Anatomy of Success
U.S. Diplomacy in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

While working earlier this year at the State Department, I walked out of a discussion between Washington analysts and a visiting Egyptian delegation in exasperation when an American remarked that he found it hard to defend his country's role in the Middle East. In his words: "We have probably botched things up more there over the last decade than in any other region."

Yes, this article praises the Department of State.

This propelled me from my seat because it inverts the recent American record. Rather than ashamedly apologize, this foreign service officer should have boasted about Washington's remarkable achievements. Not only have the efforts to improve Arab-Israeli relations been unprecedented in the American experience, but they constitute perhaps the greatest mediation of all time. Moreover, this has been a bi-partisan effort of Democratic and Republican administrations in which all Americans can take pride.

Yet the offending analyst is far from alone at denigrating U.S. efforts in the Middle East; his is common Beltway dinner party chatter. So, I shall document just how wrong he is and show how American diplomacy has helped to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Record

The United States has played a critical role every time an Arab state moved toward normal relations with Israel and every time Israel agreed to withdraw from Arab territory.

Israel returned the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip to Egypt a first time in 1949, following its war of independence, and it did so under American auspices. In 1957, it did so a second time, following the Suez War, because President Dwight D. Eisenhower insisted. Those were simple cases of imposition. The third time, when Israel returned the Sinai between 1974 and 1982, involved much more intricacy but, again, Washington took part at every stage. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger obtained the Sinai I disengagement agreement in January 1974 by traveling repeatedly between Egypt and Israel (a process dubbed shuttle diplomacy). Then, in September 1975, after three more of his efforts at shuttle diplomacy, Egypt and Israel signed the Sinai II agreement, and more territory went back to Egypt.

President Anwar al-Sadat's journey to Jerusalem in November 1977 signaled Egypt's public recognition of the Jewish state. Egypt and Israel soon undertook peace talks on their own; when disagreements quickly brought these to a halt, Washington stepped in to prod the two governments. American diplomats kept negotiations alive and arranged many of the discussions that finally led to an agreement, including the epochal thirteen-day Camp David meeting between Sadat, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, and President Jimmy Carter. This resulted in the two frameworks known as the Camp David Accords.

Egypt and Israel tried to translate these accords into a peace treaty during the next half-year but again they stumbled and again they called on American assistance. Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance and other U.S. emissaries made trips to the Middle East and a ministerial summit took place at Camp David in February 1979. When these failed to produce results, President Carter personally re-entered direct discussions with Sadat and Begin. He finally broke the deadlock by traveling to the Middle East, following which the Egypt-Israel peace treaty was signed on March 26.

To ease implementation of this treaty, President Carter committed the American taxpayer to provide billions of dollars to each of the signatories, making Washington a full-fledged participant. Fittingly, the treaty signing ceremony took place on the lawn of the White House. No third party in all history has played so essential a diplomatic role as did the United States in this instance.

Close ties to the Soviet Union notwithstanding, when Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad wanted Israeli troops near Damascus withdrawn, he too turned to the United States. Kissinger obliged and traveled between Syria and Israel during a period of 33 days, finally obtaining a "separation of forces" agreement in May 1974. The good offices of the United States are open even to allies of the Soviet Union.

Despite these difficulties, the United States has taken the lead in proposing solutions to the West Bank and Gaza issues, and these have been codified in the Camp David accords and the Reagan Plan. The "Framework of Peace in the Middle East" calls for the "resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects" to be negotiated by Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and "the representatives of the Palestinian people." Towards this end, it proposes the following sequence of steps:

• Egypt, Jordan, and Israel send teams to negotiations dealing with the Palestinian question. "The delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually agreed."
• Negotiations are based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 "in all their parts."
• The inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza gain "full autonomy."
• An "elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza" is established.
• Israeli forces withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza.
• A transitional period of five years begins.
• No later than the third year, "negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbors, and to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan."

In accordance with these provisions, Egypt and Israel set up a committee to deal with Palestinian autonomy. It was disabled from the start, however, by the absence of Jordanian and Palestinian representatives.

Then, in an effort to prod the Middle East actors, President Ronald Reagan outlined a more specific American proposal about the future of the West Bank and Gaza. In a speech on September 1, 1982 he suggested "self- government by the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza in association with Jordan." In making this recommendation, the president rejected both an independent Palestinian state and permanent Israeli control of the areas. Although the Jordanian and Israeli governments, as well as the PLO, rejected this plan, it nonetheless remains the most realistic compromise for resolving the West Bank and Gaza issues.

In essence, the Camp David Accords and the Reagan Plan commit the United States to a recognition-for-land agreement for the West Bank and Gaza similar to that which worked in other areas. (East Jerusalem, because it is the most symbolic and contentious issue, has not been dealt with at all.) Two assumptions are implicit to the U.S. approach: that these regions should eventually return to Arab rule and that most Israelis will accept this if it brings them secure and tranquil frontiers.

Additionally, the U.S. government promoted Arab-Israeli discussions in Lebanon. An American envoy, Philip C. Habib, arranged the truce between Israel and PLO forces operating in Lebanon in July 1981. Ambassador Habib also headed diplomatic efforts to end the siege of Beirut in the summer of 1982; these paid off when the PLO agreed to evacuate the city at the end of August. American mediators participated in meetings and proposed compromise solutions when the Lebanese and Israeli governments negotiated in late 1982. On reaching a stalemate, Secretary of State George P. Shultz pushed the talks along by engaging in a new round of shuttle diplomacy. After traveling for two weeks in Lebanon, Israel, and other parts of the Middle East, he eventually found a formula acceptable to both sides and he hosted the accord signed in May 1983.

Reasons for Success

These extraordinary American achievements result from a combination of persistence and correct principles.

Persistence: The presence of the U.S. secretary of state or the president as head of delegation often provided a vital boost to mediation efforts. The American commitment made logistical compromises possible that might otherwise be missed, such as transition periods, demilitarized zones, early warning systems, and other confidence-building measures. The U.S. government even invented new forms of diplomacy: the mediator who flies form one capital to another (shuttle diplomacy), the isolation of heads of state in a rural retreat (the Camp David summit), and the payment of subsidies to the signatories of a peace treaty (Egypt and Israel after 1979).

Correct principles: These include, most importantly:

• Recognition-for-land. A settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict can only be achieved through an equitable exchange whereby the Arabs agree to live in peace with Israel in return for Israel relinquishing the Arab lands it controls. To create an atmosphere conducive to compromise, Washington encourages the Arabs to enter direct negotiations with Israel and urges Israel not to take steps obstructing eventual return of the territories.
• Recognition first, land second. Because recognition-for-land calls on Israel to give up valuable concrete assets in exchange for abstract and potentially revocable assurances, Washington rightly insists that the Arabs, who have less at risk, take the first step. The cycle of distrust can only be broken when the Arabs publicly recognize Israel and state their willingness to live in peace with it. The Americans do not expect Israel to relinquish the territories it controls until the Arabs come forth with recognition.
• Step-by-step diplomacy. A comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute is illusory because it requires agreement among too many parties and effectively bestows a veto on the most reluctant of them. Rather than aim for a comprehensive settlement, Washington seeks a gradual improvement of relations, one Arab state and one issue at a time.
• A secure Israel. The U.S. government builds Israel's military strength for two reasons. First, Israeli confidence in its security is a prerequisite for return of territories. The West Bank, Gaza Strip, and southern Lebanon provide military buffer zones for Israel; evacuation from them requires Israelis to feel assured of adequate defense capabilities. Second, a strong Israel discourages the Arab states from thinking they can defeat Israel by force, and this motivates them to seek diplomatic solutions.
• Close ties to Israel. Winning Israel's trust gives Washington credibility as an honest broker and as guarantor of agreements signed by Israel. It demonstrates this trustworthiness through steady military cooperation with Israel, exact fulfillment of agreements, careful monitoring of de-militarized zones, constructive votes at the United Nations, resistance to Arab boycotts, and the like. Making close relations with Israel a cornerstone of American Middle East diplomacy provides Americans with a unique influence over Israel to urge it to withdraw from Arab territories and take chances for peace.

Guided by a standing commitment to two goals – a secure Israel and good relations with the Arab states – U.S. policy remains constant despite many changes of leadership in Washington and in the Middle East itself. Future diplomatic successes may well follow if these principles continue to be followed.

Future Challenges

This long record of success notwithstanding, only one of the territorial issues between the Arabs and Israel – the Sinai Peninsula – has been resolved. Southern Lebanon, the Golan Heights, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip remain sources of intense dispute. If Washington is to help with these issues, it needs to work on them with the same persistence and correct principles of the past.

In Israel's negotiations with Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon, there is general agreement on two critical matters: that the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, and southern Lebanon belong to these states and that Israel would eventually return those territories. These three areas are relatively simple to deal with, for they each have only one claimant.

Southern Lebanon: The government of Lebanon recognized Israel and signed an agreement with it but subsequently reneged when pressures from Syria on it grew too great. Until a stable and independent government in Lebanon appears, Washington has no mediating function to fill.

Golan Heights: Israelis do not consider the Golan to be part of their ancestral homeland (Eretz Yisrael) but intense hostility with Syria makes them reluctant to return this territory. Although widely understood as annexing the Golan in December l981, the Israeli government in fact only extended civilian laws to the region. Recognition for land applies here. Should Syria recognize Israel, it seems unlikely that Israel will insist on control of the Golan. When the time comes for negotiations, the role of the United States will be to guarantee Syrian assurances and ease the transition for both sides.

The Palestinian territories are far more complex: Jordan and the PLO both aspire to the entire area of Mandatory Palestine (meaning all of today's Jordan and Israel, plus Gaza). Some Israelis consider Eretz Yisrael to include Judea and Samaria (a.k.a. the West Bank), so they too consider everything west of the Jordan River to be a part of Israel. Thus, the Gaza Strip has two claimants; East Jerusalem and the West Bank have three. In these mutually exclusive aspirations lie the source of immense difficulties, as reflected in the tensions that characterize Israeli negotiations with Jordan and the Palestinians.

That the PI.O and Israel both reject the recognition-for-land rules in effect elsewhere compounds the difficulty in mediating their dispute. Jordan does accept these rules but has stayed in the background for years, avoiding diplomatic initiatives.

East Jerusalem and the West Bank: Recognition-for-land breaks down here. The PLO refuses to recognize Israel; alone of the directly involved Arab actors, it rejects Security Council Resolution 242 (which calls for "respect for ... every state in the area") and the PI.O charter calls for the destruction of Israel by force. For its part, Israel refuses to give back these lands: East Jerusalem was absorbed into Israel within days of its capture in June 1967 and the West Bank has been increasingly settled by Israelis since then. The problem of East Jerusalem and the West Bank is compounded by the fact that whereas other Israeli-held Arab territories are seen in terms of the benefits they bring (security, oil revenues, etc.), these areas have a deep emotional significance unrelated to their usefulness, making compromise all the more difficult.

The Gaza Strip: Jordan and the PI.O but not Israel claim this small, isolated region. Though the subject of less contention than East Jerusalem and the West Bank, Gaza' s status remains completely uncertain. A few Israeli settlements have been established in Gaza since 1967.

To further these ends, the U.S. government encourages the two Arab claimants, Jordan and the PLO, to accept Israel's existence and enter the peace process started at Camp David; it also discourages Israeli settlements in the territories. Should Jordan or the PLO – or some other Palestinian organization – be prepared to negotiate with Israel, the United States will once again almost certainly play a major mediating role.

The Soviet Factor

If the United States reconciles differences in the Middle East, the U.S.S.R. pursues an opposite tack and thwarts almost every Arab indication of peaceful intent toward Israel. It attacks agreements, undermines Arab leaders contemplating peace with Israel, and punishes those who in fact do so. It vetoes efforts to involve the United Nations in Arab-Israeli negotiations and nixes the use of U.N. forces to patrol boundaries after agreements are reached. Pious words from Moscow about building peace in the Middle East to the contrary, the public record shows its rejection of virtually every specific accomplishment toward this end.

The Soviet Union viciously condemned the Sinai II agreement, the Camp David accords, and the Egypt-Israel peace treaty on the highly illogical grounds that these breakthroughs harmed the chances of an overall Middle East settlement. In the hope of forcing the Egyptian government to resume its state of war with Israel, the Soviet Union encouraged its allies to isolate and pressure Egypt. Soviet reaction to the Lebanon-Israel accord of May 1983 was no less negative. Again, it urged its allies, Syria in particular, to obstruct the peaceful conclusion of a long-standing state of war.

Soviet pressure also impedes the PLO from negotiating. Moscow backs those factions adhering to the most extremist rhetoric and devoted most exclusively to terrorism. When Yasir Arafat expressed possible interest in the Reagan Plan, the Soviet Union and Syria turned their forces in the PLO loose against him. Even though Arafat turned down the plan in April 1983, a rebel Fatah group emerged one month later attempting to depose him as head of the PLO. With regard to Jordan, King Hussein would like to negotiate the West Bank and Gaza with Israel on the basis of President Reagan' s September 1982 plan, but he dares not, fearful of defying the U.S.S.R. and Syria.

Differences between American and Soviet policy stem from fundamentally divergent interests in the Middle East. While the United States, West Europe, Japan and the rest of the free world gain from peace, the U.S.S.R. profits from tension. Tranquility brings the West, in addition to the obvious humane advantages, a stable supply of oil from the Persian Gulf, increased trade, security for Israel, and good relations with the Arab states.

The U.S.S.R., on the contrary, benefits from turmoil. Wars increase its sales of arms, the only Soviet goods that find a ready market outside the Communist bloc; heighten the probability of Soviet allies coming to power, and jeopardize the free flow of oil to the West. Hostilities create the best opportunity for Soviet political gains while peace excludes Moscow. Its lack of credibility in Israel means it cannot mediate between Arabs and Israel. Its lack of influence over Israeli then deprives it of peaceful methods of persuasion. Arab leaders seeking peace with Israel must therefore turn away from the Soviet Union and toward the United States. Opting for a diplomatic settlement is therefore tantamount to a decision to reduce Soviet influence.

Prospects

Although the United States has compiled a remarkable record in Middle East diplomacy, it has helped with only one lasting accomplishment, the Egypt- Israel peace treaty. New opportunities may be on the way thanks to a variety of factors. War against Israel no longer brings the benefits to Arab governments it once did. In addition, declining oil revenues, the Iraq-Iran war, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Lebanese conflict add to a general atmosphere of sobriety. This is a time when nearly Arab states are increasingly resigned to accepting Israel's existence. (Even Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi president, has publicly recognized Israel's need for secure boundaries.) There exists a novel readiness for compromise in the Middle East.

The current mood may soon come to an end, however, to be replaced by a less realistic, more ideological, and more violent era. Unless Arab-Israeli negotiations develop soon, a great opportunity may have been lost. If so, the Soviets and Syrians will have succeeded in destroying progress on the Arab-Israeli question for years to come. Recognizing that the opportunity to solve the Arab-Israeli and Lebanese crises may not last long, the U.S. government needs to make weakening of the Soviet-Syrian axis a top priority in the Middle East.

Daniel Pipes, visiting fellow at The Heritage Foundation and lecturer on history at Harvard, is the author of In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power (Basic Books).

APPENDIX: Major U.S. Initiatives in the Arab- Israeli Conflict, 1967-83

• June 19, 1967. Eight days after the end of the Six Day War, President Lyndon B. Johnson announces the American principles for a lasting Middle East peace. These include respect for the political independence and territorial integrity of all parties, freedom of innocent passage, and the recognized right of national life.
• November 22, 1967. The U.S. plays a major role in drafting U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 calling for "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict" and "termination of all claims... and respect for ... every State in the area."
• December 9, 1969. Secretary of State William Rogers presents a peace plan. "Our policy is to encourage the Arabs to accept a permanent peace based on a binding agreement and to urge the Israelis to withdraw from occupied territory when their territorial integrity is assured."
• August 7, 1970. Egypt, Jordan, and Israel accept a U.S. proposal for a Cease-Fire/Standstill Agreement, ending a war of attrition in the Sinai Peninsula.
• October 22, 1973. The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 338, a joint U.S.-Soviet proposal calling for a ceasefire and for implementation of Security Council Resolution 242.
• November 11, 1973. Egypt and Israel sign a six-point cease-fire agreement at Kilometer 101 along the Suez-Cairo road, the details of which are arranged by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.
• January 18, 1974. Egypt and Israel sign their first disengagement agreement (known as Sinai I), the result of Kissinger' s efforts and his travels between the two countries. Israeli troops withdraw from their former positions west of the Suez Canal in return for reduced Egyptian forces east of the Canal and the imposition of U.N. emergency forces.
• May 31, 1974. Kissinger travels between Syria and Israel and the two countries sign a "separation of forces" agreement in Geneva. It provides for a disengagement of troops, a buffer zone policed by the U.N., a gradual thinning of forces, and the return of some territory to Syria.
• September 4, 1975. Egypt and Israel sign a second disengagement agreement (known as Sinai II), capping seven months of diplomatic efforts by Kissinger. Israel evacuates more of the Sinai Peninsula in exchange for Israeli passage through the Suez Canal, a three-year non- belligerency pledge, and the placement of U.S. early warning stations in the Sinai.
• September 18, 1978. Following thirteen days of discussions at Camp David, Anwar al-Sadat, Menachem Begin, and Jimmy Carter sign two framework agreements. One calls for a comprehensive Middle East peace, the other forms the basis for a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.
• March 26, 1979. After five months of negotiations under U.S. auspices, including shuttle diplomacy by President Carter in the Middle East, Egypt and Israel sign a peace treaty and Israel agrees to evacuate the entire Sinai Peninsula by April 1982.
• July 21, 1981. Philip C. Habib, President Ronald Reagan's special envoy to the Middle East, arranges the cessation of hostilities between Israel and the PI.O forces in Lebanon.
• August 20, 1982. Ambassador Habib reaches an agreement that Israeli armed forces end their siege of Beirut in return for a PIO evacuation of the city.
• September 1, 1982. President Reagan announces a "fresh start" peace initiative for Jordan and Israel, suggesting "self- government by the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza in association with Jordan."
• May 17, 1983. After months of U.S. diplomatic assistance, including over two weeks of travel in the Middle East by Secretary of State George P. Shultz, Lebanon and Israel sign an agreement for the withdrawal of Israeli troops and the termination of the state of war between the two countries.