As Arabs and Israelis negotiate in Washington to resolve their decades-old conflict, one of the usual suspects is missing: the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Yasir Arafat's authority has eroded and his organization is in disrepair. While his own people mutter, enemies accost him from all sides. In the assessment of U.S. News & World Report, "the PLO today faces the gravest challenge in its history," as a result of which it "can contribute little of real substance" to the peace process." This bleak situation contrasts with just three years ago, when the PLO was riding high-rich, influential, and in the ascendant.
More than a dozen factors help explain this rapid change in fortunes. We start with the mundane and end with the global:
Arafat's marriage. After decades of insisting that he was "married to the revolution," Arafat wedded Suha at-Tawil, a Christian woman some thirty-five years his junior who had worked for him. Apparently much in love, he no longer works the legendary twenty-hour days of old.
Arafat's concussion. Two people died when Arafat's plane made an emergency landing in the Libyan desert in April 1992. Arafat's head injuries seem to have affected his ability to concentrate and perhaps his lucidity.
Arafat's outbursts. The PLO leader got taped in early 1992 talking to the PLO's representative in France repeatedly cursing Jews ("Damn their fathers! The dogs! Filth and dirt!" "Trash is always trash!" "The rotten Jews"). This intemperate blast much discredited him in the West.
Loss of PLO leaders. The PLO's military chief, Khalil al-Wazir (a.k.a. Abu Jihad), was killed in his Tunisian home in April 1988 by an assassination force. Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), the PLO's number two, died just two days before the Gulf War began in January 1991 when a bodyguard turned on him. Neither PLO leader was replaced; Arafat simply took over their functions. As a result, he now holds some thirty-two PLO titles, ranging from President of Palestine to Inspector-General of the Al-'Asifa Forces.
Palestinian anger at the PLO. Palestinians increasingly resent the PLO leadership for its self-serving record. A secret report written in mid-1991 by one of Yasir Arafat's earliest allies gave expression to these widespread concerns. The report accused Arafat personally of causing Al-Fatah's "inconceivable moral degradation" and indicted the whole PLO leadership for selling out the revolution. The guerilla fighter of yesteryear died long ago, it went on, replaced by those interested in "the red carpet, the private plane of the president, free rein to spend money."
Palestinians who once bit their tongues about Arafat now speak freely. Some contest the PLO's representativeness. Zaki Razaq, a Palestinian ex-banker from Kuwait declares that "Ninety-five percent of those [Palestinians] who lived in Kuwait don't like Arafat. He only represents himself." Similarly, Hanan 'Ashrawi is described as "a spokesman for herself alone." Ahmad Jibril of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine is even more acerbic: "The PLO and its leadership do not represent the Palestinian people as rumored, and the Palestinian National Parliament... has not been elected by the Palestinian people. It was appointed by Arafat."
This disaffection turns up in survey research. Of Palestinians living in the camp of 'Ayn al-Hilwa in the spring of 1991, just 11 percent of those questioned pledged allegiance to the PLO , less than those affiliated with local Islamic groups (16 percent) and far fewer than those without affiliation (59 percent).
Fundamentalist Muslim anger at the PLO. Arafat's willingness to negotiate with Israel has won him the enmity of fundamentalists everywhere, and especially in Tehran. The revolutionary government there scorns him as a sellout and maneuvers to weaken his organization. Here's a typical Iranian newspaper comment: "While the Palestinian nation fought the despots in its homeland with stones, he [Yasir Arafat] relaxed on the beaches of Tunis with cool drinks, remembering the homeless and the oppressed." Fundamentalists elsewhere echo these sentiments. "It shames me to pronounce his name," said Ali Ben Hadj, the Algerian fundamentalist leader, of Arafat. Conversely, 'Abbas al-Musawi of Lebanon refers scornfully to the PLO as "Arafat's group."
Syrian anger at the PLO. After years of enmity, Damascus now openly derides Arafat. Mustafa Tallas, the regime's outspoken defense minister, made fun of Arafat's preference for fighting Arabs over Israelis by ascribing to him the maxim, "The liberation of Palestine can be achieved via Zimbabwe."
The intifada. The PLO still uses terror against Israelis, but stone-throwing and hatchet-wielding youths don't submit to orders from the PLO, making a mockery of that organization's authority.
The rise of Hamas. Hamas, a radical fundamentalist Muslim organization, espouses vicious anti-Semitism and utterly rejects the State of Israel ("Kill them [Jews] where you find them and expel them from where they have expelled you"). Hamas has flourished partly because its message resonates among Palestinians, especially in Gaza, and partly because it receives Iranian and Saudi backing. If Hamas continues to gain strength, it threatens to marginalize the PLO.
The rise of other anti-PLO Palestinian organizations. Arafat has innumerable other enemies among the Palestinians. Abu Nidal's group has targeted PLO operatives for almost two decades. The clutch of Palestinian organizations based in Damascus oppose Arafat's nearly every move, and are not shy about saying so. Some of Arafat's most vehement enemies come from his former ranks. Here's Abu Musa, the Fat'h figure who rebelled in 1983: "Arafat turned the Palestinian revolution into a bureaucracy so rotten that it is worse than the bureaucracy in any underdeveloped country. Naturally this institution was not capable of fighting. So when war broke out, the leadership ran away, leaving the rank and file to pay the price." Followers of Salah Khalaf formed the 14 January Correction Movement-Fat'h (that being the date of Khalaf's murder) and issued a leaflet in the West Bank characterizing Arafat as a "scheming buffoon" and an "evil Satan" who killed Khalaf on account of disagreements about Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.
West Bank disaffection. Palestinians living under Israeli rule have noted the PLO's inability to deliver. An Arabic newspaper published in Jerusalem, Al-Fajr, editorialized thus: "The ineptness of the PLO leadership in dealing with world developments is almost legendary... and threatens the future of the Palestinian people." The newspaper then raised a hitherto heretical idea: "Maybe it is time some new blood be introduced into the Palestinian leadership."
The Arab-Israeli negotiations. Israeli willingness to deal with Faisal Husseini, Hanan Ashrawi, and the other Palestinian delegates to the Washington negotiations pushes the PLO off the diplomatic center stage, relegated to maneuvering behind the scenes.
Siding with Saddam Hussein. The Kuwaiti, Saudi, and Egyptian governments have not forgiven Arafat for backing Saddam Hussein. A senior Saudi official publicly called him "that clown." "We hate his face," wrote an Egyptian columnist. Like the fundamentalists, Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir as-Sabah dismisses the PLO as "Yasir Arafat and his group." Powerful Arab governments, which once aided the PLO, now mock its goals and harass its operations.
Money troubles. The oil-rich states have almost completely cut off the funds to the PLO. Yasir Arafat complains in December 1992 that "no oil state has given the Palestinians a single penny" since April 1990. While not strictly true (the Saudis sent the PLO $3 million in October 1992), money got so tight in late 1991 that the PLO had to close its offices in Denmark, Norway, and Bolivia. More humiliating yet, the Tunisian telephone company cut off service to the PLO headquarters.
The Soviet collapse. The Soviet bloc provided enormous help to the PLO through its political support and practical assistance (intelligence, arms, training, and so forth). Obviously, all this has lapsed.
Buffeted by the more moderate and the more radical, despised by Arab and Israeli, abandoned by its patrons, the PLO seems finally to be heading for oblivion. If so, the left-wing nationalist interregnum of the Palestinian movement has come to an end, and it reverts to the Islamic basis of old. One continuity stands out: Palestinians invariably prefer the approach to Israel which most completely rejects that country's right to exist.
Sep. 13, 1993 update: Arafat simultaneously validated this analysis and escaped it by signing the Oslo Accords with Israel today. Will the gambit work?
