theoretical and policy conclusions from his analysis. Theoretically, he sees 1973-74 confirming that "it is extremely difficult to force a target state to alter its policy on a topic the target feels is important." Practically, he sees future attempts to brandish the oil weapon — or any other commodity sanction — producing even more meager results than the Arab effort.
