Michael Finch: Quite an honor to be here with these four gentlemen. All four of them have been regulars at Restoration Weekend on and off for many years. So we're very honored to have all of them up here.
Daniel Pipes: Thank you, Mike.
Well, I have a bifurcated response to Syria. Because on the one hand, I believe that when the President says there's a red line, he has to do something when the red line is breached, not change the nature of the red line, which is what in fact has happened. First, it was the use of chemical weapons, and then it was the systematic use of chemical weapons. And so what is systematic use, exactly? And nothing so far has happened.
And this has ominous implications for Iran, where there also are red lines. And it could well be that we find all sorts of complex reasons to explain why the Iranians haven't, in fact, breached those red lines. But it could also be different, because involvement in Syria, polling shows, is deeply unpopular, with some 15, 20 percent of Americans endorsing it. Whereas an attack on Iran is actually quite popular, with more than half of Americans saying that they would endorse that. So it is a bad omen, but not necessarily a telling — doesn't necessarily mean that we won't do anything with Iran.
So on the one hand, I'm very upset that the authority of the US government is so undercut by its own leadership. On the other hand, I'm quite pleased to see that we're not intervening in Syria, because I don't think we should be helping the rebels. I see the rebels as a deeply malign force, essentially an Islamist force backed by the malign Turkish government, the malign Qatari government, and the malign Saudi government. I have no wish to see them come to power.
On the other hand, the despotism of the Assad regime is horrid, monstrous. There is no good choice here. There are good Syrians, but they're nowhere near the corridors of power, and they're not contenders in the current civil war. And so there is no good side here.
And therefore, I draw the conclusion that just as we helped Stalin against Hitler, and we helped Saddam Hussein against the Ayatollah Khomeini, we should — as Assad is going down, we should help Assad against the rebels. I don't want Assad to prevail, but I also don't want the Islamist rebels to prevail. I don't want the Iranians to benefit from this, I don't want the Turks to benefit from it. I would rather see them just go at each other. I think we should use what influence we have with the supporters of both sides to get the fighting away from the civilians, so that there is not this horrid humanitarian cost.
But from our strategic point of view, it's clearly in our interest to have Hamas fighting with Hezbollah. I mean, can you imagine a better scenario than that?
(Laughter)
So I think we should stay out.
Turkey you mentioned as well. Turkey has been our longtime ally since the Korean War 60 years ago. Ten years ago, however, the Turks took a serious turn for the worse. They've had an Islamist government that has been evermore clearly showing its hand — an intelligent, subtle Islamist government, but an Islamist government nonetheless. And our government and other Western governments are very slow to pick up this problem. I've probably mentioned this five times at various Restoration Weekends. But it is ever more evidently a problem for us.
And I would predict that in the long-term Iran, after the current crises are over, will be quite a friendly country to the United States, and Turkey will be the most hostile and important opponent of the United States, and then really see a switcheroo. And Middle East generally is a very volatile place. Things move quickly, and it would not be surprising to see that Turkey emerges as our most important adversary in the region.
Michael Finch: And Daniel, I have a quick question for you — did we miss our chance with the green revolution in Iran? Will that moment come again, if not in the next three years under Obama, but under a future President where we have a chance to really have effective change in that country?
Daniel Pipes: The Iranian regime is doomed. The only question is when will it collapse. It is somewhat akin to the Soviet regime in the 1970s — deeply unpopular. Very few people believe in the ideology that the regime purveys. The question is — when will people get organized, when will there be some instant that causes them to rebel? 2009 was an opportunity — it was embarrassing to watch Merkel, Brown and Sarkozy support the street demonstrators and Obama be silent. I don't think if it happened a second time, and we were coming up to another election next month in Iran, that the Obama Administration will be quiet as it was four years ago.
The key, however, is not us. It's not our policies at this point. It is the Iranians themselves. And it is deeply unsettled and volatile. And there could be at any moment something that sets off a reaction which leads to deep change in Iran. So it's coming.
The problem is that we have a nuclear buildup that's coming faster. According to the estimates I get, particularly from Israelis, the Iranians are within weeks — not even months away — from crossing the red lines there. And who knows what's going on behind the scenes? But from what we can tell, it doesn't seem like much is happening.
So by the time of the November Restoration Weekend, we will know whether the Iranians have a bomb or are bombed.
Michael Finch: Do we have any questions from the audience? Paul, in the back?
Paul: First of all, I want to thank all four panelists for furthering my drinking problems.
(Laughter)
But this question is directed to Daniel Pipes. And one thing that Obama has become an expert at is not only backstabbing our traditional allies but also emboldening our enemies. And one of these countries who is in a very difficult neighborhood, who borders with Iran, is very pro-US, very pro-Israel and, like Iran, is a Shiite Muslim country; is Azerbaijan. And to me, it seems like they're very underappreciated. And I'm just curious to hear from you what you think of their role, and if truly the US is really using their friendship and anything else to help us against especially Iran and their nuclear ambitions.
Daniel Pipes: Azerbaijan is Turkic-speaking, and therefore connected to Turkey; but Shiite, and therefore connected to Iran. And part of it is in Iran today, and half of it was under the Soviets and is now independent — complex situation. Independent Azerbaijan is deeply connected to the Azerbaijan in Iran and has generally been quite hostile to the Iranian government, to the Islamic Republic; and has had pretty good relations with Turkey. It's had excellent relations, by the way, with Israel — just looking for a friendly face in the neighborhood.
We have not been terribly supportive of Azerbaijan, as your question implied. We could do a lot more. But we have in fact — the US government, under Bush and Obama, have seen Ankara as the address — this is our friend. Obama hugs them. But Bush has even more responsibility. Because it was a visit that Erdogan paid to the Oval Office in 2003 that precipitated Erdogan's reaching the prime ministership. So it's a joint Republican-Democratic mistake. And Azerbaijan is an asset which we are neglecting.
Michael Finch: Daniel has something happy to say.
Daniel Pipes: Well, I actually have made a career of being a pessimist.
(Laughter)
So I've reformed lately, and I'm more optimistic. And I'll point to two good pieces of news in the Middle East. One is that the Islamists, as they grow in power, divide among themselves. Look at the Iranians and the Turks, who are now battling by proxies in Syria. Look at Hezbollah and Hamas, as I mentioned before. Look at the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis in Egypt. And on and on — in Tunisia, in Libya, wherever you look — as they gain power, the Islamists divide. And I think in the long term this will be their undoing.
And indeed, I draw a parallel between them now and the Arab Nationalists in the 1950s, who seemed to be taking over the region but ultimately fell because they couldn't agree on the program, and who should be the leader, and what is the exact nature of their political approach. So the relatively good news is that they fall out among themselves.
And the second thing is that our really only strategic ally in the region — as opposed to tactic ally, Israel — is doing extremely well, whether it be demographically or in terms of its energy. Get this — Israel has as much energy, it appears, in its tiny territory akin to the size of New Jersey, as Saudi Arabia, which is United States East of the Mississippi sized. So we have a very strong ally that is doing well in the Middle East.
Michael Finch: Thank you. We're going to go to Bill, and then to Aaron. We got time for the last two questions.
Bill: My first one is very far out. That is — what are the prospects that Obama actually wants Iran to have a nuclear weapon that can humble the United States? And the second is to Mr. Gaffney — how come we cannot get [out] the fact that anybody who looks at the world and looks at world history (inaudible) since he has become President, (inaudible) Japan wants nuclear, Saudi Arabia (inaudible), Egypt (inaudible), South Korea will [develop] nuclear weapons — how come we can't get this message to the United States — (inaudible) do you feel safer now than you have eight years or four years ago? How come we cannot — where is the leadership to speak to the American people and say — do you realize what's happening to the United States and the world?
Daniel Pipes: On the Iran question — I understand Obama as having a profound contradiction within him. On the one hand, he is an anti-American leftist who believes the United States is a force for ill in the world. On the other hand, he is President of the United States and would like to go down as a great President. These are conflicting intensions.
And so when you go to a specific issue like Iran, he in his heart, I would speculate, probably thinks that it's a good thing that other countries have nuclear arms, that we not be exceptional in that regard. On the other hand, it is his watch, and it'd look bad if the Iranians get nuclear arms and further disrupt and potentially deploy them. So I think he's deeply ambivalent. And I think the policies that you see — whether it be in Syria currently or Iran in the future — reflect that deep ambivalence of he and those who are around him.
