Select questions & answers, edited.
Question: How do you see Erdoğan's influence in some of the former Eastern Bloc countries and how can the U.S. government mitigate his attempts to increase his influence there?
Answer: For our purposes, the former Warsaw Bloc countries divide in two: the Turkic republics of the former Soviet Union and the former Ottoman provinces in the Balkans. Turkey has sentimental and cultural bonds with the former, while it once ruled the latter.
Thirty years ago, as the Soviet Union collapsed, it appeared that the Turkic republics (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan), would look to Turkey for leadership. But they did not, except to limited extent in Azerbaijan. The ties are not close, the economic relations are not deep
In contrast, few observers back then looked at Balkan countries like Albania, Montenegro, and Bosnia as targets for heavy Turkish engagement. But since coming to power in 2003, Erdoğan has devoted great attention to them. He has a neo-Ottoman view of the world, meaning that he would like not political and military control, but great influence, over these former possessions. As they are small and poor countries, Turkey can exert an impressive impact.
Ankara's efforts has been varied, such as establishing a Muslim Turkish political party in Bulgaria or building large mosques in Northern Macedonia. The Turks spent a lot of money and have had some success. But in the end, I expect considerable pushback, for few in the Balkans wish to live under Erdoğan's thumb.
In this regard, I note that the Turkish-ruled area of Cyprus, now under Ankara's control for 45 years, voted in a leader, Mustafa Akinci, who is vocally critical anti-Erdoğan. If northern Cyprus resists Erdoğan, that suggests the Balkans will do so as well.
So, Turkish efforts in both Central Asia nor the Balkans have been a disappointment.
Question: Could the push to make Turkey a Muslim stronghold be Erdoğan's undoing?
Answer: Perhaps. Despite all the mosques, the Imam-Hatip religious schools, the heavy emphasis on Islamic mores, the reduction of alcohol, the pressure for many children, religiosity in Turkey has declined in recent years. Many people are saying, "If this is Islam, I'm not sure I want it."
But in other ways, Erdoğan has been successful. He has brought about a cultural shift that's comparable to what Atatürk achieved. Ataturk pushed secularism in the fifteen years 1923-38; Erdoğan pushed nationalism in seventeen years, 2002-19. Turks have become conspiratorial minded, suspicious of foreigners, and culturally chauvinistic.
In this sense, the AKP's coalition with the MHP, the arch-nationalist party of Turkey, makes great sense. The MHP represents the greater cultural force, today in Turkey. From an American point of view, the nationalist project is no less hostile than the Islamist one. Erdoğan may have lost voters, but their attitudes toward the West remain hostile. All signs suggest the country continues to undergo changes unfavorable to the United States.
