My assignment is to discuss peacemaking in the Middle East as it concerns the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Iraq-Iran war.
My thesis is simple. If you look back over six years of American policy with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Iraq-Iran war, in the first case we went from bad to good and in the second case we went from good to bad.
The Arab-Israeli Conflict
The watershed in the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict was about four years ago, the spring of 1983. Before that spring, our global and regional policies had been at odds with one another. From the global point of view, we looked to Israel as an ally, because of all the Middle East states, Israel is the most capable and willing to help the United States in its global confrontation with the Soviet Union. Regionally, however, we looked to Saudi Arabia. The trouble is Saudi Arabia and Israel have very few interests in common. Indeed, they disagree on almost everything.
Because of the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Israel, our global and regional policies were in constant conflict. In the first two years of the Reagan administration, this conflict time and again obstructed American policy. There was the battle over the sale of AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia in 1981 and the battle over U.S. policy towards the Israel incursion into Lebanon in 1982. The Reagan Plan of September 1982, in its timing and presentation, was clearly designed for a Saudi audience but went against Israeli interests. Our approach to Syria - whether it should be tough, as the Israelis advocate, or soft, as the Saudis want - was a constant source of problems. So was the issue of whether the United States should be pushing itself into peacemaking. Finally, there was U.S. policy toward the PLO: should we accommodate it and try to bring it into the political process, or treat it as a terrorist group?
In all of these cases, Israeli and Saudi views clashed, and the result was discord within the administration and a basically ineffectual policy. The consequences were especially unfortunate in the aftermath of the 1982 Lebanon war. In September of 1982 the United States was in a uniquely strong position. Our side had won a major battle. The other side had lost. Yet the gains of that were frittered away because of disagreement within the administration over the proper course of American policy.
All that changed, however, in the spring of 1983. The global policy continued to emphasize Israel, but the regional policy turned toward Israel as well, so that from 1983 to the present there has been an essential harmony.
This was due in part to disappointment with Saudi Arabia. The Saudis promised a whole variety of benefits that they never delivered. They were not helpful with regard to Syria. They did not come up with a plan the Arabs could agree on that would have been useful for us, and they did not help to revive the agreement that we had brokered between Israel and Lebanon.
Furthermore, Saudi power declined in the wake of the oil glut. The Saudis no longer had the revenues that had made them something of a worldwide power. Because they were more concerned with the threat of Iran, their ambitions were reined in and they became much more of a local power.
The consequences of our turn from Saudi Arabia to Israel have been beneficial; we have gained by having a unified policy. We have enhanced strategic cooperation with Israel, which supports an American military presence in the region. We are no longer tempted to appease the PLO because we no longer have the Saudis pushing us in that direction. We are less eager to push our views on participants in the Middle East and more ready to listen to them and wait for them to take the initiative. In fact, I think the last four years have been one of the great periods of American policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Many will complain, particularly in Washington, that we have not got new peace agreements. That is true, but beside the point. Having new peace agreements is the wrong criterion. The right criterion is whether American interests in the Middle East are secure.
By that criterion, the U.S. is better off than it has been in many years. The Soviet Union has not made new inroads. The U.S. has better relations with most of the states of the area, from Algeria to Israel to Iraq, than it has had in many years. We have effective strategic cooperation with Morocco, Egypt, Oman, Saudi Arabia and Israel. The Egypt-Israel peace, though cold, is in place. The Jordan-Israel relationship is good, for the two states need each other and cooperate more than ever on the West Bank. The Israeli economy has been turned around. The longtime preoccupation of the United States with the PLO has, at least for the time being, come to an end, which reduces the importance of the PLO. In all, I have cheerful news to report on the Arab-Israeli conflict.
The Iran-Iraq War
On the Iran-Iraq war, the news is not so cheerful. Here, the change occurred in late 1984, when our policy went from good to bad. Before late 1984, the United States had maintained a position of essential neutrality toward the war, with a tilt toward whichever side was losing. When Iran was on the defensive during the first months of fighting, we tilted toward it. When Iraq was subsequently on the defensive, we tilted toward it. The correct, though dismal, rationale was that we should help the losing side out of concern that neither side should emerge victorious. This policy recognized the weakness of the American hand, the antagonism of both sides towards the United States, and our interest in returning as much as possible to the status quo ante.
It was a modest policy. It was, in fact, a fundamentally un-American policy, for not getting involved, standing there and not doing anything, just watching, goes against our instincts. Eventually, indeed, this proved to be too much of a challenge for the United States. We had to get involved. When we did get involved, we tilted mightily toward Iran.
There were many reasons for this shift. The first has to do with the president of the United States, [Ronald Reagan,] an elderly and emotional man who is insulated from the outside world. He meets heads of state, other leaders, and his aides, but he does not meet average Americans. The only average Americans he has talked to in the last few years have been the families of hostages. Their presence in his office, their eloquent and moving appeals to his humanity, clearly had an effect on him. We know the president looks at problems in a personal way. And while we don't know what he ordered, it is pretty clear that he asked his aides to take care of the hostages in Lebanon, and they tried to do so.
The second factor in our tilt toward Iran was the assumption in policymaking circles that the Iranians will one day wake up to the big bear on their northern border, ask us for help, and in some fashion restore the old relationship we had with the Shah. It is a faulty premise. One cannot make policy on the flimsy expectation that things will change. Nonetheless, the idea that Iran will one day look again to the U.S. is a deep and abiding assumption among Americans who think about this region.
Thirdly, and perhaps connected to the second point, there is an emotional connection to Iran. It is odd and indeed ironic that whereas the vast majority of Americans feel a deep antagonism towards Iran, those who make policy and who work on Iran have an abiding affection for it, not for the government of the Ayatollah, to be sure, but for the culture of Iran, the people of Iran, and the civilization of Iran. They feel this way because they once had military or intelligence contacts there or because they sold arms there or because they are married to Iranians or because they are Iranians themselves. For all these reasons, there are emotional connections to Iran which have overridden the political antipathy toward the country and led to a hope that relations could be improved.
A fourth reason for the U.S. tilt toward Iran is the Israeli connection, which parallels the American connection in both the second and third points. The fact that the Israelis have old ties to Iran, have prospered with Iran, have hopes that Iran will once again turn to them, led them to draw some of the same conclusions that American analysts did. Because the Israeli view of the Middle East is so highly respected, American policymakers took Israeli views as an important confirmation of their own.
The tilt toward Iran has been, in a word, disastrous. It is one more blow against the United States' reputation for probity and consistency. It has sown confusion and ambivalence among friendly states in the Middle East. It has diminished Israel's stature in the United States. It has opened opportunities for the Soviet Union in the Persian Gulf region. But worst of all, it has helped the aggressor in the Iran-Iraq war. We have given arms to the side that is winning and to the side that is viciously and permanently anti-American. We have made it more possible for the Iranians to defeat Iraq and thereby to overturn the whole political order of the Middle East.
In addition to giving Teheran military aid, we have given it political aid. We have signalled the world that we think Iran is going to win and we are going to appease it. Others, following our lead, have done the same. We have also helped Iran economically, because the arms we have given have allowed the Iranians to protect their oil industry, and this has allowed them to generate the funds to purchase more arms.
Such have been the international consequences of the U.S. tilt toward Iran. The domestic consequences have been no less serious. The Iran arms scandal has shown the paucity of ideas and the unclear purpose of the Reagan administration; it has wrecked the rather fragile record of success that the administration could point to; and it has created a much more open contest not only for the presidency in 1988 but for the whole future of American foreign policy.
Select Discussion
[For the full discussion, see the attachment.]
Arnaud De Borchgrave: I want to ask the two panelists whether they agree with the proposition that we are not going to see any solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict - in terms of a solution to the Palestinian question - until the Hashemite dynasty disappears on the East Bank and Jordan becomes de facto a Palestinian state.
Daniel Pipes: I think it would be a great mistake to work for that because the Hashemite kingdom has a long history, more than 60 years, of being pro-British, pro-American, pro-Zionist, or pro-Israeli. The Palestinian movement has for 60 years had a history of being anti-British, anti-American, anti-Zionist, and anti-Israeli. There is every reason to expect that pattern to maintain itself, and therefore it is in our interest to see the kingdom remain in place.
Whether the Hashemite dynasty's removal would affect much is a second question. I doubt it. The Arab-Israeli conflict today boils down essentially to a Syrian-Israeli conflict. That is to say, the Syrian president is in a position to make the key decisions of war and peace. Consider the following contrast: Were Yasser Arafat to come to the table with the Israelis, reach an agreement with them, and become ruler of the West Bank, or retire to his family estate and tend his orchard, I contend very little would change. The missiles would still face each other and the conflict would continue. However, were Hafez al-Assad, the president of Syria, to make a deal with the Israelis, exchanging peace for the Golan Heights, the Jordanian kingdom would immediately follow suit. Others would as well, and the Arab-Israeli conflict would come to an end. To be sure, residual discontented elements would remain, but those would be domestic problems for Jordan and Israel.
Arnaud De Borchgrave: You are assuming that President Assad would like to see a swap of territory for peace, that he would like to get the Golan Heights back. My proposition is precisely the opposite. He would like the Israeli occupation to continue because it enables him to keep his own country fully mobilized and his own minority regime in power.
Daniel Pipes: I entirely agree with you. I did not mean to suggest that the Syrians will make peace. I meant to suggest that the Syrians are the ones who have the power to make peace or war.
Let me give you an analogy. The United States has a long history of seeking arms-control agreements. Now, from one point of view it would make more sense to seek an arms-control agreement with Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs are more friendly toward us than the Soviets and they are much more susceptible to American influence. However, the Yugoslavs can't make decisions about nuclear arms. Therefore, for better or worse, we can only look to the Soviet Union for an agreement.
The same applies in the Middle East. Looking to the Hashemite kingdom or to the PLO or to the local Palestinians is inherently futile. They cannot make the key decisions. I am not saying that turning to Syria will produce results, nor am I saying that we should appease Assad. I am simply saying, keep your eye on the main actor, which is Syria.
Burton Leiser: I would like to ask both commentators to expand on their perceptions of the Soviet role in the Arab-Israeli conflict: first, on whether the Soviet Union might resume relations with Israel; and secondly, on the Soviets' role in the recent PLO conference. My own impression is that under the. cover of trying to bring about a unification of the PLO, what the Soviets did was extract concessions from the so-called moderate wing of the PLO - those who are only bad and not unmitigatedly evil - in order to bring the most extreme factions back into the organization.
Daniel Pipes: The Soviets' position has to be understood in the context of what they have to offer the parties of the Middle East in contrast to what we have to offer. We have arms and we have a great deal of influence over Israel. As Egypt, Jordan, and other Arab states forego armed conflict with Israel, they turn to the U.S. They move away from the USSR, which can only offer arms. The Soviet leaders are trying to get out of this predicament by gaining a diplomatic role, and this means they have to court Israel. Ironically, the Israelis realize this full well, and as the Soviets approach them, the Israelis are becoming skittish. Indeed, the situation could arise in which it is the Israelis who refuse diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.
So far as the PLO meeting is concerned, I agree entirely with both your assessment and Robert Tucker's. It must be remembered that the Syrians are interested in turning the PLO into an arm of the Syrian foreign ministry. They would like to submerge PLO claims to Palestine to their own claim to Palestine.
Don Avery: I detected one element of disagreement between the two speakers on the significance of the Iran initiative. Was it a profound tragedy, as Daniel Pipes seems to suggest, or a tactical blunder, as Robert Tucker indicates?
Daniel Pipes: I see is as more than a tactical blunder because it has two major repercussions. Militarily, it has very much enhanced the Iranian side. The war in the Persian Gulf is essentially between the Iranian army and the Iraqi air force. The air force is what the Iraqis use to destroy Iranian infrastructure, particularly the oil-exporting facilities. That ability has been much blunted by the American arms. Domestically, I see a string of problems that preceded the Iran arms deal. There was Reykjavik. There was Daniloff. 1n other words, there was a certain fragility to the President's record, and I think it came crashing down. I feel a fundamental shift in the future of this administration and the future of conservative principles in foreign policy.
Daniel Pipes: To deal first with some of the points raised by Albert Wohlstetter:
Of course, the Soviet Union presents a permanent danger to Iran. A Soviet incursion into Iran, a takeover, is the single most dangerous prospect facing us in the Middle East. It would give the Soviets direct access to the Persian Gulf and facilitate their control over the oil of that region. By preventing Persian Gulf oil from being exported, they would control a lever over the international economy and over international politics that is unrivaled anywhere else outside the industrial world. It is of supreme importance that we do everything we can to prevent that.
I in no sense support an Iraqi victory. An Iraqi victory would lead to the disintegration of the Iranian state, and that in turn would create opportunities for the Soviets to make trouble. But at the moment there is little likelihood of an Iraqi victory. At the moment we are worried about an Iranian victory.
Were the Iranians to win, were they to place their own agents in Baghdad, they would have won not only a military victory but achieved a critical confirmation of the validity of their revolution. The revolution, which has been dissipating now for nearly a decade, would suddenly be revived. Their efforts in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and other places would be enhanced. The voice of the Ayatollah would again ring as it did in 1980. That's why we should make sure, to the extent that we can, that neither side wins a clear victory. Although the Iraqis started the war, the war shifted in 1981, and the Iranians have been clearly on the aggressive side since 1982. It is our duty to do what we can to make sure they don't win.
As for the twelve million dollars in Hawk weapons, that was the first figure reported. Subsequent revelations showed much larger arms shipments of precisely the kind of weaponry that Iran most needed. The Iraqis used to go at the oil refineries and then they stopped. One of the main reasons they stopped is that the Iranians now have ways to defend those installations.
I agree that we should keep our eye on the big picture and the big picture is the Soviet Union. But this does not mean we should appease the government in Iran, which in its own way is the more profound enemy of the United States. It hates us more on more levels, and more passionately, than does the government of the Soviet Union.
That is not to say that Teheran is a bigger enemy, but that it is crazy to try to find allies there against the Soviet Union. That is as preposterous as trying to find allies against Communists by turning to Nazis. The Iranian fundamentalists will never be allies of ours in any form whatsoever. We should not appease the Iranians, for they are our sworn enemies. The government in Teheran no more contains moderates than does the Kremlin. Long experience shows that we cannot win by helping presumed moderates in a state which has a long record of anti-American actions.
Rosanne Klass is absolutely right about the importance of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistan is going to pose a classic dilemma for the United States because the self-proclaimed forces of democracy in Pakistan have no interest in Afghanistan. They would simply cede it to the Soviets. It is the military dictator who takes interest in Afghanistan. Therefore we are willy-nilly going to be on the side of the military dictator against the self-professed democrats.
Finally, about Israeli-Iranian relations. The Israelis have a great nostalgia for Iran, the one major Middle Eastern country with which they had ongoing relations on a number of critical levels: intelligence, military, economic. They seek to recreate those relations.
By way of background: in the early 1950s David Ben-Gurion came up with something called the periphery theory. According to this theory, Turkey, Iran, Ethiopia, the Kurds and the Berbers, the Greeks of Cyprus, and other non-Arab elements of the Middle East were potential friends of Israel. In contrast, the Arabs were seen as unmitigatedly hostile to Israel. It followed that the Israelis should reach out to the non-Arab elements in the Middle East, and so they did. All those peoples and states just mentioned had some kind of relations with Israel.
The periphery theory remains very strong, even though its premises are by now anachronistic. Times have changed. On the one hand, the Arabs are no longer unmitigatedly hostile. The Egyptians have a peace treaty with Israel. The Jordanians are eager to have one, too. There are elements in Lebanon that are friendly. The prime minister of Israel recently flew off to Morocco one fine day in full view of the press.
On the other hand, Turkey no longer is the same kind of friend it was thirty years ago, nor, certainly, is Ethiopia. Iran has profoundly changed. Nonetheless, many Israelis hope to see relations with Iran revived. I would ascribe that more to nostalgia, emotion, affection than to clear geopolitical thinking, which is the cover under which they present this hope.
DANIEL PIPES is a specialist in Middle Eastern and Islamic affairs who is the author of, among other books, In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power. He is director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute and the editor of Orbis.
