 Hassan Nasrallah. |
With that praise out of the way, I shall criticize this step as a likely error: It distracts from the main theater of warfare, that of Gaza against Hamas.
For a year now, Israel has responded to the Oct. 7 atrocity. Not only was it unprepared on that day itself, but the government lacked plans for attacking Hamas, had relatively meager intelligence on its assets or leadership, and faced a powerful domestic and foreign lobby that urged making the return of hostages the first priority.
These limitations have rendered Israel's operation in Gaza only tolerably successful. Yes, military technicians may praise its tactics, but Hamas' leadership remains cohesive, its fighters remain active, its control over the population fairly intact, and its international support higher than ever. Not to put too fine a point on it, the middling progress over a year's duration contrasts dramatically with dispatching the three large state armies in six days in 1967.
To make matters worse for Israel, Hezbollah joined the conflict one day after Oct. 7. Enthused by the rampage and wanting to aid Hamas, it has attacked Israel's north with 8,000 rockets and missiles, destroying property, killing people, and forcing the long-term evacuation of more than 60,000 inhabitants. Israel demanded that Hezbollah cease its attacks and, when it did not, as any self-respecting state must, it took a series of measures, including the spectacular explosion of pagers and walkie-talkies.
 Israel has carried out large-scale operations against Hezbollah targets in Lebanon. |
The original goal had limited reach: induce Hezbollah to stop the aggression so people can return to their homes. This was a classic instance of deterrence. Cease and desist, or else.
But, as Israeli successes built on each other, the Israeli leadership succumbed to temptation, increased its ambitions, and lost its way. Forgetting deterrence, it decided (in the words of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu) "also [to] defeat Hezbollah." Ending the rocket attacks gave way to ending Hezbollah itself. Jerusalem fell into a classic pattern among victors: lose sight of the original war goal, get carried away, and adopt needlessly larger ambitions.
 Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared war on Hezbollah at the United Nations on Sep. 27. |
As a result of this error, Israel now finds itself with two full-scale battles on its hands, in the south and in the north, and two organizations to destroy. It took on Hezbollah before killing Hamas and faces the prospect of killing neither.
Note the contrast: whereas a ceasefire with Hamas has terrible consequences for Israel because it means giving up national interests in favor of a few lives, a ceasefire with Hezbollah ends the rocket and missile attacks, permitting the residents to return home and Israeli forces to devote their entire attention to Hamas.
May the Netanyahu government change course, agree to a ceasefire with Hezbollah, and without distraction obliterate Hamas.
Mr. Pipes (DanielPipes.org, @DanielPipes) is president of the Middle East Forum and a former professor of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College. © 2024 by Daniel Pipes. All rights reserved.
Sep. 28, 2024 addenda: (1) I mention my Naval War College experience in the tagline above because I co-taught a course there on "policy and strategy." Based on the writings of Carl von Clausewitz, it seeks to drill into officers the need to decide on a war goal and then stick to it. Specifically, it warns against letting success lead to expanded goals. That is precisely what I see happening in Israel now: the brilliant offense versus Hezbollah makes the plodding war on Hamas look tedious, so why not de-emphasize the latter in favor of the former? That road leads to perdition.
(2) A number of readers disagreed with the analysis above on the grounds that Israel has effectively completed its war on Hamas. To which I reply:
If so, why does Hamas still threaten Gazans? Why is there no administration in place in Gaza? Why has reconstruction not started? Why has Netanyahu not claimed that the destruction of Hamas is completed?
This Sep. 13 New York Times report suggests the problem:
nearly a year into the war, the civilian government still functions. Mr. [Ismail] Thawabteh, the director general of the Hamas-run government media office, said the government still employs thousands of people, helps distribute aid and organizes Friday prayers. Security services continue to try to enforce the law, he added.
Government-run emergency committees help secure aid and maintain order, Mr. Thawabteh said. "The government in Gaza is living through a time of challenges," he said. "But it's still in place carrying out its duties every day."
Hamas is not the only group active in Gaza. Palestinian Islamic Jihad, a Hamas ally that participated in the Oct. 7 terror attacks, remains strong. Armed gangs and neighborhood committees operate throughout the territory, with some also making threats and carrying out revenge attacks.
American officials say the groups operate with the implicit blessing of Hamas, though its precise level of oversight and control of them varies from group to group. But Mr. Sinwar is the unchallenged leader of Gaza. While his day-to-day control of the government is attenuated, as he tries to avoid being captured or killed by Israel, he still sets the broad goals and policies for Gaza, according to officials briefed on the intelligence.
Aid agencies trying to deliver humanitarian relief to Gaza acknowledge Hamas's continued control. Aid convoys must coordinate their efforts with local Hamas leaders, or risk the aid not getting through. Efforts to have Gazans who are aligned with the West Bank-based Palestinian Authority help secure aid convoys have fallen apart. American officials say Hamas hostility and threats on those convoys shut down the effort.
Another New York Times report, dated Sep. 17, elaborates.
- Khaled Meshal of Hamas: "Hamas has the upper hand. It has remained steadfast" and it brought the Israeli military into "a state of attrition."
- Ghaith al-Omari of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy: Hamas leaders "completely feel time is on their side. They think they're the only game in town."
- Maj. Gen. Gadi Shamni, a former commander of the Israeli military's Gaza division: "Hamas is winning this war. Our soldiers are winning every tactical encounter with Hamas, but we're losing the war, and in a big way. ... There's no one that can challenge Hamas there after Israeli forces leave."
- Akram Atallah, a columnist for the Ramallah-based Al-Ayyam: "If the war ends now, it would be a victory for Hamas."
Sep. 30, 2024 update:
Headline: "Israel Sends Troops Into Lebanon, Escalating Fight Against #Hezbollah. First big incursion in two decades fans fears of wider regional war."
I don't so much fear a wider regional war as that supposed @PotteryBarn slogan, "You break it, you own it." Israel has enough... pic.twitter.com/1TUnsvFgLt
— Daniel Pipes دانيال بايبس 🇺🇦 (@DanielPipes) September 30, 2024
Oct. 4, 2024 update: Today's headline: "Hamas Leader Is Holding Out for a Bigger War, U.S. Officials Say."
Oct. 6, 2024 update: More proof, if needed, that Israeli operations in Gaza are far from over: "Israeli forces redeploy to northern Gaza to quell Hamas resurgence."
Oct. 15, 2024 update: Israeli inattention to Gaza has prompted a highly unusual joint letter from the U.S. secretaries of state and defense warning that unless Israel address the "deteriorating humanitarian situation" in Gaza, they will reassess the provision of American armaments to Israel. Put differently: Defeating Hamas and establishing a decent administration in Gaza must be Jerusalem's immediate priority, not cleaning up Lebanon.
Nov. 5, 2024 update: "Though battered, Hamas still able to function in central Gaza," reads a Times of Israel headline.
