The strangest trip of Bill Clinton's presidency begins on Sunday, when he takes off for Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Why is the U.S. president making four trips to tiny Israel, more than to any other foreign country? And why does he visit the Palestinians, perhaps the most rabidly anti-American population in the world? With problems looming around the globe — possible war with North Korea, Iraq bursting out of its restraints, financial crisis in Russia — why does Mr. Clinton choose to spend time in Gaza?
Because the U.S. government, along with much of the world, believes the Arab-Israeli conflict is the key to fixing the Middle East. Saddam Hussein threatening? Lance the boil of Arab antagonism to Israel and the Iraqi tyrant no longer can rally the Arab "street." Fundamentalist Islam surging? Same remedy — which also works for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, oil supply routes in danger, and terrorism. Resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict and they will diminish or disappear from your agenda.
If only it were so. In fact, the Arab-Israeli conflict is just one of many deep problems wracking the Middle East and even its perfect solution would hardly affect the others. The region's economies would continue to decline, the many border conflicts would go on unabated, political radicalism would remain strong.
We should put aside the happy but misguided notion that a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict will create, in the phrase of Shimon Peres, Israel's former prime minister, a "new Middle East" where prosperity cools all passions and commerce replaces conflict Rather than dwell on this unattainable dream, let us deal with realities.
There is a new Middle East. Only, it is not the one envisioned by the post-Cold War, post-Oslo utopians. It is far more complicated than that, and far more perilous. The real "new Middle East" is a region in which arsenals are growing while income shrinks; where Arab intransigence toward Israel is hardening and fundamentalist Islam gaining ground; and where new rogue regimes — the Palestinian Authority, Sudan, Afghanistan — are being added to the old ones.
There is also a profound change taking place, mostly out of our sight, one that sees the formation of two blocs, one friendly to the West and the other generally not. In a world no longer dominated by the rivalry of the United States and the Soviet Union, the Middle East is rapidly sorting itself into two new regional power blocs. The formation of these blocs, or teams, is a development with profound implications for the region, and the entire post-Cold War world.
At the centre of one bloc stand Turkey and Israel, natural partners. Both are non-Arab, democratic, and Western-oriented. Each maintains a large military and faces a major threat of terrorism. And each has problems with Syria and Iran, the two countries that stand at the centre of the opposing bloc.
Ever since Ayatollah Khomeini came to power in Tehran in 1979, Damascus and Tehran have been each other's closest allies, for the simple reason that they have a host of adversaries in common. For both, the U.S. is an imperialist power that seeks to dominate the Middle East, despoil its natural resources, enslave its people, and repress its indigenous culture. For both, Israel, the "Zionist entity" is a stand-in for the U.S. on a more local and, if anything, more threatening level. For both, Turkey is the NATO member on their border that represents both an irritant and a constant challenge. In other words, in the time-honoured fashion of the Middle East, states are working with the enemy of their enemy.
If the core of each bloc is made up of a pair of countries, surrounding them are large, loose networks of teammates. Within the Middle East itself, Turkey and Israel count first and foremost on Jordan. Other potential members of this team include Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. On the opposing side, Syria and Iran can count on a numerically larger group of regional teammates. Greece occupies a position of importance analogous to that of Jordan on the other side; in addition, Greek Cyprus, the Palestinian Authority, and the Muslims of Lebanon all weigh in on the Syria-Iran side. Relations are improving with Iraq, and the same holds true of Libya and Sudan.
Perhaps most impressive is how far these networks extend beyond the Middle East. The ancient logic of 'my enemy's enemy is my friend" has helped to bring about some peculiar groupings of far-flung teammates. In the Caucasus, Azerbaijan, and Georgia line up with Turkey, Armenia with Iran. In the Balkans, Macedonia, Bosnia, Slovenia, and Croatia tend toward Turkey's side, Serbia toward Greece and therefore Syria-Iran. Then there is Central Asia, where Kazakstan, Kirgizia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan side with Turkey, Tajikistan with Iran, while Russia backs Syria-Iran.
Finally, in South Asia, Israel's long-term quest for better ties with India has been meeting with greater success now that that country is under Hindu-nationalist management. Pakistan, meanwhile, sides with Syria-Iran, although the tie has frayed because of the Taliban of Afghanistan, who are at once clients of Pakistan and sworn enemies of Iran. To varying degrees, Pakistan has also brought along Burma and Sri Lanka, which are seeking to offset Indian power. China allies with Pakistan to check India, which objectively puts it, too, with Syria-Iran.
Needless to say, all these connections are subject to the shifting tides of convenience and tactical advantage. What is impressive, nevertheless, is the extent to which the logic of "my enemy's enemy" can override even such powerful factors as shared religion or ideology. Thus, the fundamentalist Islamic Republic of Iran supports Christian Armenians and Christian Greek Cypriots against the Muslim Turks of Azerbaijan and Cyprus, while Christian Greek democrats find allies among Muslim Kurdish terrorists. Thus, the secularist and Arab nationalist Baathists of Syria have worked with Shiite Iran against their fellow Baathists in Iraq. And thus Israeli Jews and Christian Armenians, two seemingly natural allies with parallel histories and values, find themselves agreeing on almost nothing because the former side with Turkey and the latter against it.
Welcome as is the emergence of the Turkish-Israeli connection and its further extensions, the one truly promising development in the region, the future remains fraught with menace. The very growth of the two teams means that war, should it break out, can now spread faster and farther as local crises intermesh and stakes are raised all along the line. When conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan erupted in 1988, it was isolated, involving no neighbouring countries; that is no longer the case. The Cyprus problem had long had few repercussions; now it could be the match that lights the fuse on the tinderbox.
That is where the West comes in. Washington officially supports and encourages the Turkish-Israeli bond, but there is no blinking the fact that in some quarters pro-Western states working together is met with coolness. Thus, according to a Washington Post editorial that almost sounds as if it could have been written in Damascus, the trouble with Turkish-Israeli ties is that they may "reduce Israelis' perceived need to negotiate settlements inside that perimeter with the Palestinians and Syria."
At last, and through no doing of our own, we have been presented with a collection of genuinely co-operative partners in a part of the world where our like-minded friends, however stalwart, have been alarmingly few. The question still waiting to be answered is whether we have the wit, the far-sightedness, and the courage to seize the opportunity before us and, instead of hindering or standing aside, help these partners withstand their enemies and fashion a future they and we can live in.
Daniel Pipes is the editor of the Middle East Quarterly and the author of Conspiracy: How the Paranoid Style Flourishes, and Where It Comes From.
