The United States has consistently pursued policies fostering improved relations among the peoples of the Middle East while the U.S.S.R. has done its best to impede every American effort at reconciliation. The focus of U.S. initiatives – the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Lebanese crisis – are also the focus of Soviet opposition.
The Arab-Israeli Conflict
All six actors directly involved in the Arab-Israeli dispute – Israel, its four neighbors, and the PLO – have, to one degree or other, demonstrated a willingness to settle their differences through diplomatic means. Every indication of peaceful intent by the Arabs has been quickly encouraged by the U.S. and opposed by the Soviet Union. This pattern is striking and consistent.
Israel. The U.S. has always held that when conditions are suitable, Arab lands held by Israel must by relinquished. Toward this end, it has urged Israel to take chances for the sake of a peaceful settlement. Acknowledging that Israel must give up concrete assets (land) for abstract assurances (promises of peaceful intent), the U. S. has stood by Israel, vouching for its security and reassuring it that concessions will not be abused. Israeli courage aided by U.S. mediation has been the basis of every agreement for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Arab territories.
As long ago as 1957, Israel unconditionally returned the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip to Egypt because President Eisenhower strongly pressured it to do so. After the October 1973 war, diplomatic efforts by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger culminated in the Sinai I and Sinai II agreements; the latter, in September 1975, led to the evacuation of Israeli troops from western portions of the Sinai.
Egypt. Anwar al-Sadat's journey to Jerusalem in November 1977, which signaled the end of Egypt's armed conflict with Israel, was rewarded by the U.S. with strengthened ties and additional aid. Then, when the initial enthusiasm created by Sadat's act waned, Washington prodded Egypt and Israel to continue talking. Not only did Americans play a critical role in keeping negotiations alive, but they arranged many of the discussions that made a final agreement possible, including thirteen days of meetings in September 1978 at the U.S. presidential retreat at Camp David. Fittingly, when an Egypt-Israel peace treaty was signed in March 1979, the ceremony took place on the lawn of the White House, with the U.S. government a full-fledged signatory. The American government followed this up with billions of dollars in aid for each of the two countries to facilitate their implementation of the treaty. In all history, a third party has probably never played so direct a role in aiding agreement between two other states as the United States did in the case of Egypt and Israel.
The Soviet Union vehemently rejected the Camp David accords and the peace treaty, claiming, illogically, that these harmed the chances of a Middle East settlement. Accordingly, Soviet clients in the Middle East worked to isolate Egypt and make it pay maximally for daring to end its state of war with Israel. Close Syrian ties to the Soviet Union notwithstanding, when Hafiz al-Asad wanted Israeli troops near Damascus to withdraw, he asked the United States for help. Shuttle diplomacy conducted by Secretary of State Kissinger led in June 1974 to the evacuation of Israeli troops from their forward positions. The good offices of the United States are open to everyone, even allies of the Soviet Union.
Lebanon. More recently, another U.S. secretary of state, George P. Shultz, has been engaged in shuttle diplomacy, again with the goal of Arab-Israeli peace. Mr. Shultz devoted fifteen days in April and May 1983 to travel in the Middle East to nail down an agreement for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon. The Soviet government's reaction – condemnation – was predictable, for it invariably opposes improved relations between Arabs and Israelis. Moscow also encouraged Syria to pursue a vitriolic policy. Syria rejected the accords out of hand, insisting that Lebanon's duty as an Arab country requires it to fight Israel.
Jordan. With regard to Jordan, King Hussein finds himself caught up by Soviet pressure. He would like to negotiate with Israel over the future of the West Bank on the basis of President Reagan's initiative of September 1982. But he holds back, fearful of entering into peace negotiations against the wishes of the Soviet Union and its Middle East proxies, Syria in particular. It has been made clear to Hussein that should he participate in American-sponsored talks, he will become a target of assassination.
The PLO. Similar Soviet pressure discourages the PLO from trying negotiations. While the U.S. urges it to abandon terrorism, to recognize Israel, and to enter into the Camp David peace process, the Soviet Union prefers it to maintain the old methods of violence and extremist rhetoric. The result has been deep division within the PLO. Should it continue to try to destroy Israel by force or opt instead for a diplomatic settlement? Put in other terms, should it depend on Soviet weapons or American mediation? When Arafat – without ever denouncing violent methods – showed interest in the Reagan Initiative, the Soviet Union and Syria turned against him, organizing a rebel PLO faction in May 1983 which sought to depose him as head of the PLO, and may yet succeed.
Further Arab states. Arab governments not bordering on Israel also felt a two-way tug. Their increasing willingness to live in peace with Israel was encouraged by the U.S. and opposed by the U.S.S.R. Washington pressured Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states to use their economic leverage in favor of the Arab states willing to coexist peacefully with Israel and it rewarded those Arab states such as Oman. the Sudan, Tunisia, and Morocco, that favored the peace process. The Soviet Union always pursued contrary goals, using its Arab allies to hinder the development of peaceful relations.
Conclusion. The record shows the United States, often in the person of the secretary of state or the president, often provided the boost needed to make the mediation successful every time Israel has agreed to withdraw from an Arab territory. This was the case with Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon, and it will probably also hold true some day with Jordan. The U.S. has been so eager to push the process forward, it has invented new forms of diplomacy: the mediator who flies from one capital to another (shuttle diplomacy), the isolation of heads of state in a rural retreat (the Camp David meeting), and the payment of subsidies to the signatories of a peace treaty (Egypt and Israel from 1979 onward).
The Soviet role has, to the contrary, been unremittingly negative. It carped at every agreement, threatened any Arab contemplating peace with Israel, and punished anyone who did in fact do so. Further, the U.S.S.R. has vetoed every effort to involve the United Nations in Arab-Israeli negotiations or to use U.N. forces to patrol delicate boundaries after agreement has been reached.
The Lebanese Crisis
The same pattern applies in Lebanon. Since civil war broke out there in 1975, the United States has been involved in nearly every effort at conciliation, while the Soviet Union has done its best to perpetuate the carnage. In the past two and a half years the contrast has been especially stark.
It was an American envoy, Philip Habib, who arranged a truce between the PLO and Israel in July 1981. A year later, Mr. Habib was active to end the siege of Beirut and his efforts paid off in August 1982 when the PLO agreed to evacuate the city. To guarantee their safe passage, the United States and two of its allies, France and Italy, provided several thousand troops on the ground in Beirut. These left Lebanon seventeen days later, on September 10, 1982, their mandate fulfilled. They returned later in September, responding to the massacres at Sabra and Shatila, with the mission of preventing further disruptions.
Following the tumultuous events of August and September 1982, the U.S. formulated a long-term policy to bring peace to Lebanon. It contained two critical provisions: the withdrawal of all foreign forces and the extension of government power to the entire country. The U.S. then took active steps to attain each of these objectives. To begin the process of troop withdrawal, Washington pressured Israel to reach an agreement with the Lebanese government; this was, as we have seen, signed in May 1983. To extend the control of the central government in Beirut, the U.S. convinced President Amin Gemayel to offer a place to all political communities and parties in Lebanon. These efforts eventually led to the talks on national reconciliation that opened in Geneva in October 1983.
As elsewhere, the Soviet Union and its allies have done everything to prevent peaceful relations in Lebanon. With Soviet support, the Syrian government has stymied both American goals in the country. Rather than withdraw its troops from Lebanon, Syria has increased their number and fortified them more heavily, perhaps with the intent of permanently occupying the 60 percent of Lebanese territory it now controls. Soviet approval of this policy is made clear by the presence of Soviet advisors in Lebanon (whose presence is not officially admitted but who have been frequently sighted). Syria has also done its best to undermine the expansion of government power by urging the anti- government forces to derecognize the government in Beirut and set up their own state under Syrian tutelage. Here too, the U.S.S.R. has fully backed Syria.
In conclusion, the U.S. government has spared no effort in the search for a Middle East peace. Regardless of pious words by Soviet leaders about building peace in the Middle East, their record shows harsh discouragement of every concrete effort toward this end.
Mr. Pipes is an instructor in history at Harvard University.
