Starting from the premise that the U.S. military attack against Libya on April 15, 1986, was "probably the most controversial discrete foreign policy action undertaken by the Reagan administration," Davis offers a solid and very detailed analysis of this incident. In addition to the heroic research effort that went into his account, what makes it especially valuable is that it, unlike the majority of book-length treatments of Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi, contains not the slightest taint of apologetics for the "mad dog of the Middle East" (as President Reagan once described him).
Davis reviews the consequences of the raid on Tripoli, the opinions current in the United States at the time (such as, that fighting against Libya "could easily rival Vietnam as one of America's longest and most painful military involvements") and comes up with a noteworthy conclusion. While accepting the limited utility of military force, especially when deployed episodically, Davis argues that the raid won real benefits. "Over against the rigid assertion that military force cannot possibly accomplish anything against terrorism, and in fact will only create a cycle of worse violence, it appears that the U.S. attack may have helped break the cycle of accelerating Middle Eastern terrorism dating from 1983." He is right; in hindsight, it appears that 1986 marked the apogee of Middle East-based terrorism against Westerners, and that the American raid was a critical element in the subsequent reduction in incidents.
