Too much information on Afghanistan comes from journalists who quickly don a turban, join a group of mujahidin fighters, get buzzed by Soviet gunships, and then think themselves experts. On the other hand, specialists who understand Afghan society and civilization well enough to assess the larger issues of the war tend not to know enough about conditions on the ground.
Olivier Roy, a young French anthropologist who has made annual trips to Afghanistan since 1980, mixes the knowledge of the specialist with the timely information of the traveler, and the combination is extremely impressive. Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan
(Cambridge, 256 pages, $24.95) is the first book to explain the context of the mujahidin and the factors that will decide their fate.
Mr. Roy is categorical in saying that "there is no possibility of the resistance being crushed by might." It faces military problems, to be sure, especially the scarcity of materiel and long lines of communication. But Mr. Roy contends that, above all, the war hinges on political relations among the Afghans. The U.S.S.R. can win if it succeeds in driving a wedge between the resistance and the Afghan population, even if that takes decades. The resistance can win if it manages to unify the Afghans behind the goal of Soviet expulsion.
Mr. Roy believes the resistance has taken proper steps to avoid alienating itself from the civilians. It takes great care to act in a legal fashion, treating noncombatants justly and respecting decisions made by independent religious judges. Moreover, nine long years of war have cemented relations between the resistance and the civilian population. This amounts to a major change in Afghan society, because, until the fighting began, Afghans directed their ultimate allegiance to the extended family, the tribe, the village, the profession or the ethnic group. The war pulled Afghans away from these parochial affiliations and imbued them with a sense of belonging to something larger.
In most countries where this process of cohesion has occurred, that larger entity is the nation. But in Afghanistan nationalism remains a weak force. Instead, allegiance has grown to the international community of Moslems, the Islamic people as a whole. This strengthening of Islamic sentiment translates into a much greater social role for Islam. Also, it gives religious officials an enhanced authority and permits fundamentalist leaders to emerge as the power brokers. In contrast, the standing of tribal leaders and village families has plummeted.
As proof of the civilian population's new solidarity, Mr. Roy points to the cooperation offered the resistance: "Throughout the country there is no shortage of willing guides, people who will lend out their horses, provide shelter, education and finance, without any coercion. To anyone who knew the old Afghanistan where, apart from individual hospitality, everything had to be paid for, the spiritual growth of the people is a striking phenomenon."
As the resistance cultivates interdependence between itself and the citizenry it must also promote alliances among its various armed factions. The Afghans can win only if they form wide-ranging, cohesive guerrilla groups that can roam the whole country (and not be limited to their own tribal grounds, as they usually are at present). Mr. Roy sees such groups as "the only way to counter the greater degree of mobility the Soviet army now has." Mobile patrols will be deployed only, however, once the Afghans overcome their old rivalries.
Should Afghan solidarity falter, the U.S.S.R. will win; should it improve, the resistance will win; and if it remains as it is, the war will continue indefinitely. This reasoning leads Mr. Roy to predict that Moscow will escalate the fighting, for this offers the only way the Soviets can exhaust the civilian population and pressure it to press for a settlement.
While Mr. Roy does not deal with U.S. policy, his analysis suggests some new and useful directions for American aid. In addition to weapons, the resistance needs both a radio station to provide trustworthy news and an underground network to operate in areas under Soviet control. The U.S. government already sponsors courses for Afghan journalists; it could also help train technicians and provide the hardware for a radio station. As for a subterranean organization, "the Afghans know next to nothing about underground resistance and are ill-suited to this kind of combat, being somewhat indiscreet."
Mr. Roy argues that the cohesion required from Afghans for the war effort generally is also crucial in this area. A religious leader-who is accustomed to openness and proselytizing-can no more run a clandestine network than the network can operate in the midst of tribal rivalries. Although major obstacles restrict the efficacy of an underground, this is probably an area where U.S. aid could accomplish much, either through training in this country or in Pakistan.
