I address four questions in this report concerning the Mahmoud Mohammad Issa Mohammad deportation proceedings:
I. Have Palestinians in Lebanon been targeted since 1972 by the Syrian government?
II. Have Palestinian supporters of Yasir Arafat been targeted since 1971 by the Syrian government?
III. Is Mr. Mohammad, given his biography, likely he targeted by the Syrian government?
IV. How do Palestinians living in Lebanon currently fare, and how do their circumstances compare to those of other groups?
I. Does Damascus Target Palestinians in Lebanon?
To understand the role of the Syrian government in Lebanon, it's best to begin with some background, then look at the specific question of its targeting Palestinians in Lebanon.
Background: Syria and Lebanon
Although Lebanon became a separate political unity in 1920, Damascus has never reconciled itself to the existence of an independent Lebanon, a reluctance symbolized by its refusal to open an embassy in Beirut. Through the first five decades of Lebanon's existence, Syrian leaders pursued a variety of policies to win control over the country, without much success. But when Hafiz al-Asad came to power in Damascus in 1970, the equation changed. With regard to Lebanon, his rule divides into three main periods: 1971-75, 1975-90, and 1990 on.
Rising tensions, 1971-75. After the signing of the Cairo Agreement of November 1969, the Lebanese body politic steadily fractured. President Asad used the opportunity created by this fracture to extend his influence in Lebanon, finding allies in that country among the political parties, the militias, and the leaders.
Civil war, 1975-90. The Lebanese civil war, which began in April 1975, offered Asad a chance to control increasing portions of Lebanese territory.[1] The process culminated when the Syrians won full control over the country in October 1990 and then gained formal diplomatic sanction for this control in a May 1991 "Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination."
Syrian hegemony, 1990 on. Once the Syrians ruled Lebanon, they began to rebuild the country. In striking contrast to their earlier behavior, they made peace and prosperity in that country a top priority, and for good reason. A peaceful Lebanon reduces the demands on its military to keep the peace; a thriving Lebanon increases Syria's wealth; and a quiet Lebanon improves Syria's image. Having joined the negotiations with Israel (known as the peace process), the Syrians are anxious to derive benefits from it—and that means keeping things quiet in Lebanon. Accordingly, Damascus backs Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri's government to overhaul a broken country. Toward this end, the Asad regime does its best to neutralize those who would disrupt the current calm by continuing to deploy some 30-40,000 Syrian troops in the country and disarming the militias.
Lebanese generally accept the Syrian presence and make little trouble for it. While very small numbers of Lebanese want to see a formal union with Syria (survey research conducted by Hilal Khashan among 500 Lebanese Sunnis in 1989-90 showed that a mere 3 percent favored this solution),[2] they have given up on hopes (promoted especially by Michel 'Awn) to try to expel the Syrians from their territory. Lebanese have suffered much through the long civil war and now accept the reality of Syrian occupation and the quiet it brings. The net effect of this, in the words of Lebanon's Defense Minister Muhsin Dallul, is for Lebanon to head "towards an unannounced confederation (kunfidraliya ghayr ma'luna) with Syria."[3]
Even the Israelis acknowledge this new, more positive Syrian outlook. Foreign Minister Shimon Peres has noted that "Syria worked very hard to set up the Hariri government. It worked very hard to allow Hariri to devote his efforts to his main goal—the economic rehabilitation of Lebanon."[4]
Circumstances in Lebanon
A new reality has been forming in Lebanon over the past two years, characterized mainly by the growth of a strong central government, with a nature of its own. With the support of Syria, this regime grants top priority to the rehabilitation of Lebanon and its development into a stable and striving country. The 'regeneration' process, rooted in the Ta'if Agreement of September 1989, is going strong, and changes are already evident. Alongside the effort to change the communal structure, the political system is stable and functioning for the first time in years.
- A. The Lebanese political system is striving to abandon the communal government structure in favor of increased democratization of the central government institutions. There are changes in the structure of the new parliament, founded after the general elections held in August-September 1992 (the first democratic elections since 1972). These elections determined a different division of the Muslim and Christian components in the government foci, giving birth to a new government, headed by Rafiq Hariri, who is contributing his personal gifts of charisma, power, and considerable economic pull to the Lebanese regeneration process.
- B. The civilian security situation is improving steadily as time goes by, a result of the Lebanese government's decisive policy to implement its authority throughout the country. It has introduced considerable changes in the security forces, and mainly in the army, aimed at establishing additional sovereignty strongholds on Lebanese territory. The main step taken was canceling the communal division of the military brigades and redeploying them, so that there are no more brigades pertaining to certain communities, deployed in territorial formations aimed at protecting them. In addition, the regime is making an effort to reinforce the army by arming and equipping it, as well as providing Arab and Western professional training aimed at raising its operational level. At the same time, the government continues to dismantle the militias, gradually decreasing the internal strife potential between the various groups and communities and contributing to the peace and rehabilitation process. Moreover, it is now clear to the various groups that the days of solving the conflicts among themselves and between themselves and the central government by violent means are over. Everyone—especially the leaders of the groups—now understands that domestic problems are solved by negotiations.
- C. In the economic sphere the various steps taken by the Lebanese regime to stabilize order and individual calm are also aimed at creating the appropriate climate to attract foreign investors, rehabilitate the infrastructure, and improve conditions of life in Lebanon. An improvement in the general situation, and especially in the rate of exchange, is already evident. If in the past the high inflation rate and exorbitant prices brought the people into the streets, the current situation is much more relaxed. While the population still expects favorable developments and a significant improvement in the economic situation—both general and individual—people already feel a certain relief. It is clear to them that the Lebanese regime's wish to heal the ailments of the Lebanese economic system is genuine and they tend to give it credit.
- D. In the foreign relations sphere one of the conspicuous changes, connected to the developments abroad, is Lebanon's involvement in the peace process. The country is dedicating itself to this cause with the objective of attaining peace in the South and re-acquiring the areas currently controlled by Israel. Progress in the peace process will enable Lebanon to turn its efforts towards rehabilitation of the infrastructure and will help improve the economic situation of the residents of Southern Lebanon as well. In actual fact, the recent moves of the Lebanese Army aimed at occupying additional strongholds in the South, alongside the UNIFIL forces, already improve the security situation and the conditions of life in the area. Among other things, the Lebanese Army is supposed to enforce law and order, as well as supervise the rehabilitation of the population and the infrastructure in Southern Lebanon.
As mentioned above, Syria is backing and encouraging the Lebanese regime to change the country, since a peaceful and striving Lebanon is in its own interest, as well, requiring minimal military resources, and improving the Syrian image in the eyes of international public opinion. To this end, Syria is doing its best to neutralize group and individual antibodies opposing it and its activities in Lebanon, especially if they are connected to its interests outside the country. Syria is avoiding a power struggle with the Hizbullah and the Palestinians, but at the same time, it is making clear that their activities must conform with the main Syrian interest—that of maintaining peace and order. Vis-à-vis the Hizbullah, Syria is cooperating with the organization's patron, namely Iran, while as regards the Palestinian PFLP, DFLP, Jibril, and other organizations, they are under its total control. Fatah is enjoying freedom of action in the refugee camps in Southern Lebanon. Although Syria did not prevent the confrontation between Fatah and the Lebanese Army in the summer of 1992, during the initial deployment of the Lebanese Army in the South, making clear that the Lebanese interest came first, it has no interest in confronting elements belonging to the Arafat camp, who is a partner to the political process. In the framework of the Arab cooperation it helped form, Syria wishes to avoid obstruction of the political process.
As to the Lebanese regime itself, I have already mentioned its interest in furthering the country's rehabilitation and stability, while avoiding domestic conflicts which could deter the process—neither will it act contrary to Syrian interests. This is also relevant to the various groups in Lebanon which recognize the change the country is undergoing. The new rules of the game apply to the Palestinian organizations, as well. Despite their limited freedom of action, they do not really criticize the government and even attempt a certain degree of integration with the new system. They initiated discussions with the regime in Beirut, aimed at securing the right to a dignified life, adequate income, and security of the Palestinian population of Lebanon. The rivalry between the Palestinian elements, and especially the struggle between the Abu Nidal Organization and the Fatah in the refugee camps in Southern Lebanon are limited to this definite framework. The relations between the other Palestinian elements in Lebanon are characterized by cooperation between themselves and also with other Lebanese organizations, such as the Hizbullah, in the activities vis-à-vis Israel. This common interest overrides any sporadic individual conflicts. The PFLP is conspicuous in its good relations with all the elements in Lebanon—Palestinian or Lebanese—and with Syria, as well, where the Organization's HQ is based. PFLP activists move freely from Lebanon to Syria.
As regards Mohammed's claim that he is identified with Fatah, it is of note that activists from various organizations worked in the framework of the Palestinian Research Center, since this institution belongs to the PLO and not to the Fatah. His contacts with Hawari are somewhat puzzling, since he did not report of defecting to the Fatah, and it is know that Hawari headed a Fatah apparatus made up exclusively of Fatah members. Another possibility is that the contact was maintained in the framework of the cooperation between his organization, the PFLP, and the Fatah, and this does not contradict his membership in the PFLP.
The conclusion arising from the new reality in Lebanon is that there is increased personal security in the country, enjoyed by the Palestinians, as well. There are no grounds to the claim that the Palestinians are being persecuted by the Lebanese, the Syrians, and the Israelis, since this contradicts the basic interests of all concerned—Lebanon, Syria, and even Israel, which is striving towards peace and quiet along its northern border, as well as peace with all the Arab states. Clearly, Israel has no interest in hurting the Palestinians just because they are Palestinians, but at the same time, anti-Israeli elements in Southern Lebanon who initiate actions against Israel are endangering themselves. Nevertheless, there is no difference between Palestinians or any other elements in this regard.
Syria and Lebanon's Palestinians
Have Palestinian supporters of Yasir Arafat been targeted since 1971 by the Syrian government?
Rising tensions, 1971-75. I do not know of attacks on Palestinians by Syrian forces or their proxies during this period.
Civil war, 1975-90. I also do not know of attacks on Palestinians by Syrian forces or their proxies during this period.
Syrian hegemony, 1990 on. Again, I do not know of attacks on Palestinians by Syrian forces or their proxies during this period. Syrian control over Lebanon is not directed against the Palestinians; more than that, the Syrians have not sought a show-down with the Palestinians. Quite the contrary, the Syrians have established a record of leaving alone residents of Lebanon who do not make trouble for them. If the Palestinians conform to the Syrian goal of maintaining peace and order, Damascus does not bother them. Only when they challenge the existing order do they hear from Asad's forces. The Palestinian population resident in Lebanon generally lives according to Syrian rules, and so carries on undisturbed by Syrian forces.
The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and other Palestinian organizations are another matter, however, and deserve separate consideration.[5]
II. Does Damascus Target Supporters of Yasir Arafat?
The Syrian government has targeted Yasir Arafat's supporters many times since 1971; more than that, the two sides have at times engaged in full-scale battles.
In this section, I look at the complex nature of Syrian-PLO ties, take up the question of Damascus targeting Arafat's supporters, and conclude with an assessment of current PLO-Syrian relations.
The Asad-Arafat Relationship
The generally bad state of relations between Hafiz al-Asad of Syria and Yasir Arafat results from their being rivals. At the same time, theirs is a subtle and many-sided relationship. To portray the two men as simple enemies (as Mr. Mohammad's witnesses do) distorts a complex picture.
Rivalry. Both Asad and Arafat hope someday to control a Palestinian state.[6] Asad maintains that he has the right to rule Palestine because it is "an essential part of Southern Syria."[7] Arafat turns this relationship around, claiming rights not only to Palestine but (in a bit of hyperbole) to Syria as well: "I recall President al-Asad saying that Palestine is Southern Syria. I replied to this by saying that Syria is Northern Palestine."[8] While Asad ultimately aspires to win control of the Palestinian movement, Arafat is determined not to let this happen, but instead to keep his own independence (or in his jargon, to "maintain the integrity of national decisionmaking"). This clash of ambitions underlies nearly all interactions between the two men.
Over the years, Asad has gathered around him in Damascus a variety of anti-Arafat Palestinian groups. (Trabulsi refers to this fact on p. 80.) Grouped into an alliance called the "National, Democratic, and Islamic Front," they now number ten:
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, led by Na'if Hawatma;
Fatah-Intifada, led by Sa'id Musa Muragha;
Hamas, the pro-Iranian fundamentalist Muslim group, led by Ahmad Yasin;
Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine, led by Fat'hi Shakaki;
Palestine Liberation Front, led by Muhammad 'Abbas;
Palestinian Communist Party, led by Sulayman an-Najjab;
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (Mr. Mohammad's old gang), led by George Habash;
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, led by Ahmad Jibril;
Popular Struggle Front, led by Samir Ghawsha;
Sa'iqa, an arm of the Syrian government, led by Sami al-'Attar and 'Isam al-Qadi.
The renegade Fatah Revolutionary Council (FRC, also known as the Abu Nidal Organization or ANO), led by Abu Nidal, may also have its headquarters in Syria. In addition, tensions arising from the Israel-PLO accord are steadily spawning new groups; thus, one of the PLO militia leaders in Lebanon, Munir Maqda, recently broke with Arafat and set up his own organization, the Phalanges of Black September 13.
This is an important point; while the defense witnesses routinely identify the PLO with Arafat (e.g., Trabulsi on p. 77), the PLO actually contains many autonomous sub-groups which both cooperate and compete with each other. They agree on a goal (to establish a Palestinian state) but disagree on means (e.g., which Arab states to work with, whether to use diplomacy or not) and scope (whether to call for the destruction of Israel or not). Every Palestinian group contesting Arafat's approach works with the Syrian authorities. To draw a distinction between the two main bodies of Palestinian groups, I use the terms "Arafat's PLO" and "Asad's PLO."
The kaleidoscopic quality of Arab politics. However bad the Asad-Arafat ties appear to be, they must be understood in the context of the Middle Eastern pattern of "fighting, then kissing." Alliances form and break with lightening speed. One day leaders insult and attack each other, the next they literally kiss each other on the cheeks and work together. Close allies routinely become bitter enemies, then allies again. 'Abd al-Hamid Zaydani, a fundamentalist Muslim leader in Yemen, sums up this characteristic behavior: "Either we unite or we fight."[9] The PLO's Khalid al-Hasan once tried to explain why Arab leaders so often make and break bonds:
I do not believe Arab history has ever known a final estrangement. Our Arab history is full of agreements and differences. When we differ and then grow tired of differing, we agree. When we grow tired of agreeing, we differ, and so on. After every agreement or difference we pass through a time that changes things. This is the Arab nature.[10]
Trabulsi gives an example of this phenomenon when he points to Asad's unexpected "flip" in support of the Christian/rightist forces in Lebanon in 1976 (p. 66). Nassar makes this point (p. 2.24)[11] when he points out that
it was not always easy relationship between the PLO and Arab states. And there has been a lot of ups and downs between various countries, and the PLO. . . . those downs sometimes seem to be way down, but in reality they are not. There is consultation and working in between and so on. So they never totally cut the rope or cut the relationship to become enemies. I don't want to give the impression that they [i.e., the PLO and Damascus] were at a point where they were enemies, ready to kill each other. I will not believe for a moment that Syria would try to assassinate, for example, Yassir Arafat. I wouldn't believe that for a moment.
Here are three more examples of this pattern. (1) For twelve years after 1977, Asad relentlessly reviled the Egyptian authorities for making peace with Israel; then one day in 1989 he re-established relations with Cairo and all was sweetness and light. (2) Jordan's King al-Husayn and Arafat made war in 1970; they cooperated in 1982; fell out in 1983; allied in 1985; broke relations in 1986; and made up in 1988. (3) In mid-1992, Arafat and Habash's militias were in conflict in Lebanon; but when the two leaders met in Amman in October 1992, they literally embraced each other. Assessment. Arafat and Asad are not profound enemies or men attached to contrary political philosophies; rather, they are tacticians at one moment cooperating and another in conflict. Beyond this, they operate in the same political environment, they share many assumptions, personal qualities, enemies, and aspirations.
The two men maintain a complex network of ties. Yes, they dislike each other personally and compete politically. Yes, Asad forced Arafat to beat an ignominious retreat from Lebanon in 1983 and followed this up shortly after by hustling Arafat to the Damascus airport and forcibly putting him on a commercial plane—a terrible humiliation to someone with Arafat's sense of self. Their rivalry also has a murderous edge—but what do you expect for men of their temperament and accomplishments? Asad has killed tens of thousands of his own people; why not PLO members too? They resemble two Mafia dons who murder each other's men but also drink together at festivals and cooperate against outsiders.
This same pattern of mixed enmity and friendship extends down to the ordinary members of the Fatah and Syrian camps. Therefore, one must not assume Damascus has malign intentions toward Mr. Mohammad. This means he cannot derive his claim of danger from the larger political circumstances (as Trabulsi attempts to do in ungrammatical fashion on p. 76: "Anybody who identify themself with . . . Arafat . . . was subject to assassination"). Rather, Mr. Mohammad must establish Syrian enmity directed specifically toward his person.
The Historical Record
What about specific Syrian attacks on Arafat supporters? These peaked in the early 1980s and have since nearly ended.
Alliance, 1971-76. During this period, the PLO and Damascus were closely aligned.
Rivals, 1976-90. From April 1975 to December 1975, the PLO and Damascus were closely allied; during the first five months of 1976, Asad disentangled himself from this partnership; and on 31 May 1976, he changed sides and turned on his Palestinian allies.
Syrian relations with Arafat over the next fifteen years defy quick summary, for they shifted many times. The two sides mostly competed but sometimes cooperated.
When his disagreements with Arafat were most acute, Asad usually relied on force. In 1983, for example, Asad patronized Abu Musa's rebellion within the Fatah ranks against Yasir Arafat. In that years, Syrian troops and their Palestinian allies launched two major armed assaults on Arafat's PLO in the area around Tripoli, Lebanon, forcing Arafat and his men to evacuate that city.
Asad's forces also used terrorist means against Arafat's wing of the PLO during these years. Either Abu Nidal or the Damascus-based groups assassinated Arafat's men in Europe, including Na'im Khadir in Brussels, Majid Abu Sharar in Rome,MECS 5.94 and 'Isam Sartawi in Lisbon. A Palestinian with close ties to Arafat who edited an anti-Syrian weekly in Athens was shot three times from a yard away as he left his apartment building in September 1985. NYT 19 Sept 85 and Athens radio Two Palestinian groups based in Damascus claimed responsibility for the March 1986 assassination of Zafir al-Masri, the newly-appointed mayor of Nablus; in the West Bank itself, however, many residents accused Syrian operatives of the crime. NYT 3 Mar 1986
While Asad repeatedly attacked Arafat's men, it is important to note that he did not do so gratuitously. Unlike the other, less skilled practioners of terrorism, Asad used this instrument only when it served a policy end. He invariably has a clear sense of what he is trying to achieve; he uses terrorism like a scalpel, as a finely-honed instrument of state. Knowing what he wants to achieve, he deploys violence with great skill. This also points to Mr. Mohammad being safe unless he engages in acts which run contrary to Asad's concept of his own interests.
Since 1990. This requires a detailed look.
The Current Situation
Arafat and Asad have had extensive contacts, many of them friendly, since the end of the Kuwait War.
After eight years of conflict, the two parties made up in May 1991. Within days of the Syrian-Lebanese Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination, they announced that they had decided to "forget the past" and to work together.[12] In particular, Asad released 1,500 Palestinian detainees MEWatch World Report 1991, p. 598 and gave up his attempts to topple Arafat as the PLO's leader. Yasir 'Abd Rabbuh, head of the PLO Information Department, characterized ties between the PLO and Syria as having "turned a new leaf"; Sulayman an-Najjab termed it "a new chapter."[13] PLO media not only spoke of an "atmosphere of concord and agreement" in the talks, but even offered these as an example for other Arab leaders to emulate.[14] When Arafat visited Damascus in October 1991, Asad received him with all the honor due a chief of state. A month later, the Syrians agreed to reopen the PLO office in Damascus. Faruq Qaddumi, Arafat's "foreign minister," visited Damascus in connection with this decision and the Syrian state media reported that his views were "identical" (a word that pops up more than once in the next few paragraphs) on all the topics discussed with those of Syria's Foreign Minister Faruq ash-Shar'.[15]
Since then, Arafat's aides often visited Damascus to discuss several issues, and most notably their negotiations with Israel. Kubursi grudgingly concedes this point (p. 91), while Nassar admits it openly (p. 2.25) and offers useful information to support this argument. He writes of a "shaky" rapprochement between the Syrians and Arafat before the peace process began, for the two sides
needed to get their act together, all the Arab participants. And that meant the PLO and Syria had to get together, and they have gotten together and they have had a lot of meetings. The Syrian foreign minister and the PLO foreign minister, or head of the political department, Mr. Kadumi [Qaddumi], have had many meetings, and try to, you know—they agree and disagree and so on, and try to coordinate their efforts at the peace process.
Here's some specific data to flesh out Nassar's point. In a typical news item, found in a Palestinian newspaper, we read that
Marwan 'Abd al-Hamid, an adviser to PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat, has said that during his recent visit to Damascus he perceived the Syrian leadership's eagerness to coordinate on every aspect of the peace process with the other concerned Arab parties.
'Abd al-Hamid said that he handed over a message from Arafat to Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad. He stressed that in the event the peace talks are resumed, Damascus will support Palestinian demands and principles.[16]
For its part, Arafat's PLO makes concerted efforts to improve relations with Asad. In March 1993, a Jordanian newspaper quoted excerpts from an 111-page report the PLO presented to Syrian officials which showed the PLO's eagerness to patch things up.
We sincerely seek to overcome the past phase and to open a new chapter in the history of Palestinian-Syrian relations. We aim ultimately to normalize those relations and see this as the initial step to unifying the Arab ranks. . . . It would be best to build bridges between President Hafiz al-Asad and President Yasir Arafat . . . to bring about Syrian-Palestinian friendship.[17]
Later in March, Qaddumi attended an Arab coordination meeting in Damascus. When asked his view of the results, he praised the "unified Arab stand" toward the peace process.[18] Shortly afterward, he indicated that the Syrians and Palestinians held "identical views on all issues."[19]
More examples: In July 1993, Qaddumi made another trip to Damascus where he met with the Syrian foreign minister to coordinate policies. On his departure, Qaddumi "expressed deep gratitude for the warm reception he received in Syria"[20] and pointed out that coordination between Fatah and Damascus "is taking place at the highest level." He concluded by stressing again that "The Palestinian and Syrian sides' views are identical."[21] These are hardly the sort of statements made by enemies.
In August, Syria's Foreign Minister Shar' received three high-level PLO members and, according to Syrian state television, they discussed "the results of the Arab League Council session, developments in Lebanon, . . . and the upcoming visit to the region by the U.S. secretary of state."[22] In an interview with the Syrian news agency, Qaddumi reiterated that "coordination and cooperation between Syria and the PLO is a strategic matter."[23] On arriving in Damascus a few days later, he expressed delight on being in that "beloved, brotherly country" and said he was there to "coordinate moves between Syria and the PLO."[24] During the visit, Qaddumi met leaders of the PLO factions based in Damascus in an effort to work together.
Most recently, Arafat made a special trip in January 1994 to Hafiz al-Asad's home village of Qardaha to offer his condolences on the death of Asad's son Basil. Questioned about this unexpected move, 'Arafat mentioned "the longstanding, strong relationship [with Asad] . . . a brotherly relation between us that developed thirty years ago." For good measure, 'Arafat added that he welcomes "any opportunity to visit the brothers in Syria."[25]
When Arafat cannot get directly what he wants from Asad, he turns to intermediaries for help. On the eve of the Madrid Conference, for example, he got President Husni Mubarak of Egypt to help persuade Asad to have the Damascus-based Palestinian groups tone down their attacks on himself. Sharq Awsat
Looking ahead, Asad and Arafat could come to blows again, but: (1) it's not a prospect now or in the foreseeable future and (2) it's hard to see how such a battle could take place in Lebanon, where the Syrians overwhelmingly dominate.
III. Will the Syrians Target Mr. Mohammad?
Mr. Mohammad claims he left the PFLP in 1972 and joined Fatah; or, using our terminology, that he left Asad's PLO for Arafat's PLO. Let us assume that in 1972 he ended all ties, overt and clandestine, with the PLFP. Nonetheless, he may have maintained good relations with the PFLP's patrons in Damascus. Palestinians often retain private, discreet links to governments, even those at odds with the organizations to which they are affiliated for in the volatile world of Palestinian politics, individuals and states alike try to keep as many options open as possible. Even while working for Col. Hawari, then, Mr. Mohammad could reasonably have enjoyed decent to excellent relations with the Syrian authorities. Without knowing more, we must keep open the possibility of links between Mr. Mohammad and the Syrian authorities.
Mr. Mohammad argues that he would now be in jeopardy in Lebanon because the Syrians would target him on account of three past affiliations: to the Palestine Research Centre, to "Col. Hawari," and to the Iraqi government. Let us assume the truth of all his claimed affiliations and inquire into the implications they might have on his personal security.
Working for the Palestine Research Centre. The Palestinian Research Centre belongs to the PLO, not to Fatah; during the 1970s, activists from various organizations of the PLO worked there. Accordingly, employment there signals nothing about an individual's membership nor his relations with the Syrian government. The Syrian authorities have no reason whatsoever to harm someone just because he once worked at the Palestinian Research Centre.
Working for Col. Hawari. "Colonel Hawari" is the nom de guerre of 'Abdallah 'Abd al-Hamid Labib. A member of the PFLP before 1979, Col. Hawari belonged to the Iraqi-supported May 15 Organization headed by Abu Ibrahim. He later became a bodyguard for Yasir Arafat and headed the Special Operations Group, a division of Fatah's Central Security and Intelligence Apparatus. Rub Rev 156 Col. Hawari died in May 1991 in Iraq, supposedly in a traffic accident.
The Special Operations Group included elements of trusted Fatah units such as Force 17 and May 15. Its operations peaked in the mid-1980s, when it launched several attacks on American and Israeli airliners, as well as on U.S. facilities in Europe.
To the best of our knowledge, none of the Special Operations Group activities were directed against Syrian interests, so I see no reason why affiliation with this group would cause problems for Mr. Mohammad with the Syrian authorities.
Two main possibilities exist:
Mr. Mohammad maintained membership in both the PFLP and Fatah, for the lines between Asad's PLO and Arafat's PLO are fluid. (For example, Arafat's current spokesman Bassam Abu Sharif, once worked as Habash's chief assistant in the PFLP.)
Mr. Mohammad was a PFLP agent in Fatah, for the groups are constantly infiltrating each other. (In one spectacular example, a member of the Abu Nidal Organization killed Salah Khalaf, Arafat's top aide, in January 1991 by becoming a member of his bodyguard.)
Carrying an Iraqi passport. Mr. Mohammad's having carried an Iraqi passport is, so far as I have been informed, his only connection to the Iraqi government. Our comments deal, therefore, only with the implications of his carrying this passport.
By way of introduction, it's important to understand that passports have a very different meaning among PLO members than they do for most of us. The former habitually collect multiple passports—real ones, forged ones, symbolic ones. For example, a radio station in 1991 quoted a Lebanese military source to the effect that of Palestinians detained for a trial, some of them held four different passports.[26] Passports are not a source of identity but a form of currency.
PLO members get their passports from several sources:
Residence: living in a country sometimes bestows a passport. In the Middle East, this is most common in Jordan, but also takes place in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Outside the Middle East, Palestinians can acquire an American, Canadian, or other passport after a few years.
Patron states: States like Iraq and Libya give PLO members passports. These might use genuine or false names.
Forgery: If no state is willing to supply a false-name passport, the PLO apparatus is well known for its ability to forge passports. (Soviet-bloc states began helping this effort in the 1972.) Rubin, Rev 39 PLO members engaged in terrorist operations usually carry such bogus passports.
Symbolism: The PLO issues "passports" of the "State of Palestine"—in operational terms only pieces of paper, but important symbols for a dreamed-of state.
Putting all this together, a single PLO member carry a Jordanian passport by virtue of an earlier residence and a French passport due to his business in Marseilles; an Iraqi passport due to his close connections to the regime in Baghdad; a Yemeni passport forged in the basements of Tunis; and a Palestinian "passport" for sentiment's sake.
In other words, the fluid world of the PLO underground one picks up patronage, including passports, where one can. Passports indicate not permanent allegiance but tactical cooperation. Yesterday's agent for Iraq may well be today's agent for Syria.
In this context, it becomes clear that Mr. Mohammad's having once carried an Iraqi passport has little or no significance for Damascus today. To think that Damascus would remember about Mr. Mohammad's Iraqi passport of years back, much less care about it, is fundamentally to misunderstand the situation.
Here are three general thoughts on the likelihood of the Syrian authorities targeting Mr. Mohammad:
(1) The assertion of Syrian hegemony in Lebanon in 1990 wiped the slate clean. Old antagonisms and hatreds are now suppressed, lots of old scores are not being settled. Given the atrocities of the civil war now being overlooked, what the Syrian authorities would consider to be Mr. Mohammad's three trivial infractions are very easy to forget.
(2) Mr. Mohammad's past infractions are balanced by his having attacked an Israeli plane—a major accomplishment in the eyes of Syria's leadership.
(3) In raising these three issues (the Palestine Research Centre, Col. Hawari, and the Iraqi passport), Mr. Mohammad brings up extraneous issues; he has been and will always be known for one thing, and one thing only: his murderous act of 1968.
Mr. Mohammad's past affiliations alone do not point to his being in jeopardy today. Quite the contrary, if he intends to live quietly in the future, no one will make trouble for him. It is not enough for Mr. Mohammad to argue from principle that he is in danger of being targeted by the Syrian government; rather, he must prove specific dangers to his person.
It's not surprising that Mr. Mohammad would prefer to live in Canada than in Lebanon (many other individuals make the same choice each year), but he has no reason to fear for his life in Lebanon.
IV. Palestinian Circumstances in Lebanon
The witnesses hold that the Lebanese discriminate against Palestinians living in Lebanon. While the Lebanese have reason to resent the PLO's leading role in starting Lebanon's civil war, continuing the war, bringing Israeli retribution down on Lebanese heads, and so on, this resentment does not translate into persecution of Palestinians living in Lebanon.
I begin with a general assessment of the positive changes in Lebanon since 1991, then look at specific aspects of Palestinian life in that country.
Background: A New Situation
Much has changed in Lebanon over the past two years, especially with the emergence of a strong central government backed by Damascus. This regime adheres to three main principles: further the country's rehabilitation and stability, avoid domestic conflicts which could deter the process, and never act contrary to Syrian interests. The "regeneration" process, rooted in the National Reconciliation Charter (usually known as the Ta'if Accords) of September 1989, is going strong and changes are already evident in the arenas of politics, the military, economics, and foreign relations.
Politics. The Lebanese political system is stable and functioning for the first time in years. The leadership is trying to abandon the communal model of old and to democratize the central government institutions. There are changes in the structure of the new parliament, founded after the general elections held in August-September 1992 (the first democratic elections since 1972). These elections determined a different division of the Muslim and Christian components in the government foci, giving birth to a new government, headed by Rafiq al-Hariri, a billionaire businessman who brings charisma, power, wealth, and Saudi connections to the regeneration process.
Military. Thanks to the Lebanese government's decisive policy to implement its authority throughout the country, security is improving. The authorities have reshaped the armed forces, especially the army, to establish central government sovereignty over the whole of Lebanese territory. They abolished the communal division in military units and redeployed them; already, religiously-based units have nearly disappeared. The regime is trying to reinforce the army by arming and equipping it, as well as providing Arab and Western professional training aimed at raising its operational level. Simultaneously, it continues to dismantle the militias, thereby decreasing the potential for internal strife between various groups and communities while contributing to the process of rehabilitation. The militias now realize that the days of resolving conflicts among themselves and with the central government by violent means are over. Everyone—especially the leaders of the militias—understands that political problems must now be solved through negotiations.
Economics. The authorities place top priority on the rehabilitation of Lebanon and its development into a stable and thriving country. Economic improvements, especially in the rate of exchange, are already evident. The high inflation rate and exorbitant prices of recent years, which brought the people into the streets, has nearly ended. The population has already experienced relief from the bad old days. A recent Washington Post headline, "The Latest Explosion in Beirut Is a Construction Boom," summed up the vast changes underway.[27]
Looking to the longer term, the authorities hope to create a climate that will attract foreign investment, renew the decayed infrastructure, and improve conditions of life in Lebanon. For an example of how the government portrays itself, please see the attached five-page advertising spread from The New York Times of 22 November 1993; it is full of words like "back in business," "rebirth," rebuild," "expansion," and "normality." Nor is this just dreams: Solidère, a private corporation founded by Prime Minister Hariri to rebuild downtown Beirut, raised an astonishing $926 million in January 1994.
In a related development, Asad has sought since mid-1993 to improve his government's reputation by clamping down on smuggling and drug-trafficking out of Lebanon. This clean-up campaign has dramatically reduced lawlessness in the Bekaa Valley and other parts of Lebanon.
Foreign relations. The authorities hope to attain peace in Southern Lebanon and reassert control over the areas currently under Israeli control; this is the primary goal in the peace process with Israel. Progress here would not only repair the South but improve the economic climate in the whole country. The Lebanese Army's recent moves to occupy additional strongholds in the South, alongside the UNIFIL forces, have already improved the area's security situation and conditions of life. It is supposed to enforce law and order as well as supervise the rehabilitation of the population and the infrastructure in Southern Lebanon.
Are the Palestinians in Lebanon Unprotected?
Within this new Lebanon, Arafat's PLO remains a major military and political power.
Background. Most of the PLO's fighters left Lebanon either in August 1982 (under Israeli pressure) or in December 1983 (under Syrian pressure). But the 1985 Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon signaled the quiet return of some 6,000 PLO militiamen. Hiro, Leb 194; same number By April 1990, a newspaper report stated the PLO "has completed the rebuilding of its military forces in the country." It went on to provide important details:
The P.L.O. forces, which held training exercises at two sites in Lebanon recently, now number 11,000, compared with the 8,000 who were forced out by Israel in 1982, according to Lebanese security officials and P.L.O. members. In addition to the thousands who have returned, the organization says it has recruited hundreds of new young men. . . . P.L.O. members who spoke on condition of anonymity said the organization was in the second stage of a long-term effort to re-establish itself in Lebanon.
In the first stage, an estimated 8,000 P.L.O. guerrillas, who were forced to evacuate West Beirut during the Israeli invasion [of 1982], returned gradually to bases and Palestinian refugee camps, the P.L.O. sources said.
They said hundreds of new recruits between the ages of 16 and 20 had joined guerrilla ranks in the last eight years. "They were only children when the Israeli invasion took place," one source pointed out.
According to updated figures provided by Lebanese security officials and Palestinians, the total number of Palestinian guerrillas in Lebanon is about 11,000, with Al Fatah accounting for nearly 5,000 of them.[28]
Five thousand fighters may not sound like much, but it is in the Lebanese context: the Syrian soldiers who dominate Lebanon number only 30-40,000.
In March 1991, as the newly-revived Lebanese Army disarmed Christian and Muslim militias, some of the latter sold their arms at bargain prices to the PLO, giving the Palestinians a boost in power.
The battle over south Lebanon. In April-June 1991, the Lebanese government (with Syrian backing) decided to take control of the Sidon area in southern Lebanon, the region containing the largest Palestinian population and the PLO leadership structure. Arafat responded by using the presence of his fighters—and the possibility of violence—to wring political and social concessions from Beirut, including security arrangements for Palestinian camps , the opening of an "embassy" in Lebanon, granting work permits to Palestinians, and providing educational, health, and cultural facilities to Palestinians. Such talks were indeed held. Trouble was, the PLO then demanded more: the right to maintain fighters outside the Palestinian camps; insisted on the talks leading to a formal treaty "between the State of Palestine and the State of Lebanon"; and insisted that Foreign Minister Buwayz himself take part in the talks.[1]
Hoping to avoid violence, the Lebanese government capitulated on some points. Defense Minister Muhsin Dallul promised equal rights for Palestinians; but he did not grant PLO militias the control they sought.
The PLO therefore decided to resist the Lebanese Army. At this point the Lebanese authorities withdrew its concessions, closed down the political dialogue, and deployed its troops. They indicated an intent only to resume the discussions when the fighting ended. The PLO fought incompetently, however, and lost a three-day battle against Lebanese army forces, paving the way for Beirut's re-establishment of control in the area . Some 45 people lost their lives and 150 were injured in the hostilities. In addition, the Lebanese took 270 Palestinians prisoner. After the smoke cleared, the Lebanese no longer wanted to engage in a dialogue with the PLO. "What would the dialogue deal with and with what rights?" asked President Hirawi.[2] Nonetheless, the Lebanese subsequently agreed to resume the dialogue, once the Palestinians' arms had all been transferred.
Although the Lebanese Army routed the PLO militia, several points should be kept in mind: (1) The Lebanese soldiers did not move into the Palestinian camps. It appears that they did not because the Syrian government opposed such an infringement of the PLO's authority.
(2) The PLO did not have to give up its arms but was permitted to take them out of Lebanon.
(3) The PLO's power was sufficient for it to make threats. A senior PLO militia leader was quoted to the effect that "everything now hinges on the ongoing talks about a political dialogue between the Lebanese state and the PLO. He said that if the dialogue becomes deadlocked, a fresh military eruption cannot be ruled out."[3] The PLO did sometimes resort to force, as in September 1991 when a failed operation against Israel ended up taking fifteen soldiers hostage from the U.N. Interim Forces in Lebanon.
At the conclusion of the July 1991 battles, Yasir Arafat thanked God that "we have emerged from this diabolical cycle and arrived at the untroubled Lebanese-Palestinian relations that we have sought over the years."[4] As a symbol of this new relationship, Arafat offered to give the PLO's medium and heavy arms to the Lebanese Army as a gift.[5]
Arafat has retained this military force. A July 1993 magazine inquiry estimated that Fatah has 3,000 fighters in Lebanon.[6] That same month Foreign Report (a newsletter put out by The Economist) looked at the PLO in Lebanon and concluded that it "and some other significant Palestinian factions are still in business. They are well-armed and probably better organised militarily than ever before."[7]
All this shows that Mr. Mohammad's witnesses are wrong to claim that Palestinians in Lebanon "outside their camps have no protection whatsoever" (Trabulsi, p. 75).
Political Gains
The PLO's revived fortunes have permitted it to make political gains. An April 1990 report explains:
The P.L.O. is also seeking formal recognition in any redistribution of political power in Lebanon. Zeid Wehbeh [Zayd Wahba], the P.L.O.'s chief representative in Lebanon, asked several times recently that a new Lebanese national reconciliation pact be revised to recognize the Palestinian presence on Lebanese soil and regulate the relationship between the Government in Beirut and the P.L.O.[8]
Already in July 1991, the Lebanese authorities agreed to engage in talks with the PLO as though it were a state government. The PLO demanded that Beirut recognize it as a state; that it have the right to engage in political and information activities; and PLO fighters have the right to remain in the Palestinian camps.
In late June 1993 Arafat's PLO reopened its office in Beirut after closure for ten years.[9] The PLO structure in Lebanon has representatives with geographic jurisdictions (Beirut, Sidon, Mount Lebanon, etc.) and functional ones (commander of the militia, social affairs, media, finances, etc.).
In conclusion, Fatah is nothing like the out-of-control monster that tormented Lebanon during the 1967-82 period,[10] but the organization retains its militia and continues to play an active role in the country. To portray it as weak and passive is nonsense.
Good PLO Relations With Beirut
The improved situation in Lebanon also applies to PLO-Beirut relations. The Palestinians rarely criticize the Lebanese government; to the contrary, they are attempting to integrate into the new system.
The PLO says it has excellent relations with the Lebanese authorities. When visiting Lebanon, PLO leaders unfailingly praise the Lebanese government. Yasir Arafat occasionally met with Lebanon's President Ilyas al-Hirawi; for example, the two got together in Paris in October 1991 to coordinate strategies just before the Madrid Conference opened. The PLO's representative in Lebanon also met with Hirawi from time to time and used words like "cordial and positive" to describe the occasions.[11] Faruq Qaddumi used especially flowery and effusive language after meeting with Hirawi:
We, the members of the Palestinian delegation, are very pleased to have met today with his excellency the Lebanese president in Beirut, this Arab capital with which we shared years of suffering for the sake of the Palestinian cause and other issues. The Lebanese people have made great sacrifices. We came to Beirut to meet with our brothers in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan to coordinate Arab stands on a good initiative from fraternal Lebanon and his excellency brother Faris Buwayz [the foreign minister]. We came here to coordinate Arab stands, to reach agreement at this significant phase in history, and to assess the past stage of bilateral talks. . . . During the meeting, President Hirawi reiterated the principled, supportive stand adopted by fraternal Lebanon on the Palestinian cause. This stand backs the peace process so that the Palestinian people can fully regain their political rights.[12]
It wasn't just the peace process that inspired such rosy statements. The Israeli decision temporary to expel four hundred Palestinian fundamentalist Muslims to Lebanon in December 1992 set off a storm of PLO-Lebanese solidarity. Both sides went out of their way to issue statements confirming their identical views on Israeli perfidy and the need to stand up to it.[13]
Mr. Mohammad may argue that the assassination of leading Palestinian figures in Lebanon points to the dangers of that country. But this results from internecine Palestinian problems (especially with the Abu Nidal Organization) which have nothing to do with the Lebanese authorities. For example, a bomb went off a few yards from the office of Fatah's Abu al-'Aynayn in April 1992, wounding at least five people—less than two years after Abu al-'Aynayn led a Fatah military operation against the Abu Nidal Organization.
PLO factions also engage in conflict against each other. For example, two Fatah leaders (the military chief for southern Lebanon and the commander of a battalion) fought each other in February 1991. The fighting raged in villages and refugee camps. So heavy were the exchanges, one account noted that "the thud of mortars and explosions caused by recoilless rifles rocked [the city of] Sidon."[14] The Associated Press reported 17 Palestinians dead and 40 injured. In addition, "hundreds of Palestinian families" lost their homes and fled to Beirut or the north of Lebanon.[15]
In conclusion, the major changes now taking place in Lebanon means that Palestinians enjoy much enhanced personal security in that country. Mr. Mohammad has no grounds to claim that Palestinians are being persecuted by the Lebanese, the Syrians, or the Israelis, for the simple reasons that this would contradict the interests of all three parties.
Do Palestinians Suffer Systemic Discrimination?
The Lebanese government is willing to grant Palestinians full rights so long as the PLO does not challenge its authority. The PLO has not accepted these terms.
Background. The PLO entered Lebanon in the late 1960s with enough force to build a state-within-a-state. Then, in the Cairo Agreement of November 1969, the Arab states compelled Beirut formally to accede to the PLO's semi-sovereignty on its territory. PLO activities deeply divided Lebanese citizens, with Muslims and leftists welcoming the PLO's armed strength, while Christians and rightists saw it as a mortal danger to Lebanon's identity. This tension over the PLO contributed directly to the outbreak of civil war in 1975. PLO strength in Lebanon lasted until 1982, when Israeli forces compelled most Palestinian militiamen to leave.
The current situation. Even today, PLO rights and military power remains a very sore and delicate issue in Lebanon's politics. Lebanese authorities frequently express goodwill toward the Palestinians, but always conditional on the latter's understanding that they must accept the state's sovereignty. Lebanon's former prime minister, 'Umar Karama, often emphasized this double point. For example, he declared on 2 July 1991:
it is important for me to say that the brother Palestinians are the guests of this country and that the Lebanese state is responsible for them. We will ensure all their social rights. We are prepared at any time to hold all the necessary talks to secure their rights and dignity. . . . they are our beloved brothers and guests. We are ready at any time to give them all help and protection and to safeguard their lives and dignity.[16]
Two days later, he reiterated that "the sons of the Palestinian people are dear brothers and guests in Lebanon."[17] The term "guests" implies that Palestinians live in Lebanon on invitation and are not to take it over. Lebanon's President Ilyas al-Hirawi was more blunt: "We strongly reject the presence of a statelet within our state or any armed group other than the Lebanese Army."[18]
After the Palestinian militia lost to Lebanese troops in a July 1991 confrontation, Lebanese and Palestinians went out of their way to make up. The Lebanese Army stressed that no harm would befall Palestinians—so long as they refrained from challenging its authority. It promised to treat everyone equally and to guarantee their security. The Lebanese minister in charge of the Liaison Committee with the PLO expressed a hope that "all differences and disputes [with the PLO] will end, that amity will be restored to the relations between the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples, and that the unity of their common fate will be reasserted." To this, the PLO's representative in Lebanon, Zayd Wahba, replied: "We have absolutely no problems with our brothers in the Lebanese Army. Now everyone will be united against the Israeli enemy."[19] A Lebanese minister on the Liaison Committee explained the steps ahead:
we will . . . work to protect the social and civil rights of the Palestinian brothers. We will certainly pursue this matter and study in within a framework of Lebanese law and sovereignty. We have asked the Palestinian brothers to give us a detailed memorandum on everything they regard as legitimate civil and social rights. We will study this memorandum and determine what can be implemented in line with the law. Naturally, we will always maintain a framework of good relations with the Palestinians.
This minister reiterated Beirut's terms: "Any civic activity is allowed [to the Palestinians] but military activity and military organizations are not allowed and must be confined to the camps under the supervision of the Lebanese Army." He again confirmed that the Lebanese Army "will not enter the camps."[20] Foreign Minister Faris Buwayz reiterated:
The Palestinian people clearly enjoy social rights and are subject to Lebanese law. . . . We have lived with the PLO and the Palestinian people on good terms when the PLO demanded no military privileges that Lebanese could not afford. . . . the Palestinians can exercise political freedom in Lebanon, such as the freedom to hold conferences and meetings, and this country can grant them a diplomatic platform.[21]
In conclusion, I know of no evidence that Lebanese are persecuting Palestinians resident in their country. No massacres or lesser problems face Palestinians, not even retaliation for the destruction they wrought.
The future. The PLO has initiated discussions with the authorities in Beirut to secure for the Palestinian population of Lebanon the right to a dignified life, adequate income, and security.
Systemic discrimination does not exist; let us look at specific potential problems, including citizenship, freedom of movement, social services, and employment.
Citizenship
For the purposes of Mr. Mohammad's trial, all this boils down to a simple point: the Lebanese government offers citizenship and the Palestinians say no, they don't want even to hear about it.
Freedom of Movement
In place of passports, Palestinians living in Lebanon usually travel on laisser passer documents provided by the Lebanese government. The laisser passer does not guarantee a bearer the automatic right to return to Lebanon. This said, Palestinians by the hundreds move in and out of Lebanon each day without trouble.
In July 1991, the PLO requested that Palestinians be given residence permits and travel documents allowing them freely to return to Lebanon; to sweeten the deal, it promised to obey Lebanese laws and not to engage in internal domestic politics. The Lebanese authorities did not take up this offer, believing that Palestinians should obey laws and refrain from violence without their having to make concessions in return. As this exchange implies, the Lebanese authorities see their control over movement as a lever to extract concessions from the Palestinians.
Every traveler who enters Lebanon through the international airport in Beirut must pass through not only Lebanese controls but Syrian ones too. This gives the Syrian authorities ample opportunity to deny entrance to anyone they wish to exclude. They would surely look into whether Mr. Mohammad is still affiliated with the Iraqi government; assuming that he is not, he should be in no danger. But if he is affiliated, he'd do better not to go to Lebanon, Instead, he could go to Jordan (where Palestinians are automatically granted citizenship) or Iraq itself.
Palestinian residents have a permanent laisser passer (not the annually-renewed variety one usually finds) and have a guaranteed right both to leave and return to Lebanon.
Social Services
A Lebanese "Directorate for Palestinian Affairs" regulates Palestinian employment and provides social services. Lebanese officials have repeatedly stressed that Palestinians enjoy the same rights and obligations as Lebanese citizens. In July 1991, Defense Minister Michael al-Murr revealed that the cabinet "decided to treat all Palestinians residing in Lebanon in accordance with Lebanese law and to grant them work permits as ordinary citizens."[22]
Education. Palestinians benefit from the many schools throughout Lebanon established specifically for their purposes by UNRWA. Palestinian children are entitled to nine years of schooling without charge; they are also entitled to enter a number of centers for professional and technical training.
Not only do Palestinians attend school in large percentages than the rest of the Lebanese, but they enjoy a higher standard of education. For example, a report issued by the Danish Refugee Council (and dated 9 August 1990) holds that the basic education available to Palestinians "is considered to be far more efficient than the equivalent in the public Lebanese schools."
State schools are open to all residents of Lebanon, including foreigners. In addition, Palestinian residents can avail themselves of the UNRWA institutions which exist exclusively for them. Health care: Palestinian residents have the same treatment as citizens. Those who work for the government get government-sponsored care, while those who do not are on their own.
Employment
Not long after October 1989, when Lebanese members of parliament passed the Ta'if Accords, the Lebanese authorities began requiring that employees have valid work permits. This regulation should not be taken too seriously, however, for the government lacks the means or the will to enforce its provisions. The challenge is to find work, not to get permission to be paid.
"In a positive development, on July 3, 1991, the Lebanese government abolished a 1983 regulation forbidding non-Lebanese from working in fifty-one specified trades."[23]
Conclusion
One of Yasir Arafat's aides recently asserted his belief that there will not be "any future trouble regarding the Palestinian presence in Lebanon."[24] This assessment strikes me as correct.
[1] Radio Free Lebanon, 21 June 1991. |
[2] Sawt al-Jabal, 12 July 1991. |
[3] Radio Free Lebanon, 3 July 1991. |
[4] Radio Monte Carlo, 5 July 1991. |
[5] Radio Monte Carlo, 10 July 1991. |
[6] The Jerusalem Report, 15 July 1993. |
[7] Foreign Report, 8 July 1993. |
[8] The New York Times, 2 April 1990. |
[9] Al-Majalla (London), 27 June-3 July 1993. |
[10] On which, see Daniel Pipes, "How Important is the PLO?" Commentary, April 1983. |
[11] Radio Lebanon, 13 January 1992. |
[12] Radio Lebanon, 2 April 1992. |
[13] E.g., Radio Lebanon and Sawt Lubnan, 18, 19, 20, 21, 26 December 1992. |
[14] Agence France Presse, 15 February 1991. |
[15] Radio Free Lebanon, 15 February 1991. |
[16] Sawt Lubnan, 2 July 1991. |
[17] Radio Lebanon, 4 July 1991. |
[18] Radio Lebanon, 9 July 1991. |
[19] Sawt Lubnan, 4 July 1991. |
[20] Sawt al-Jabal, 5 July 1991. |
[21] Ash-Sharq al-Awsat, 13 July 1991. |
[22] Sawt Lubnan, 5 July 1991. |
[23] Human Rights Watch, World Report 1991, pp. 606-07 |
[24] Yasir 'Abd Rabbuh on Radio Lebanon, 1 April 1993. |
[1] For details on this complex and protracted process, see the several books on the subject, including Adeed Dawisha, Syria and the Lebanese Crisis (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980); Annie Laurent and Antoine Basbous, Une Proie pour deux fauves? (Beirut: Ad-Da'irat, 1983); idem, Guerres secrètes au Liban (Paris: Gallimard, 1987); Naomi Joy Weinberger, Syrian Intervention in Lebanon: The 1975-76 Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). |
[2] Hilal Khashan, "The Lebanese State: Lebanese Unity and the Sunni Muslim Position," International Sociology 7 (1992): 93. |
[3] Radio Free Lebanon, 15 October 1993. References to radio and television broadcasts derive from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, as do some news agency and newspaper reports. We have occasionally amended fbis translations for purposes of style. |
[4] Qol Yisra'el, 1 August 1993. Also, IDF Radio, 2 August 1993. |
[5] Please note that throughout the discussion that follows, we distinguish between Palestinians and PLO members. As recent events have made clear, the PLO has interests quite distinct from the Palestinian population as a whole. |
[6] On the subtleties of this rivalry, see Daniel Pipes, "Arab versus Arab Over Palestine," The Long Shadow: Culture and Politics in the Middle East (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1989), pp. 119-43. |
[7] Radio Damascus, 8 March 1974. |
[8] Radio Damascus, 18 May 1979. |
[9] Agence France Presse, 15 April 1990. |
[10] Radio Monte Carlo, 11 December 1984. |
[11] The 2 in front of Nassar's page number is our way of indicating it's the second day of his testimony, 21 May 1993. |
[12] Radio Monte Carlo, 26 May 1991. |
[13] Radio Jordan, 27 May 1991; Ad-Dustur (Jordan), 9 June 1991. |
[14] Sawt Filastin (Algiers), 29 May 1991. |
[15] Syrian Arab Republic Radio, 9 November 1991. |
[16] Al-Quds (Jerusalem), 23 February 1993. |
[17] Ad-Dustur (Amman), 11 March 1993. |
[18] Syrian Arab Republic Radio, 29 March 1993. |
[19] Akhbar al-Usbu' (Amman), 1 April 1993. |
[20] Syrian Arab News Agency, 10 July 1993. |
[21] Tishrin, 11 July 1993. |
[22] Damascus Television, 1 August 1993. |
[23] Syrian Arab News Agency, 21 August 1993. |
[24] Radio Damascus, 24 August 1993. [25] Al-Wasat (London), 14-20 February 1994. |
[26] Radio Lebanon, 4 July 1991. |
[27] The Washington Post, 9 December 1993. Along similar lines, see "Nation Recovering From War," The Washington Times, 13 October 1993. For a full analysis of Lebanese reconstruction, see Ian Meadows, "Lebanon: Up From the Ashes," ARAMCO World, January-February 1994, pp. 16-29. |
[28] The New York Times, 2 April 1990. |
[29] Radio Free Lebanon, 21 June 1991. |
[30] Sawt al-Jabal, 12 July 1991. |
[31] Radio Free Lebanon, 3 July 1991. |
[32] Radio Monte Carlo, 5 July 1991. |
[33] Radio Monte Carlo, 10 July 1991. |
[34] The Jerusalem Report, 15 July 1993. |
[35] Foreign Report, 8 July 1993. |
[36] The New York Times, 2 April 1990. |
[37] Al-Majalla (London), 27 June-3 July 1993. |
[38] On which, see Daniel Pipes, "How Important is the PLO?" Commentary, April 1983. |
[39] Radio Lebanon, 13 January 1992. |
[40] Radio Lebanon, 2 April 1992. |
[41] E.g., Radio Lebanon and Sawt Lubnan, 18, 19, 20, 21, 26 December 1992. |
[42] Agence France Presse, 15 February 1991. |
[43] Radio Free Lebanon, 15 February 1991. |
[44] Sawt Lubnan, 2 July 1991. |
[45] Radio Lebanon, 4 July 1991. |
[46] Radio Lebanon, 9 July 1991. |
[47] Sawt Lubnan, 4 July 1991. |
[48] Sawt al-Jabal, 5 July 1991. |
[49] Ash-Sharq al-Awsat, 13 July 1991. |
[50] Sawt Lubnan, 5 July 1991. |
[51] Human Rights Watch, World Report 1991, pp. 606-07 |
[52] Yasir 'Abd Rabbuh on Radio Lebanon, 1 April 1993. |
