It is a relief to get away, at least momentarily, from the intricacies of peace process diplomacy and return to the bedrock of the Arab-Israeli conflict-conventional warfare. Goodman and Carus, two talented military analysts, provide an authoritative and insightful assessment of the "future battlefield." They do so primarily from the vantage point of Israel-not surprising given the close U.S. ties to Israel and the wealth of information and analysis coming from that country.
They develop several lines of thinking. Syria is the only strategic enemy of Israel (the other Arab countries pose "at worst a tactical . . . concern" for Israel). Damascus has "fallen far short" of achieving strategic parity with Israel, its long-standing aim; but the Syrian force is powerful enough to provide a "potent deterrent" to Israeli military action. Middle East forces will continue to depend on imported high technology. Economics will critically affect the impact of high technology on the Arab-Israeli military balance. Paradoxically, while make mutual deterrence more likely, they also increase Israel's ability to deliver a knock-out blow.
Perhaps the key conclusion is that "the new technologies will tend to benefit Israel more than the Syrians." This is because Israel has the skills to make such weapons, to improve on those acquired abroad, and to staff them. As a result, "Israel will undoubtedly continue to enjoy an absolute military advantage over Syria-and even a wide constellation of Arab states-during the 1990s."
