Numbers
Between ten and fifteen million Muslims, immigrants and converts, live today in Western Europe and the Americas. In Western Europe, Muslims number about twelve million. Over 3 million Muslims live in France, L'Express 10 Mar about 2 million in West Germany, 1½ million in the United Kingdom. About a half million Muslim residents live in Italy and Holland, Nielsen 93, 61 while Belgium and Spain each host about 300,000. Lesser numbers live in Sweden (150,000) and Switzerland (125,000). In many West European countries Muslims have replaced Jews as the second largest religious community; they also outnumber Protestants in France, Catholics in Berlin, and so forth.
In North America the numbers are much disputed, with a low of one million and a high of ten; the American Muslim Council uses the figure 5.2 million. The largest-scale study to date, however, shows a Muslim population of just 1.4 million.[1]
Women constitute a small percentage of the diaspora populations, as little as one-sixth the Muslims in some countries and as much as half in others. In general, their numbers have grown over time, once male workers decide to stay and a community infrastructure develops.
Immigrant communities tend to concentrate in urban areas and especially in the center of cities, making Muslims very visible. Some towns, such as Bradford in England and the Parisian suburb of Saint-Denys, have a very significant Muslim elements. But Dearborn, Michigan, must have the largest concentration, with 90 percent of its population either born in Arab countries or descended from Arab immigrants (many of them Christians, to be sure); to make the picture even more complete, most of the non-Arabs in that city are black Muslim converts.
Immigration
This Muslim population came into existence during the second half of the twentieth century. Before 1955 negligible numbers of Muslims lived in Western Europe and North America; just the odd student, merchant, sailor, worker, exile, or convert. Their numbers began to swell in the 1960s as five major developments took place. The advanced industrial economies of Western Europe sought new sources of unskilled and semi-skilled labor. The Muslim countries experienced a demographic explosion, with attendant unemployment and poverty. Large bodies of Muslim students enrolled at universities in the West. Problems in the newly independent Muslim states (especially their internal repression and many wars) dispatched an unceasing stream of exiles to seek refuge in the stable, free Western countries. And several developments in the West (self-doubt, intermarriage, separatism) prompted significant numbers of native-born Westerners to convert to Islam.
Muslims in the West originate mostly from Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, though smaller numbers come from other regions, such as the Indonesians resident in Holland or the Albanians in Italy. A single ethnic group of Muslims predominates in each of the three major European countries: Maghrebis (Algerians, Moroccans, Tunisians) in France, Turks in Germany, South Asians in Great Britain. American black converts dominate in the United States, followed by Iranians, Levantine Arabs, South Asians, and Sub-Saharan Africans. These seven groupings make up the great bulk of the Muslim population in the West.
Changed Minds about Staying
Most immigrants arrive in the West intending to return home before long, and live their lives accordingly. For most Palestinians, Fawaz Turki explains "America is a means to get an education, make a fortune, establish a name, acquire a passport. They do not go to America to become American. They do not, and finally find that they cannot, cross the divide to American culture. The freewheeling social, sexual, and linguistic norms of American society are at the furthest remove from the internal climate of the Palestinian soul."[2] This same outlook holds true for most other Muslim immigrants as well.
But whatever their original intentions, many Muslim residents change their minds. Workers get accustomed to higher incomes, students stay on beyond their schooling, and exiles find that the troubles besetting their home countries do not pass. What started as a temporary sojourn in many cases turns into something permanent. Around 1980 especially, large numbers of Muslims went from migrant to immigrant status (the former expects to return home, the latter does not). This prompted worried European states to restrict entry and to offer financial incentives for long-time residents to return home, to little avail. Muslim numbers continued steadily to grow through reproduction, further immigration, and conversion.
Some Middle East politicians profess to see signs that the troubles in the Muslim world are on the way to solution, and so the emigrants will return home. Thus, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, has observed that "Some Arab communities in Europe are perhaps compelled to live there because their countries have problems. I believe that this problem will eventually be solved."[3] It is difficult, however, for an outside observer to locate the source of the king's optimism.
Diverse Attitudes towards the Islamic Faith
Living in the West seems to effect Muslims in contrary ways, with one minority turning vehemently toward Islam and another rejecting it. Some Islamists see the West as a safe haven to begin reviving the Shari'a; indeed, a sizable proportion of Turks -- perhaps 10 percent -- who migrated to Germany had this in mind. Ironically, these Turks exploit the pluralism of Western society to practice an anti-Western way of life illegal back home. This permits Islamists to organize themselves in ways they usually cannot back home. Circumstances are ideal: governments pay them little attention, money is plentiful, communication and transportation links first-rate. Accordingly, they have recruited scores of operatives in the West, added tens of thousands of new members to their organizations, and raised tens of millions of dollars. The United States has become home to virtually every radical Islamic group operating in the Middle East, while the Egyptian magazine Al-Musawwar calls Germany "the international headquarters of fundamentalists."[4]
At the same time, minority Muslim populations see Europe as a place to maintain their cultural traditions, banned or discriminated against at home, and so migrate in disproportionate numbers. Berbers in Algeria, who constitute just 20 percent of Algeria's population make up over 50 percent (possibly even over 60 percent) of the Algerians in France. Kurds make up 20 percent of the Turkish population but 25 percent of the Turks in Germany (a number that is the more impressive when one realizes how much more rural they are). Alevis (Turkish Shi'is) move more often to Germany and stay there longer. Both Berbers and Kurds tend to be ardently anti-Islamist.
Some Muslims take the opportunity of living in a non-Muslim country to neglect their religion or even to abandon it. Symptomatic of this attitude, one British Muslim wrote to a magazine "I am seriously thinking of leaving Islam, but someone told me that I can't. I think this is silly and such statements only make me dislike Islam more."[5] More famously, Salman Rushdie announced that "Where God lived inside of me, there is now a hole. I am no longer a practicing Muslim"[6] and "I do not believe in the existence of an external Supreme Being."[7]
Family Issues
Relations between the sexes is a difficult issue in all Muslim societies, and all the more so in the West, where Islamic customs are novel and generally unwelcome to the majority population. The male Muslim immigrant's treatment of wives, sisters, and daughters raises a host of extremely delicate issues. Two topics stand out for their political importance: Muslim women marrying out of the faith and the abduction of children.
Muslim women marrying out. While Islam allows men to marry non-Muslim women adhering to monotheistic faiths, and even for those wives permanently to remain non-Muslims, it requires Muslim women to marry within the faith. This means that Muslim families living in the West often forbid girls from the partner of their choice. Those girls, however, in increasing numbers have decided to disobey parental strictures. So intense is the pressure, they sometimes abandon their family entirely by converting to Christianity -- thereby exchanging the religion of their parents for that of their husbands. This radical, irrevocable act makes them instantly unwelcome in the Muslim community but at the same time integrates them quite fully into the mainstream society. The firm opposition of most Muslim men to their daughters or sisters marrying outside the community breeds resentment and sometimes results in brutalities, such as the November 1989 killing (inadvertently recorded by the FBI) in the American city of St. Louis, when a Palestinian father stabbed his daughter thirteen times with a butcher's knife as her mother held the girl down -- largely because the girl was spending time with a young, non-Muslim, black youth.[8]
Abduction of children. Still, immigrant Muslim women only rarely marry outside faith; in contrast, their male counterparts have fully availed themselves of their freedom to do so. Indeed, one estimate suggests over a million of them have married Western women since 1950, primarily in France and Germany.[9] These many marriages have led to many divorces, some of which involve monumental fights over children. While Western laws favor the mother taking custody, Islamic law awards children to the father, and herein lies many a vicious battle.
To preempt the process in an unfriendly court, Muslim fathers regularly abduct the children to their country of origin, far beyond the reach of Western laws. Of many well-known accounts, Not Without My Daughter,[10] the 1987 autobiographical story of Betty Mahmoody, an American citizen married to an Iranian, has had the greatest impact. In Europe, Not Without My Daughter resonated far more than in the United States, becoming an immediate and much-discussed best-seller in Spain, France, Germany and Scandinavia. The German version, Nicht ohne meine Tochter, has sold more than 4 million copies. 118
French children abducted to Algeria alone number several thousand. The traffic has reached the point that professional abductors take children from France to Algeria and vice-versa.[11] The Association of the Mothers of Abducted Children, headquartered in Paris, exerts a considerable political influence. Across the West, tens of thousands of children have been abducted; when family members are factored in, these cases touch hundreds of thousands of individuals. Moreover, the issue reverberates far beyond the parents and families involved, touching a particularly sensitive chord in the Western psyche and ratcheting up emotions against Muslims, agitating public opinion, and even riling diplomatic relations between the French and Algerian governments.[12]
Tensions
Tensions arise from other problems too. On the Muslim side, Islamism is the major culprit; other sources of problems include violence and financial scandals. On the Western side, nativism poses the deepest threat to comity.
Islamism. Islamists in Europe and America stress three themes, each of which leads to tensions with the majority population: separatism, anti-Westernism, and Islamic supremacism.
Separatism presumes that the minority stay outside the mainstream of society, living in protected enclaves speaking its own language and running its own institutions. Islamists in particular raise separatist demands which would establish cultural apartheid. Like Khomeini who took refuge in a suburb of Paris for several months in 1978-79 but never set foot in the City of Lights, some Muslims opt for a completely insular existence in the West, remaining willfully ignorant of the cultures and societies around them, creating islands of Islamist piety as self-isolated and self-sufficient as possible. Culturally, Islamists remain outsiders, learning just the street culture they need to get by, and even this only superficially. While this picture is hardly unique (Chinatowns from Amsterdam to San Francisco share it), Muslim communities do have a special quality; they alone have a profoundly anti-Western ideology to fall back on. No other immigrant group has an institution to parallel the Islamist mosques which teach that the West is evil, Westerners unclean and unworthy -- old, somewhat abstract doctrines which acquire new relevance when Muslims live in Europe or America.
Some Islamists openly espouse hatred of the very West that affords them political shelter, prosperity, and freedom of expression. They depict the West as pig-like and rotten to the core, controlled by Crusaders, Freemasons, Zionists, and other satanic forces. The West stands for self-indulgence, whether gluttony or promiscuity. "AIDS, drugs, venereal disease, alcohol and tobacco abuse" are "plagues of the modern western society."[13] Islamists particularly fear secularism, which they interpret as the source of the West's evil (Muhammad Al-Bahiy, an Egyptian scholar and religious official, once likened secularism to the "lust of the belly and the vagina")[14] and its chief instrument to sap Islam of vitality.
Other Islamists, especially Khomeini's followers, go beyond separatism and hatred to portray the West as ripe for take-over, and imagine themselves its inheritors.[15] The disparity in demographic rates of increase combined with ideological arrogance leads them to believe that they can eventually outnumber the Western autochtones in their own countries. These Muslim supremacists do not hide their intentions. Harun Reshit Tuylogzzlu, an imam in Germany, has repeatedly referred to himself as the "Conqueror of Europe" and calls upon an audience to "break the horns of those who tried to prevent this public function and to tear out the tongues of all our opponents."[16] Fouad Salah, a Tunisian convicted of setting off bombs in France in 1985-86, killing thirteen, told the judge handling his case: "I do not renounce my fight against the West which assassinated the Prophet Muhammad. . . . We Muslims should kill every last one of you [Westerners]."[17] While these extremist statements are hardly the whole story -- peaceful and positive relations usually prevail -- they raise very strong reactions among the non-Muslim majority population.
Political violence. Muslims in the West act violently, not because of a violent streak inherent to Islam but for reasons having to do with their countries of origins and their own circumstances. The many ideological and military conflicts of the Muslim world have a way of spilling over to Europe and America. The Arab-Israeli conflict, the Lebanese civil war, and the Iraq-Iran war have caused the most incidents but other conflicts -- Afghanistan, Kuwait, Azerbaijan, the Kurds, Cyprus, Yugoslavia, Somalia, Chad -- also generate frictions which get played out in the West.
Other violence has nothing to do with the Middle East but develops out of circumstances in the West. Immigrants and Western converts to Islam have distinct patterns, and so need to be considered apart. Riots by immigrants or against them (both commonly known as race riots) have the greatest potential for immediate trouble. Violent incidents usually take place in the satellite towns that offer cheap housing and which have become ghetto-like suburbs of Muslims.
European converts rarely resort to force, but American ones, especially African-Americans, have perpetrated considerable violence. Malcolm X, murdered in 1965, is the cause celèbre, but there were other assassinations within the Nation of Islam. Some gangs have taken up Islam as a cover for their criminal activities; El Rukn, the most violent street gang of Chicago, has the highest profile, at one time even receiving money from Libya.[18] Islam often provides little more than the cover for hate cults that bear little resemblance to the mainstream faith. Most prominent of these is the Nation of Islam, a black American creed that emerged in Detroit in the 1930s, now led by Louis Farrakhan, a talented orator; it has little in common with mainstream beyond its name and a few customs.
Crime. Impressions to the contrary notwithstanding,[19] the crime rate of first-generation Muslim immigrants stands on average 40 percent below that of the indigenous population. The second and third generations are another story, however, especially the beurs (second-generation Muslims in France) and the German-born Turks. These latter disproportionately engage in theft, wanton destruction of property, and murderous gang fighting. In Stuttgart, Germany, home to the Mercedes factories and a Muslim population of roughly 15 percent, the children of Muslim immigrants made up nearly 85 percent of the city's juvenile delinquents in 1991.[20]
Muslims have also made their mark in criminal activity connected to big business. Apart from the Paris-based Agha Khan, virtually every Muslim tycoon in the West has ended up prosecuted on account of fraud. 'Adnan Khashoggi and Ghaith Pharaon have been indicted in the United States, Rifat Sayed in Sweden, and Asil Nadir in Britain. Much the worst case, however, in terms of size, nefariousness, and notoriety, involved the Bank for Credit and Commerce International and its late head, Agha Hassan Abedi.
Nativism
Almost everywhere in Western Europe (but rarely in the United States), a majority within the original Christian and Jewish population complains about being flooded by hordes of impoverished foreigners, and by Muslim immigrants especially. A small number goes further and adopts nativist ideas. These elements play up the importance of skin color, indulge in blatant bias, and promote an aggressive nationalism. Such nativism has marked similarities to fascism.
Hostility toward Muslims derives in part from the universal antipathy to foreigners. Employment problems cause much tension, and Europeans hold foreigners responsible for the scarcity of opportunity and, therefore, want them out and sometimes even attack them. Germans especially feel that they have lost control of their borders, that anyone can land in their country and begin drawing welfare checks. A sense of siege sets in: Europe, it is said, has as many people as it can hold. "The boat is full" gets repeated from one end of the continent to the other.
Several factors have particular importance in explaining European nativism vis-à-vis Muslims.
Anti-Islamic sentiments. Inherited biases against Islam and Muslims remain strong, with religious hatred sometimes directly underlying antipathy toward Muslims (as expressed in a graffito of Cordoba, Spain: "Jesus Yes, Muslims No!"). Hostility often takes a visceral form: Günter Wallraff quotes a conversation between two middle-aged German construction workers in adjoining toilet stalls: "What smells worse than piss and shit?" "Work," replies the other. "No, a Turk," comes the retort.[21]
Dislike of alien customs. Antipathies also result from differences in race, culture, and customs. A longing for uniformity, a yearning for a society less varied, less confusing, and less challenging leads to a rejection of pluralism and a desire for "purity." Right-wing politicians incessantly talk up this theme, but mainstream figures also use it. Jacques Chirac, the Gaullist president of France, once expressed sympathy for his countrymen "driven crazy" by the "noise and smells" of immigrants.[22] His predecessor, François Mitterrand, spoke ominously of "the threshold of tolerance,"[23] a sentiment echoed by Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who used the same expression, warning that the Toleranzschwelle not be crossed.
Then there's another level altogether, the world of Saudi playboys who flaunt their money and their lasciviousness. While small in number, the fame of their antics (such shopping sprees in London or painting the genitalia on statues in Beverly Hills) inspire considerable ill-will. Typical of this was a scene in an American hotel, witnessed by a doctor: "Semi-clad women could be seen darting from room to room, giggling, followed by Saudi princes who were unshaven and dishevelled. Everyone seemed drunk to the gills."[24]
Demographic fears. Nativists put the highest priority on limiting this Muslim influx as well as reducing the millions of Muslims (especially the families accompanying the workers) already resident in Western Europe. As the number of Muslims grows, so does a sense of alarm among the majority population. The prevention of illegal immigration has become a high priority throughout the West. Two countries, Austria and Switzerland, have deployed their armies along the frontier to keep immigrants out (not all of them Muslims, of course). The Italian army backs the police in keeping out tens of thousands of desperate Albanians, who are predominantly Muslims. Since 1987 a considerable number of Middle Easterners and South Asians have entered the United States via Mexico, and the number of Muslims among the "wetbacks" seems to be increasing. Efforts of European governments notwithstanding, Muslim immigrants continue to arrive from around the world, looking for work, education, family members, or refuge.
In addition, the Muslim birthrate in the West far exceeds that of native Europeans and Americans. One-fifth of all children born in France have a father from North Africa and Muhammad is one of the most common given names in the United Kingdom. Some Westerners compare birth rates and fear being submerged. Writing in The Spectator, Charles Moore recalled T. S. Eliot's caution of "hooded hordes": "Because of our obstinate refusal to have enough babies, Western European civilisation will start to die at the point when it could have revived with new blood. Then the hooded hordes will win, and the Koran will be taught, as Gibbon famously imagined, in the schools of Oxford."[25] In perhaps the most apocalyptic version of this concern, Jean Raspail, a leading French intellectual, already in 1973 wrote The Camp of the Saints, a novel depicting the end of Western civilization due to the uncontrolled influx of Muslims from Bangladesh.[26]
This is not just the stuff of novels. "O somos todos moros, o somos todos cristianos" ("All of us are Muslims or all of us are Christians") was the motto of Spain's inquisition; skinheads have roughly the same fear, though emptied of religious content. Jean-Marie le Pen tells his followers, "I don't want the French to become like the Red Indians -- annihilated by immigration."[27]
Right-wing politics. Beginning with Enoch Powell in England in the late 1960s (who predicted "rivers of blood" should immigration continue), the Muslim presence has spurred the growth of right-wing parties in Western Europe. Often called National Fronts, these movements tend to speak the same language (warning against the Islamization of Europe) and employ the same tactics (setting fire to refugee shelters or stopping mosque construction). The membership ranges from respectable types alarmed by the influx of alien peoples to vicious skinheads and lethal neo-Nazis.
Le Pen's National Front in France is currently the most powerful nativist organization, garnering about 15 percent of the national vote; and twice that number agree with Le Pen's views on restricting the number and rights of foreigners. The United States has nothing comparable, but hints of a similar trend can be discerned. Pat Robertson, the televangelist and former presidential candidate, fulminated when Imam Wahaj Siraj of New York opened a session of the House of Representatives with a recitation from the Qur'an in late 1991. Patrick Buchanan, a two-time presidential candidate, has observed that, "For a millennium, the struggle for mankind's destiny was between Christianity and Islam; in the 21st century, it may be so again."[28]
These nativist sentiments prompt acute worries among Muslims. Jokes heard among Germans ("What is the difference between a Jew and a Turk? Well, the Jew got his lesson, the Turk has yet to get his!")[29] cause some Muslims to see themselves heading into a Holocaust of their own. Thus, Kalim Siddiqui, director of London's Muslim Institute, has spoken of "Hitler-style gas chambers for Muslims,"[30] while Shabbir Akhtar, a member of the Bradford Council of Mosques, held that "the next time there are gas chambers in Europe, there is no doubt concerning who'll be inside them."[31]
In the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, the Muslim presence ranks as probably the number-one political issue in Western Europe. In France, for example, a commentator recently noted that "immigration is at the heart of the French political debate."[32] The same applies to many other European countries.
Impact on the Home Countries
Muslims in the West have higher incomes than their relatives back home and enjoy such benefits as freedom of expression, democratic politics, and the rule of law. In brief, they live in a more modern environment than any of their co-religionists. This gives them the opportunity to evolve in new ways. The results have great importance for their countries of origin.
Economics: Remittances from migrant workers deeply affect home-country economies, as do the workers themselves when they return home with new skills.
Politics: Democracy is a rarity in the Muslim countries, but not so in the West; individuals versed in Western democracy have had a major role in the politics of Algeria, Tunisia, Turkey, and Pakistan. Voluntary associations, hardly known in the home-countries, are coming into existence under the tutelage of coreligionists in the West. Further, freedom makes the West the best place to organize politically. Umar 'Abd ar-Rahman, the Egyptian fundamentalist leader convicted of seditious conspiracy in New York, directed his movement from New Jersey. Hamas, the Palestinian group, has established its headquarters just outside Washington, D.C. Two Muslim members of parliament in Britain are campaigning for the application of Shar'i law in Pakistan.[33]
Culture: The pioneering work of leading intellectuals in the West has a powerful impact back in their countries of origin, where many of them become important figures and their work greatly influences their compatriots. Olivier Roy points out that, conversely, the brain drain to the West of intellectuals who are not Islamists, especially in the social sciences, leaves the intellectual realm in the home countries to be taken over by the Islamists."[34]
Religion: Shabbir Akhtar, a fundamentalist living in Britain, notes that "the freest Muslims live in the West and in Iran. Everywhere else, Islam is an outlawed political force."[35] The work of a diaspora thinker such as Fazlur Rahman (a Pakistani long at the University of Chicago) has great repercussions in the Muslim world, raising the strange possibility of the West's becoming the center of Islamic culture.
[1] Barry Kosmin and Seymour Lachman, One Nation Under God: Religion in Contemporary American Society (New York: Crown, 1994) reached this number after surveying 113,000 households in April 1989-April 1990. |
[2] Fawaz Turki, Exile's Return: The Making of a Palestinian American (New York: Free Press, 1994), pp. 83-84. |
[3] MBC Television (London), 14 November 1991. #114 |
[4] Al-Musawwar (Cairo), 4 December 1992. #115 |
[5] Trends, 2/2 (1988), p. 23. Quoted in Philip Lewis, Islamic Britain: Religion, Politics and Identity among British Muslims (London: I. B. Tauris, 1994), p. 192. |
[6] L'Express, March 17, 1989. 13 |
[7] Ameena Meer, "Interview: Salman Rushdie," Bomb, Spring 1989, p. 36; Far Eastern Economic Review, March 2, 1989. |
[8] The tape was made public at the murder trial in October 1991 The New York Times, 28 October 1991; for a full report, see Ellen Harris, Guarding the Secrets: Palestinian Terrorism and a Father's Murder of His Too-American Daughter (New York: Scribner, 1995), pp. 222-30. |
[9] Ulrike Neumann, "'Mein Mann ist Moslem -- na und?' -- Immer mehr deutsche Frauen heiraten einen Mann aus einem islamischen Kulturkreis," Der Neue Tag (Weiden, Germany), 19 August 1991. |
[10] Betty Mahmoody with William Hoffer, Not Without My Daughter: A True Story (New York: St. Martin's, 1987). |
[11] "Profession: voleurs d'enfants," Liberation, 6 July 1984, p. 5. |
[12] Christiane Chombeau, "L'ambassadeur d'Algerie s'explique sur les enfants des couples mixtes," Le Monde, 28 July 1984; Frederic Fritscher, "Le 'contentieux familial' franco-algerien est en voie de reglement," Le Monde, 24 December 1985; Catherine Erhel, "Gabrielle Bertrand -- la pasionaria des enfants enlevés," Liberation, 6 July 1984, p. 6. |
[13] "Muslim Doctors Take First Steps to Work for the Common Good of the Community in Britain," Crescent International, 16-30 September 1991, p. 8. |
[14] In a conversation with Khalid Durلn in Cairo, December 1978. |
[15] Curiously, this impulse was predicted by G. K. Chesterton in his 1914 novel, Flying Inn. That account has the Muslim takeover begin with the shutting of British pubs! |
[16] Spoken at a public meeting of the Ruhr Bolgesi Islam Kultur Merkezleri ("Islamic Cultural Centers of the Ruhr Region"); "Gegnern reissen wir die Zunge aus," Westdeutsche Allgemeine (Recklinghausen), 23 June 1979. |
[17] Le Monde, 4 April 1992. #47 |
[18] Michael Abramowitz, "Street Gang's 'Language' Becomes Its Albatross," The Washington Post, 25 August 1991, p. A3. Mainstream Muslims rightly doubt whether this and other groups noted here ought even to be counted as Muslim; we do so because they are routinely perceived as Muslims. |
[19] See the report published by a Belgian weekly magazine in four installments "Un dossier derangeant - les immigrés," Pourquoi Pas? (Brussels) starting 24 August 1982. |
[20] Personal communication by Boujemaa Toukad, a Moroccan social worker attached to a court for juvenile delinquents (Jugendgerichtshelfer). His findings are corroborated by the detailed and painstaking research of Michael Gebauer, "Kriminalitaet der Gastarbeiterkinder," in H.-J. Brandt & K.-P. Haase, eds., Begegnung mit Turken, Begegnung mit dem Islam; Vol. I (Hamburg: E. B. Verlag Rissen, 1982), pp. (2.12) 15-25. |
[21] Günter Wallraff, Ganz Unten (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1985), p. 42. 28 |
[22] The Economist, 29 June 1991. #119 |
[23] Howard LaFranchi, "French City Reaches Out to Immigrants," The Christian Science Monitor, 7 August 1991, p. 15. |
[24] Seymour Gray, Beyond the Veil: The Adventures of an American Doctor in Saudi Arabia (New York: Harper & Row, 1983), p. 12. |
[25] The Spectator, 19 October 1991.#117 |
[26] Jean Raspail, Le Camp des Saints (Paris: Editions Robert Laffont, 1973). |
[27] Foreign Report, 14 November 1991. #119 |
[28] Patrick Buchanan, "Global Resurgence of Islam," The Washington Times, 21 August 1989. |
[29] Michael Schwarze, "Gespenstisch und gedankenlos," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14 May 1982, p. 1. |
[30] The Independent, 3 June 1989. |
[31] The Guardian, 27 February 1989. RF 240-1 |
[32] Paul-Marie de la Gorge, "Chirac joue du tam-tam," Jeune Afrique, 3-9 July 1991. #119 |
[33] The Sunday Telegraph, 19 March 1995. #117 |
[34] Olivier Roy, L'Echec de l'Islam politique (Paris: Seuil, 1992), p. 22. |
[35] Shabbir Akhtar, Be Careful With Muhammad! The Salman Rushdie Affair (London: Bellew Publishing, 1989), p. 89. |
