Karsh notes the mistrust that characterized Soviet-Syrian relations when Hafiz al-Asad first came to power in November 1970, then asks how the two states went on to develop what has been the USSR's "most enduring and uninterrupted tie" in the Middle East. The not-very-surprising answer lies in a network of "mutually beneficial strategic interdependence" between the two states.
The strength of Karsh's effort lies in his precise and excellent account of that interdependence and how it changed over a period of nearly two decades. He sees Sadat's trip to Jerusalem as a decisive event: before November 1977, Asad had the stronger hand; thereafter the Soviets did. The weakness of his book lies in a very fundamental and surprising misreading of Soviet interests in the Middle East. Against all evidence, Karsh assumes that Moscow seeks "the attainment and preservation of stability" in that region. He reaches this conclusion by supposing that the Soviets want in the Middle East what they have attained in Eastern Europe, "a stable and safe frontier in order to minimize potential threats." But this premise errs in two ways: neither Syria nor any other Arab country has ever posed a threat to Russia, as have France and Germany, nor are they likely to. And, being separated from Soviet territory by Turkey and Iran, they are far from being contiguous. Had Karsh assumed more aggressive Soviet intentions, he would have been on much safer ground analytically, and his fine study would have achieved its potential.
