CHICAGO – "Iran was a singularity." That's how a State Department official replied when I asked him if the United States might get in trouble again by aligning too closely with Anwar Sadat's government in Egypt.
 Sadat of Egypt (L) and the shah of Iran in Tehran in 1976. |
Sadat shares with the late shah:
1. Well-intentioned despotism. In a recent press conference, Sadat reacted furiously to a characterization of him as a "good-guy dictator," yet that's exactly what he is, much like the shah. These "good guys" bring in the trappings of democracy, such as political parties, parliaments and even some elections, but citizens have no say about the head of state nor about fundamental governmental policies.
2. Encouragement of big Western firms. Until 1973, Cairo was austere, then it rapidly became a playground for the rich. An already repugnant disparity between wealthy and poor Egyptians widened further with the influx of new wealth, just as happened in Iran.
3. Expectations of a better life. Staking his prestige on the oil boom, the shah lost out when Iran's revenues did not keep pace with expenditures. Sadat depends on a complex mix of oil sales, worker remittances, tourism, industrialization and peace to float the decrepit Egyptian economy. Disruption hurt the shah and may soon threaten Sadat.
4. Western alignment. Not only does Egypt side with the West against the Soviet Union, but it has closer ties with the United States than with any state in the Middle East. This unhealthy isolation creates the impression among many citizens that the leadership has sold out the country to Western interests. Good relations with Israel in each case exacerbate this concern.
5. Moslem and leftist opposition. Enemies of the regime agree on opposing despotic rule, foreign investment, pro – Western alignment, peace with Israel – though from sharply different standpoints, as their break in Iran makes clear. Nonetheless, they can cooperate long enough to evict a leader they both despise. In Iran, Moslem groups had the best organization; in Egypt, leftists stand a better chance of challenging Sadat's regime. As an authoritarian (and not totalitarian) ruler, Sadat, like the shah, permits enough political activity to take place that it might get out of control.
6. Dependence on Washington. When the crisis broke, the shah needed U.S. support and guidance and looked to the president as the final arbiter of his destiny. Sadat will do the same. His testy news conference on Sept. 9 (when he told a foreign reporter, "in other times I would have shot you") and his expulsion of U.S. and French newsmen in subsequent days resulted from nervousness over his deteriorating image in the West as a result of the crackdown.
 The Reagans and Sadats at a White House dinner in August 1981. |
Washington had a special responsibility for the shah and now for Sadat, two vulnerable friends bucking the prevailing Middle East trend toward Islam and non-alignment to stand forthrightly by the United States. We failed the shah; Sadat cannot be allowed to go down too. To help him means following a course of action nearly opposite from that taken with the shah.
It means all-out, consistent, permanent support. Should Sadat face mounting internal troubles, we should stick by him, even if that means tacit approval of repression which is anathema to ourselves: censorship, detentions, and executions; that is part of the price for being a great power and having authoritarian friends. It may be distasteful, but the United States cannot limit itself to dealing with democracies. Giving Sadat a steady endorsement will have great psychological importance both for him and his enemies.
At the same time – and this may seem to contradict the previous point, but it does not – Washington must keep its distance from Sadat and reduce the U.S. profile in Egypt: no military bases, modest arms sales, a medium – sized embassy, few factories, restrictions on advertising. So many Egyptians, activist Moslems and leftists alike, resent the U.S. presence in their country that too much visibility will probably provoke violent reactions. Unlike the shah, Sadat is a consummate politician; yet he may be permitting the United States to take on too large a role in Egypt for his good or ours.
Besides Egypt, the United States has other important non-democratic friends in the Middle East, including Morocco, the Sudan, Saudi Arabia and Oman. Each of these countries requires a carefully balanced policy of unwavering support for the regime and caution against an excessively large U.S. presence in the country. Iran was not a "singularity" but a vivid demonstration of what can go wrong elsewhere in the Middle East.
Daniel Pipes, associated with the University of Chicago, is the author of Slave Soldiers and Islam, recently published by Yale University Press.
