The System of Government
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a monarchy characterized by the exceptionally important role of the royal family, the House of Saud. Members of the dynasty fill most key positions and maintain a near monopoly over political activity in the country.
Saudi Arabia has possibly the least-known political system of any country with international importance. In part, this is due to the region's inaccessibility and, until recently, poverty. No outside power took much interest in central Arabia and the indigenous peoples developed their own political structures, almost without influences from the West. As a result, even though outsiders are now intensely interested in the Saudi system, they know little about it. To make matters worse, the royal family has followed a policy of extreme discretion, making its structures, divisions, and duties more a matter of speculation than of fact. Nonroyal political affairs are equally obscure, because political activity outside the royal family is banned.
The paucity of information means that reports about Saudi political institutions are sketchy, contradictory, and unverifiable. Reputable sources differ on such basic facts as the different types of law courts, the forums of local administration, and the number of King Abd al-Aziz's sons. The following account reflects these uncertainties.
Many of the Saudi state's unusual features can be explained by its relative newness. While some parts of the Arabian peninsula, such as the Yemen or the cities of the Hijaz, on the west coast of the peninsula, have long been governed by constituted governments, the rest of the area has been dominated by tribes which lack even the most elementary forms of state authority (a police force, a fixed capital, written records). Only when their energies were harnessed to a religious cause have the tribes formed anything more enduring than transient coalitions of warriors. This happened twice, first in the seventh century under Muhammad, the prophet of Islam, and second in the eighteenth century, when the religious leader Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, founder of the Wahhabi movement, joined forces with the tribal chief Muhammad ibn Saud. From the time of this alliance in 1744, the Saudi family has always led a cause with a grander purpose than mere camel raiding or protecting water wells. Religious ideology inspired Saudi soldiers to conquer many of the territories of today's Saudi Arabia before the kingdom fell to outside forces in 1818. It was resurrected on a smaller scale between 1820 and 1891 before falling again.
Thus, the Wahhabi-Saudi alliance was already 150 years old when Abd al-Aziz ibn Abd ar-Rahman ibn Faisal as-Saud began to piece the present state together in 1902 in the name of Islamic purification as preached in Wahhabi doctrine. Starting with the recapture of his ancestral home, Riyadh, he expanded his rule to other parts of central Arabia, then to the east and-west coasts of the peninsula. These conquests continued over a period of thirty-two years, until his territories reached approximately their present extent in 1934. His achievement, bringing al-Hasa ( east coast), Najd (inland), and Hijaz and Asir (southwest) under a single rule, was without precedent.
Abd al-Aziz named his domain the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932, commemorating his eighteenth-century ancestor and creating a state where none had ever existed before. The notion of a Saudi Arabian nationality no more existed in central Arabia before 1932 than that of a United States existed in sixteenth-century America. As with so many other new states, Saudi Arabia has had to establish itself as a meaningful political entity in a short time. Tribal affiliations are far from eradicated and the Hijaz still retains a sense of separateness (which is moderated, however, by the fact that it benefits from the oil revenues produced on the other side of the peninsula). The fact that the state was created from within, by a local leader, makes tribal and regional ties that much more binding; while most new states were created by European colonial masters – neutral outsiders who disrupted traditional systems and eventually left – Saudi Arabia was the achievement of one local family. As a result, the House of Saud is deeply resented by other tribal leaders for its wealth and power.
Abd al-Aziz relied on an ancient method for consolidating his kingdom: marrying the widows and daughters of his defeated enemies. Exploiting the right of a Muslim man to four wives at once and easy terms of divorce, he wed some three hundred women and had forty-five recognized sons by at least twenty-two mothers. These sons, whose birthdates range from 1900 to 1952, have constituted the dominant political force in the kingdom since Abd al-Aziz's death in 1953 and, assuming the regime stays in power, they will remain in charge for decades to come. Full brothers tend to form groupings against half-brothers; and because of their mother's origins, these disputes have direct tribal and regional implications. Until now, this discord has not created irreconcilable rifts.
Saudi leaders have shown a remarkable devotion to their own way of life, making theirs probably the only country of standing not willing even to make a show of adopting Western ideals and institutions. Islamic law reigns supreme with few concessions to Western sensibilities: women are forbidden to take part in public life, criminal punishments follow traditional forms, and the Koran is claimed to be the constitution of state.
Income from oil has led to a huge increase in the functions which the Saudi government undertakes. Half a century ago it did nothing more than provide a guarantee of social order and a rudimentary form of justice. The central government consisted of the king, his advisors, and some of his relatives; public functions were limited to royal assemblies; and the state treasury was no more than the sacks of gold coins carried wherever the king went. Today, the Saudi state offers among the widest array of services of any in the world, including free education through the doctorate degree, free medical treatment at some of the most advanced facilities in existence, padded salaries, low-interest loans, subsidies for consumer goods, and guarantees for businesses. It even helps young men pay bride-prices.
State functions have required a massive expansion of government bureaucracy, to the point that a large portion of the native Saudi working force is employed by the government. This gives the rulers a vital source of leverage; even more important, state functions have given the government pervasive control over the country, for it disburses nearly all the country's wealth. The Saudi leadership (and the rulers of other thinly populated oil-rich states) enjoy the unique advantage of distributing money to their citizens virtually without taxation. This gives the government an enviable popularity and a most extraordinary source of power over every aspect of life.
The King
The king (malik) of Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarch within the constraints of his family's support and the laws of Islam. He is head of state and chief executive of the government.
When Abd al-Aziz took Riyadh in January 1902, he acquired a twin title: imam (religious leader) of the Wahhabis and emir (prince) of Najd. He became king of Hijaz after conquering that province in January 1926 and shortly after elevated his title to "King of Najd and Its Dependencies." For five years he retained this cumbersome double kingship; then, on September 22, 1932, he announced that he had taken a new title, king of Saudi Arabia. Since Abd al-Aziz's death in November 1953, four of his sons have succeeded him to this position: Saud (1953-64), Faisal (1964-75), Khalid (1975- 82), and Fahd (1982 to the present).
The position of king includes several components, dynastic, tribal, and religious. It is as head of the House of Saud that the king derives his power, for the royal family's support determines who rules. Sovereignty resides in the family; whoever leads it is head of state. The selection of an heir-apparent in advance, a tradition established by Abd al-Aziz, is a key decision. Selecting the crown prince is perhaps the single most critical issue in Saudi politics; although it arises only occasionally, it touches on all actions of the royal family. Abdallah is the current crown prince.
The Saud family has no written rule of succession nor even an informal hierarchy. Muslim civilization has never decided whether succession should go by birthright or according to ability; as a result, most dynasties have mixed the two qualifications, often leading to disastrous succession crises. The House of Saud has transferred power nineteen times since the eighteenth century: nine times to a brother, seven to a son, and three to a cousin. A Saudi king typically hopes to pass his rule to a son. However, with thirty-one of Abd al-Aziz's sons alive at this writing, such a succession will be unlikely for some time to come. This issue could easily split the family. Selection of a new crown prince involves such factors as seniority, education, ability, temperament, popularity, the number of his full brothers, and his mother's tribal affiliation. Until now, ideology has played little role in this procedure. So far as can be discerned, the actual decision on matters of succession is taken by the Royal Council.
The king's tribal role (as sheikh) is decreasing, in large part because tribal ties are weakening in the context of a state which provides services once available only from the tribe (such as protection, welfare, and economic opportunities). Abd al-Aziz's style was always that of a tribal leader; even after becoming ruler of many tribes and immense domains, an international figure and a very wealthy man, he retained the demeanor of a tribal sheikh ruling through his personal authority and accessible to all, almost without intermediaries. As a government bureaucracy developed, the tribal aspect of the king's duties inevitably shrank; also, increases in population and in international concerns now limit the king's accessibility. He still holds audiences, however; he is addressed by his given name; and he is expected to mete out individual justice. The fact that King Khalid had cultivated excellent relations with the tribes was an important factor in his being chosen to rule.
As religious leader (imam) of his people, the king is bound to carry out Islamic law, to defend the borders from unbelievers, and personally to set a righteous example for his subjects. Saudi sponsorship of Wahhabi doctrines gives the king an unusually close connection to religion for a Muslim leader; even more important is his role as "Protector of the Two Holy Cities" (Mecca and Medina).
The Royal Family
Members of the ruling dynasty fill vital positions in the government, both at high and intermediate levels. The following list includes most of the positions held by the sons and grandsons of King Abd al-Aziz in early 1982 before the death of Khalid; it does not include the many other princes holding government posts.
Sons of Abd al-Aziz
Khalid: prime minister (since 1975)
* Fahd: first deputy prime minister (1975)
Abdallah: second deputy prime minister (1975) and commander of the National Guard (1963)
Abd al-Muhsin: governor of Medina
* Sultan: minister of defense and aviation (1962)
Muta'ib: minister of public works and housing Saudi Arabia (1975); minister of municipalities and rural affairs (1978)
Talal: special envoy, UNESCO (1979)
* Turki: formerly deputy minister of defense and aviation until 1979, now in disgrace
Badr: deputy commander of the National Guard Nawwaf: special advisor on Persian Gulf affairs
* Nayef: minister of the interior (1975)
* Salman: governor of Riyadh (1962)
Majid: governor of Mecca
Abd al-Ilah: governor of al-Qasim (1980)
Sattam: deputy governor of Riyadh
* Ahmad: deputy minister of the interior (1978)
Muqrin: governor of Ha'il (1980)
Grandsons of Abd al-Aziz:
Sons of Faisal
Muhammad: president, Islamic Bank (formerly head of the Saline Water Conversion Corporation)
Khalid: governor of Asir
Saud: foreign minister (1975)
Turki: director of foreign intelligence
Son of Abd al-Muhsin
Saud: deputy governor of Mecca
Son of Sultan
Fahd: deputy minister of labor and social affairs
[* Indicates members of the so-called Sudairi Seven, sons of Hussa bint Ahmad as-Sudairi. It also includes Abd ar-Rahman, not listed here.]
In all, the direct descendants of Abd al-Aziz number nine ministers and three deputy ministers, six governors and two deputy governors, as well as four other major positions.
All princes are entitled to a stipend. Unregulated before 1963, the privy purse once consumed most of government revenues, leading to extravagant consumption and corruption and, on two occasions, nearly bankrupting the kingdom. Since 1963, stipends depend on a mix of two factors: a prince's age and his proximity by generation and direct descent to Faisal ibn Turki, paternal grandfather of King Abd al-Aziz. Precise figures are of course unknown, but Abd al-Aziz's sons receive something on the order of $100,000 to $250,000 a year and the younger princes about $20,000 to $50,000 - handsome sums but nothing like the profits available in business, especially as agents of foreign firms selling to the government. (A deal to install a national telephone system reportedly fell through because the commission was excessive even by Saud family standards; Crown Prince Fahd's son Muhammad reportedly stood to gain $1.3 billion from this one transaction.)
Although King Abd al-Aziz used marriage to bind the country together, bringing daughters of almost every tribe and region to his bed, his descendants increasingly tend toward monogamy (a probable symptom of Western influence) and marriage to cousins (a reflection of their increasing sense of blue-bloodedness). Young princes and princesses are encouraged to marry within the House of Saud or its collateral lines, the Thunayan, Jiluwi, and Sudairi families. The only other family wholeheartedly sanctioned is that of Al Shaykh, the descendants of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, founder of the religious movement. Prince Turki's marriage to the daughter of a rich but undistinguished physician from Jeddah in 1978 contributed to his disgrace.
Royal Council
That the Royal Council (Ahl al-Aqd wa'l-Hall, Those who Bind and Loosen) even exists has been barely acknowledged by the government; its composition, functions, and jurisdiction have never been made public. It appears to be the forum in which the leading princes (but not the king) decide matters pertaining to the royal family. Foremost are those questions associated with the monarchy: choosing a crown prince, approving his succession to the throne, or requiring the king to abdicate. In addition, the Royal Council also decides more routine royal matters, such as stipends for princes and princesses, government appointments for princes, and questions of discipline.
Membership in this loosely structured body seems to vary according to the occasion. For example, about seventy princes signed a resolution of the Royal Council in March 1964 which sought to force King Saud to transfer most of his powers to Crown Prince Faisal; almost a hundred princes signed the decree forcing Saud to abdicate in Faisal's favor in October of that year. The March document was signed by the following relatives of the king: two uncles, twenty-three brothers, ten nephews, fifteen cousins, five members of the Jiluwi branch, two members of the Abdallah ibn Turki branch, eight members of the Saud al-Kabir branch, and three other distant cousins.
An "Inner Group" of the Royal Council also exists, about which we know even less; however, it appears to actually implement the full Council's wishes and to make routine decisions. It was this group which actually forced Saud (some say at gunpoint) to transfer his powers to Faisal in March 1964; the Inner Group proclaimed Khalid king within two hours of Faisal's assassination in March 1975. At that time, membership in the Inner Group was said to include Faisal's uncle Abdallah ibn Abd ar-Rahman and four of his oldest brothers: Muhammad, Nasir, Saud and Fahd. This Inner Group, probably the most powerful institution in the country by virtue of its influence within the royal family, including the right to appoint and recall a monarch, is also its least-known organization.
Council of Ministers
Abd al-Aziz had no need for ministers through the first decades of his rule; as a tribal leader with no administrative responsibilities, he waged war, distributed revenues, and adjudicated disputes. In about 1925, when his conquest of the Hijaz virtually ended the wars of expansion and opened a new era of consolidation and bureaucratization, this began to change. Abd al-Aziz kept some of the Hijaz's more developed political institutions (such as its directorates and consultative council), later using some of these as a basis for government institutions for the kingdom. Nonetheless, his rule remained patrimonial; Abd al-Aziz's son Faisal became the first minister in 1930, taking the foreign affairs portfolio. Abdallah as-Sulayman, the king's accountant, became finance minister two years later. Other ministries followed in due time, particularly in the 1950s and 1970s, marking the increasing size and complexity of the government. From the first, ministers have been both royal and nonroyal.
As the bureaucracy grew, ministers also gained in importance. Although always responsible to the king, they have in fact carved out a good deal of autonomy as the complexity of their offices has increased. With time, functional division has become more pronounced: princes still hold the most sensitive posts (defense, interior, national guard, foreign affairs), with commoners taking the more technical positions (finance, oil, planning). Religious authorities, usually of the Shaykh family, predominate in matters connected to religion, justice, and education.
Skills needed for modern government are still lacking among the Saudis. As a result, foreigners have played key roles in helping the House of Saud adjust to its new bureaucratic and international concerns; these include the "Northern Arabs" (Egyptians, Palestinians, Syrians, etc.), Muslims from other countries (Iran, India), and Westerners (the most famous being a Briton, Harry St. John Philby).
In his last official act, in October 1953, King Abd al-Aziz established a Council of Ministers to meet the "obligations and the diversifications of the responsibilities placed on the state." But the Council had no prescribed functions or effective role until a Royal Decree of May 1958 (inspired by Crown Prince Faisal) specified its policymaking and policy-executing duties. Like its predecessor, a Council of Deputies, the Council of Ministers has the authority to consider all questions arising in the kingdom, including the budget, treaties, contracts, administrative appointments, and court cases involving the government; however, unlike the Council of Deputies, this new body has to refer its decisions to the king for approval. Its decisions, therefore, are recommendations only, which may be ignored or enacted by the administration, as the king directs. A quorum requires two-thirds of the members, decisions are probably reached by consensus, and the king may veto a Council decision within thirty days.
The Council functions, in part, as a legislature by formulating most government decrees. The increasing volume of state affairs has meant growing authority and freedom of action for the Council. It cannot, of course, override a king's veto, but because no state funds can be paid out except through the Council, it can delay the effect of his positive decrees by failing to authorize the necessary funds.
Consultative Council
The Hijaz had a consultative council (majlis ash-shura, a representative body which can have some legislative functions) at the time of its conquest, but it was disbanded in all but name in 1928 when King Abd al-Aziz proclaimed his intent to replace it with a single consultative council for the whole kingdom. Nothing more was heard of this until years after Abd al-Aziz's death, when in 1960 Prince Talal, leader of a group called the "free princes," announced at a press conference that a "national council" was under consideration by the Council of Ministers; the government quickly denied his statement, but Talal had raised an issue which then refused to go away. When Faisal formed a new government in 1962, he promised to institute a consultative council, but again nothing happened. Khalid made a similar statement of intent on becoming king but also did nothing. More talk followed the Iranian upheaval in early 1979, followed by intense discussions after the Mecca siege of November 1979.
In January 1980, Crown Prince Fahd promised that a consultative council would be set up within two months. Two months later a committee was formed and charged with establishing a council in accordance with Islamic laws; two years later, its findings have not yet been made public. Talk of a consultative council surfaces in times of crisis, only to be forgotten with a return to normality. The royal family seems to believe that it can do without such a body and is holding out as long as possible against it. In turn, reformers, both royal and not, have made it the focus of their demands, correctly seeing it as the beginning of popular participation in the government.
Religious Law
Islam has direct bearing on the political life of Saudi Arabia because its sacred law minutely regulates the activities of believers, public (political authority, war, taxation, justice) as well as private (sexual relations, cleanliness, diet). Living by the sacred law of Islam requires an involvement with politics; a Muslim cannot live a wholly righteous life unless his government acts in accordance with Islamic law. Experts in the law, known as ulema, are therefore in a position to influence the rulers.
In no Muslim state in modern times have the ulema so consistently exercised political influence as in Saudi Arabia (Khomeini's revolutionary experiment in Iran is not really comparable); and nowhere else has Islam been taken quite so seriously as in the deserts of Arabia. According to the fundamentalist Wahhabi ideology, the Koran is the constitution of state (a view almost universally rejected by Muslims elsewhere). This then gives the leading ulema an interpretive role somewhat parallel to a supreme court except that these religious scholars are not necessarily government employees. Because the raison d'être of the Saudi state is narrowly tied to Wahhabi doctrines, the political leadership has been extremely careful never to stray far from the strictures of the ulema, especially those of the Shaykh family, the descendants of the Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. This family enjoys an authority over matters religious roughly parallel to that of the Saudis over matters political. Many religious, judicial, and educational posts in the kingdom are the preserve of the Shaykh family.
Since the eighteenth century, the religious authorities have had a police force, the Committee for Encouraging Virtue and Preventing Vice (Hay'at al-Amr bi'l-Ma'ruf wa'n-Nahi 'an al-Munkar), a vice squad operating in nearly all the cities ruled by the Saudis. It can punish any activity the religious authorities deem harmful, including smoking, drinking, music playing, breaking the fast of Ramadan, or gambling. It can even enforce observance of the daily periods of prayer. Over the years, the Committee's role has decreased, but it still compels storeowners to close shop during prayer periods and runs women off the street when more than their hands and feet are showing.
Relations between the political and religious authorities are cordial, a major strength of the Saud dynasty (in contrast to the Pahlavis in Iran). Nevertheless, tensions have developed as oil revenues transform Arabia's landscape. Tacit tradeoffs take place: in return for freedom of action in foreign policy, oil exploration, and economic modernization, the royal family permits the ulema greater power over the moral and private lives of citizens. The Iranian revolution spurred a tightening of controls after many years of relaxation: restrictions on women traveling and working, dress codes, and new regulations for foreigners were included. In general, the ruling dynasty, with its finely tuned political sensitivities, has prevailed over the more ideological and inflexible demands of the Wahhabi standard bearers.
During times of crisis, the royal family asks the leading ulema to issue religious decisions (fatwas) to sanction contemplated government actions. Twelve of them signed the fatwa authorizing the transfer of power from King Saud to Crown Prince Faisal in March 1964, including four members of the Shaykh family. In November 1979, leading ulema granted the government a fatwa permitting it to assault forcibly the Great Mosque in Mecca which had been taken over by religious fanatics.
Regional & Local Government
Provincial government is even more unclear than the central administration. Saudi Arabia is divided into eighteen provinces, two of which, Riyadh and the Eastern Province, make up half the country's expanse. Other leading provinces include Mecca, Medina, Ha'il, and the Northern Frontiers; their governors report directly to the minister of the interior, while governors of smaller provinces (Afif, Asir, al-Bahah, Bisha, al-Jawf, Jizan, al-Khasira, Najran, Northern Region, al-Qasim, al-Qu'ayyat, Ranya) report to the deputy minister. The current governors of Asir, Ha'il, Mecca, Medina, al-Qasim, and Riyadh are princes.
In keeping with the extreme centralization of the government, there are no provincial capitals; administration is direct from Riyadh. Regulations dating from November 1963 call for the creation of provincial councils, but like the consultative council on the national level, they have never come into existence. Each governor holds assemblies in which he grants financial assistance and dispenses justice much as the king does. Larger cities such as Mecca, Medina, and Jidda have general municipal councils whose members are nominated by local citizens and approved by the king. The policies they formulate are then executed by general administrative committees. In tribal areas, district councils are presided over by tribal chiefs. Villages have councils headed by the local sheikh along with three other members; their purpose is to enforce regulations received from higher levels of government.
Other Political Forces
A nearly total ban proscribes political activity outside the government. Demonstrations and strikes are violently repressed; elections are unknown. Political parties, labor unions, or any formal pressure groups are illegal, and no legislature exists (except in the executive, the Council of Ministers). The press is censored to preclude controversy, and many books are blacklisted. Police checkpoints strictly monitor movement between towns and the vice squad has free access to private homes. Surveillance is lowkey but pervasive. No forums exist for dissenting opinions on the royal family, the country's rapid changes, Islam, world politics, or oil policies. The system offers little scope for the expression of competing views, much less for acting on them.
Yet Saudi Arabia is not totalitarian: travel outside the country is common, political crimes are rare, people do not live in fear of the police, and the state does not try to take over all existing organizations. That the leaders have managed to ban political expression without becoming tyrants indicates that features of tribal leadership are still in force. Rulers see themselves in a paternal role, much as a sheikh of old might, in close touch with the concerns of subjects and keeping those concerns in balance. The populace, long used to being looked after in this manner, has not insisted on organized interest groups or popular representation. Reformers calling for a more representative political system have not won much support. With time, as the population becomes better informed, it may claim a greater political role; whether the House of Saud can recognize these aspirations in time will be a central factor in its continued stability.
Significant discontent may come from religious, tribal, regional, military, labor, and radical groups.
Islam
Many of Abd al-Aziz's conquests were accomplished by the Ikhwan (Brotherhood), a force of (10,000 settled Bedouin devoted to the most stringent interpretation of Wahhabi Islam. Growing restive about the king's increasing moderation and statesmanship after his conquest of the Hijaz In 1925, they eventually turned against him in 1929 to 1930. Although crushed, the fanatical spirit of (he Ikhwan and the legacy of their armed might arc vividly remembered. The attack on Mecca's Great Mosque, which occurred on November 20, 1979, and lasted two weeks, made it clear that this spirit was still alive and could yet threaten the Saudi dynasty. This event shattered royal smugness about knowing the subjects' concerns and inspired more political introspection among the rulers than at any time since the death of Abd al-Aziz in 1953.
Halfway through the Meccan siege, Shi'a riots broke out in Qatif in the far northeast of Saudi Arabia; if the attack on Mecca reminded Saudi rulers of their earliest constituency, the Shi'a disturbances symbolized the anger of their most-dispossessed subjects. Reviled and persecuted for their beliefs, the quarter million Shi'a living in al-Hasa have always suffered under Wahhabi rule. They lack representation in the government (to date, only one minister) and are particularly susceptible to influence from Iran (a group called the Islamic Revolutionary Organization, directed from Teheran, claimed to have instigated the 1979 riots). The Shi'a problem has special importance because it is centered in the oil-producing region; reports reached the West in early 1982 that whole villages of Shi'a had been relocated at the opposite end of the kingdom, in the southwest.
Regional
Oil revenues, which derive from resources in one small portion of the kingdom, have given all the other regions reason to stay within Saudi Arabia; but oil income tends to exacerbate differences between rich and poor regions, creating new dissatisfactions. Also, conflicts over tribal and regional representation at the national level become sharper the more money that the central government has to disburse. An abortive conspiracy to take over the government in May 1969 had a Hijazi character to it, and some have seen a tribal element in the attack on Mecca ten years later. These regional dangers, however, appear to be fading in the face of other tensions.
Military
The Saudi leadership views itself as a major force in the Middle East and Persian Gulf and has undertaken since 1962 to spend enormous sums of money (in 1981-82, $25 billion) on expanding and improving their armed forces. An enlarged military (current levels: 45,000 in the army, 17,000 in the air force, 4,000 in the navy) increases the danger of a challenge to the royal family. Officers were among the key figures of the 1969 coup attempt; and soldiers may have plotted with the fanatics who seized the Great Mosque in 1979, although there has been no clear evidence of military insubordination. Soldiers are privileged and respected; in the short run, this wins their loyalty, but eventually their increased power could lead them to turn against the state.
If so, the Saudi government is prepared. The National Guard, a 20,000-man force recruited and deployed along tribal lines, is considered the most loyal support of the Saud family and of the Wahhabi way of life. It is entrusted with defense of the government itself. In addition, a contingent of Pakistanis and other foreigners (numbering perhaps 20,000 men) guards the oil fields and could have a key role in controlling any internal disturbances.
Labor
A prohibition on labor unions means that all dissent is expressed illegally. Labor in Saudi Arabia divides into three categories: native, non-Muslim, and foreign Muslim. Native Saudis are highly privileged and often overpaid; to the extent that they are discontent, the government usually responds with alacrity to please them. For the foreseeable future, native workers will constitute only about one-third to one-fourth of the Saudi labor force.
Highly skilled workers from the industrial countries pose no problems; they come and go on relatively brief assignments. Other non-Muslim workers can also be contained, for example, the large numbers of South Koreans who come on contract and live in their own compounds, virtually quarantined from Saudi society.
Foreign Muslim workers, Arabs and non-Arabs alike (the latter including Turks, Iranians, Pakistanis, and Indians especially) come to Saudi Arabia for the money, but often reside there for long periods, becoming involved in the life of the country. They feel ties to the Saudis, ties which the government itself encourages with its frequent emphasis on the brotherhood of all Arabs and Muslims. Yet they are consistently paid less than citizens and denied the many privileges citizens receive. Non-native Muslim workers suffer a pervasive, almost systematic discrimination which contrasts glaringly with their expectations, a disparity which has explosive potential. The Saudi government, aware of this, has tried to cut back on employing non-Saudi Muslims; however, a complete exclusion will never be possible because the annual pilgrimage Muslims must make to the holy places of Islam located in Saudi Arabia brings new waves of illegal migrant workers every year.
Radical Organizations
The Arabian Peninsula People's Union, founded in 1953 in the aftermath of labor troubles in the oil fields, still survives in a minor way, without apparent means to threaten the regime. A Saudi Arabian Communist Party appears to be limited to Saudi citizens in exile. The Vanguard of the Arabian Revolution publishes a magazine, Voice of the Vanguard, which occasionally gets inside the kingdom, without noticeable effect. Saudi nationals have shown themselves remarkably unreceptive to radical ideologies. Extremist Palestinian organizations have conducted some sabotage in Saudi Arabia – including perhaps the two fires at the Abqaiq oil fields in 1977 which caused over $100 million in damages – but they have almost no appeal to Saudis.
National Prospects
The long-awaited consultative council, if and when it is established, will mark the beginning of a new era in Saudi politics. Even if entirely appointed by the crown and restricted to an advisory role on limited matters, the inclusion of representatives from the population at large will probably lead to increasing popular representation in the government and move it towards constitutional monarchy.
Until this happens, the Saud dynasty will have to try to balance the increasingly conflicting demands of its subjects without any formal guidance. Should the family lose touch – and this seems likely, given its wealth and international orientation – violent change could well sweep them aside. Oil income has created special tensions: rapid changes brought by modernization, a huge foreign presence, and the many problems associated with a boom-and-bust economy. But the Saud family has several factors working in its favor – the country's size, the separation between cities, and the different functions of the cities (press and embassies in Jidda, religious establishment in Mecca and Medina, administration in Riyadh, oil in Dammam) – all of which make it unlikely that a rebel force could take the country over. In addition, the government has protected itself well against internal enemies. Security is tight and probably effective. The armed forces are institutionally divided and would find it difficult to unite against the politicians. Princes of the Saud family occupy so many sensitive positions that it would be difficult to organize a conspiracy without their getting wind of it.
But if the government is well prepared for challenges from outside the royal family, it is much less well able to deal with the many hundreds of princes. This is a matter of personalities and currents little known to the outside world, but the fact that King Faisal was assassinated by his nephew (even if he was insane, as the Saudi government claims) strikes an ominous note for the future. Presumably, no one but a prince could have entered the king's assembly hiding a pistol. The "free princes" of the early 1960s point to the sort of ideological splits which can divide the royal family. But the most dangerous problem of all is an irreconcilable division over succession to the throne. The absence of a formula for succession virtually insures that, should the Saud family survive all other threats, it will fall on this inescapable issue.
Further Reading
Dhanani, Gulshan. "Political Institutions in Saudi Arabia." International Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1, 1980.
Harrington, Charles W. "The Saudi Arabian Council of Ministers." Middle East Journal, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1958.
Holden, David and Richard, Johns. The House of Saud: The Rise and Rule of the Most Powerful Dynasty in the Arab World. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981.
Kelidar, A. R. "The Problem of Succession in Saudi Arabia." Asian Affairs, Vol. 65, No. 1, 1978.
Koury, Enver M. The Saudi Decision-Making Body: The House of Al-Saud. Washington, D.C.: Institute of Middle Eastern and North African Affairs, 1978.
Long, David E. Saudi Arabia. Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1976.
Nollet, R. "Regard sur le clan des Al Saud." L'Afrique et l'Asie Modernes, 118 (1978).
Onder, Zehra, Saudi-Arabien: Zwischen islamischer Ideologie und westlicher Ökonomie. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1980.
