The retreat of the Arab states from the conflict with Israel, leaving central stage to the Palestinians, has four main causes: ideological, economic, political and structural.
Ideological problems stem in part from the powerful brew of ideas and plans concocted in the post-World War II era and as late as 1970. These were the years of raging anti-imperialism, anti-Zionism, Arab socialism, and the Third Way. However crude and ill-conceived, there can be no doubt of the vitality and ambition of the early governments. Among Muslims, only Turks, with their long tradition of sovereign politics, did not give in to the euphoria of creating a new man. Those who lived through the Six-Day War of 1967 cannot forget the shrill histrionics of the Arab leaders; and anyone who reviews the rhetorical edge of that era will be astonished by the optimism that underlay public life.
In subsequent years, this gave way to a sense of limitations. The wild rhetoric vanished, replaced by sobriety and bitter realism. In part, this had to do with repeated military failures against Israel. More profoundly, it reflected a grievous disappointment about the course of modern history. As Arabs looked around, they saw social inequity, intellectual backwardness, and economic failure. The optimism that undergirded the earlier era disappeared, replaced by bitter disillusion. Limitations replaced hope; mordant introspection took the place of exuberant ambitions. Governments paid less attention to international politics and more to domestic concerns; Israel receded as a priority.
Economic difficulties attendant on the 1970s oil boom confirmed this change. The boom, which lasted 1970-80, brought heady, exhilarating times to the Middle East. Past mistakes appeared to have been swept away as a bright future beckoned. The oil boom brought much of the region growth rates of 20, 40, and even 50 percent a year. Oil producers led the way, of course, but countries like Egypt and Jordan whose populations serviced the producers also benefited. The money brought not just political muscle, military power, but something deeper: a sense that the trauma of modernization had been finessed. For a few glorious years, it seemed that oil would solve the region's problems – even Zionism. Indeed, the only Middle Eastern country entirely excluded from the bonanza was Israel.
But intoxication brings hangover, and the spree in the 1970s brought on punishing 1980s. Just as the boom blessed virtually the whole region, the bust afflicted nearly everyone other than Israel. The Lebanese, who maintained a startlingly high economic standard of living through the first decade of the civil war, experienced poverty and even hunger. And while the bust revealed the strength of existing institutions, it undid earlier gains. The consequences of the decline can be traced with almost graph-like precision, from the price of Islamic art in London auction houses to the interest of African states in diplomatic relations with Israel. It made the Arab states distinctly less focused on the conflict with Israel, as symbolized by Anwar al-Sadat's 1977 trip to Jerusalem.
Political problems have to do with a re-orientation toward Iran. For most states, anti-Zionism was a luxury -- something to promote when the time was right, and to put aside when not. The Iraqi attack on Iran in September 1979 opened problems with an urgency far surpassing that of Palestinians and Israel. The more the Iraq-Iran war pressed, the less attention was paid to anti-Zionism. When the war finally wound down, attention redirected to Israel, but no longer with the earlier determination or bravado.
As the high tide of state involvement receded, it left something much smaller in its wake; those Arabs with a personal stake in the outcome of the conflict with Israel: Palestinians. The origins of this changing of the guard go back as far as 1967, when the three states crushed by Israel encouraged the Palestinians to take up the fight in their stead. But state interest continued strong for another fifteen years; acknowledgment of the Palestinians' place was more symbolic than real.
Structural differences between states and non-state actors added a final element. States conflicts are more tractable than communal ones. Governments being hierarchical structures – and this is especially true of the Middle East's many authoritarian regimes – changes often depend on convincing a single person (like Hafiz al-Assad). Eliminating just one person (like Bashir Gemayel) can radically change circumstances. In contrast, communities like the Palestinians consist of many-headed and elusive networks where opinions shift slowly and no individual disposes of much power.
Further, states compromise more readily than do individuals. While the multiple interests of rulers make it difficult for them long to maintain a consistent policy, individuals can do so indefinitely. Egyptian officials tend to care less about making Jerusalem the capital of Palestine than installing functioning utilities in Cairo. Likewise, Jordanian generals feel less passionately about Israeli control of Nablus than do the inhabitants of that city.
Mr. Pipes is director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute.
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