Despite its title, over nine-tenths of this large and impressive trilogy deals with the Middle East-no surprise given that both authors have earned their marks as specialists on Middle East military matters. The entire study was conducted under the auspices of the Defense Advance Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and is grounded in a rigorous review of journalist and scholarly sources (no doubt enhanced here and there by Pentagon information). Each analysis follows the same outline: a chronology followed by an analysis of forces, operations, and weaponry. But the analyses do differ - the longer the better.
The Iraq-Iran war receives the most attention and is by far the most consistently original and insightful account; indeed, it should be many years before anyone matches the scope of Cordesman and Wagner's undertaking. Next most impressive is the review of the 1973 and 1982 Arab-Israeli wars, along with an interpretation of trends since 1982; this volume is thorough but not quite so pathbreaking. Finally come the relatively short surveys of wars in Afghanistan and the Falklands, which are merely useful.
The authors draw specific lessons: Western threat assessments "have a number of shortcomings" when used against unsophisticated opponents; nothing can replace the infantryman; the tank remains important; and so forth. The conclusion takes up the issue of applying technology to limited force engagements, concentrating on the U.S. Central Command. Of many insights, one especially stands out: the West should, wherever possible, arrange for friendly local states to carry as much of the military burden as possible.
Mar. 14, 1996 update: Volume 4, The Gulf War, has appeared.
