When President-elect Ronald Reagan takes office on Jan. 20, he probably will inherit the same problem that helped make him President – the hostage crisis, Jimmy Carter's curse and obsession.
If they are not released soon, the fate of the 52 Americans held captive in Iran since Nov, 4, 1979, will become Reagan's to ponder. It will be the new President's top concern, if not his obsession. Reagan may wish first to tinker with the economy, dismantle the Department of Education, lower taxes or fire the entire Latin American diplomatic staff – but the whole world will watch what he does about the hostages.
In the 14 months since Iranians seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, Americans have been reminded almost daily of the hostages' painful captivity. With time, the humiliation grows more profound; Americans' emotions run high and deep, and they cannot be ignored. The continuing war between Iraq and Iran with its constant threat to oil supply lines and political stability in Iran is also a factor that can't be ignored. Overshadowing these, the Soviet Union looms large from neighboring Afghanistan and across its long border with Iran.
Despite the patient hard work of President Carter and the Algerian intermediaries, Iran's leaders show little eagerness to release the hostages. And, if the Iranians continue to do nothing, neither should Reagan. A broad consensus exists in the Reagan camp that short of abjectly conceding everything to Iran, the United States is powerless to bring about the safe release of the hostages. The Carter Administration has done everything possible: It mobilized world opinion against Iran, pressured U.S. allies for help, mounted an armed rescue mission and engaged in negotiations. So far, all have failed.
The new Administration should de-emphasize the hostage crisis by breaking off negotiations. This would lead to a lowering of American passions on the subject (as happened already during the summer of 1980) and would diminish the value of the hostages to their captors. "Benign neglect" would reduce the power Iran's leaders can wield over Washington. If the Reagan Administration can demonstrate patience, then Tehran would not be able to manipulate the United States so easily.
Terminating negotiations for the hostages also would indicate to Iran and the world that the Reagan Administration does not deal with terrorists, even when they control a government. This much is relatively simple. Ignoring the hostages leaves it up to the Iranians to take the next step. Should they release the Americans, the problem ends there. But if they move in the other direction and either threaten to put the hostages on trial or to harm them physically, other problems arise.
In theory, the United States could ignore such provocations; but the anger of American citizens surely would demand some retribution. Also, if the United States is to preserve its credibility as a great power, it must do something.
What? The United States is constrained in two ways: First, indiscriminate destruction of property or killing of Iranians runs counter to America's moral tradition. Washington cannot simply "nuke 'em" or "bomb them back to the Stone Age." Similarly, Iranians who are now in the United States must not be harmed, for that would violate American law. However high passions against Iran run, the Reagan Administration must not violate national standards of morality and legality in a fit of rage, no matter how justifiable.
Second, Reagan must not seek to undermine the Iranian government's military power. Khomeini's followers currently are engaged in a war with Iraq, in fighting regional separatist movements and in suppressing leftist groups. No matter how Americans feel about the current leaders of Iran, it is in the United States interest to have the country become a strong and stable state. If Washington tries to smash its power, the way is opened for the regime in Baghdad to consolidate its hold over Iran's Khuzistan province and possibly to conquer other regions of Iran. Kurdish and other ethnic rebels might be able to set up autonomous regions, some of them possibly under Soviet influence. Iranian leftists, until now in retreat, might emerge to claim the prize that eluded them when the shah fled the country. And as Iran splinters, the Soviet Union certainly would exploit new opportunities to meddle.
What can the United States do to strike back at Iran's government without harming innocent persons or undercutting its military potential? Several imperfect options present themselves:
For the long term, the United States can squeeze Iran economically, persuade U.S. allies to cut off trade, implement a naval blockade, mine Iran's ports and stop the smuggling or goods into Iran from the United Arab Emirates. Economic pressure probably would not affect Iran's military capabilities, for the government first would reduce supplies to civilians in order to maintain its military strength.
This would create new hardships for an already embattled Iranian population, following on the steep economic decline caused by the drop in oil production, the embargo and the war on Iraq. Eventually, the Iranian population will resist further economic suffering. At that point the leaders in Tehran will have a choice: Either to release the Americans or to face massive domestic discontent. If Washington applies pressure carefully, Iran may release the hostages in a few months to a year.
Or it may not. The Iranians' response to war with Iraq has been implacable; whatever it docs, the Reagan Administration may confront the same determination. Thus, the new President may want to consider a more forceful response – direct military action.
Here two targets present themselves: Khuzistan province and the Iranian leaders themselves. Although attacking either involves a distasteful and risky military operation, both would show the Reagan Administration's firmness.
Khuzistan contains most of Iran's oil wealth and it lies along the Persian Gulf; the U.S. Navy can seize this province from Iran and hold it ransom until America's diplomats are let free. America would then control the one major Iranian economic asset – oil. Of course, the fact that the Iraqis already have invaded Khuzistan, vastly complicates the situation.
Alternatively, the United States could attempt to seize and hold officials of the Iranian government, members of its parliament or even leading mullahs. Such a step might be accomplished by clandestine means or through a surprise military raid. Once Washington had Iranian leaders safely away, it would be in position to negotiate an exchange for its own diplomats.
Unlike the Carter Administration, however, the incoming Reagan government bears no responsibility for the hostages' plight. Thus, a Reagan White House can afford to do the prudent thing – nothing. But that luxury will persist inly so long as the Iranians refrain from publicly tormenting or harming the hostages.
If the Iranians stage show trials of the captive or harm them in any way, Reagan probably would be forced to choose one or more of his unpalatable military options. Neither Washington nor Tehran could foresee or full control the consequences of such a step.
President-elect Reagan has had the misfortune of inheriting one of the most uncontrollable and dangerous foreign-policy problems in recent memory. And, like his predecessor, he will discover that his response is just as likely to be shaped in Tehran as it is in the Oval Office.
Daniel Pipes is a historian at the University of Chicago. Amos Perlmutter, a professor of political science and sociology at American University, edits the Journal of Strategic Studies.
