Feste's goodwill is as obvious as is her ignorance of the Arab-Israeli conflict. A specialist on "intervention strategy in world affairs," she writes about Arab-Israel relations because this "provides an intriguing and fascinating introduction to international politics." Her previous work includes two studies on negotiations between the Arabs and Israel: one on decision making games, the other a public policy simulation exercise. Her technique involves drawing on perception theory, negotiation theory, and theories of power, then combining these with the empirical record of actual plans and behavior in the hope of discovering new insights into forwarding the negotiating process. So far, so good.
Trouble is, Feste doesn't understand the nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict. She sees it as a bilateral struggle between two parties, the Palestinians and Israelis, thereby missing the very element that makes this issue so difficult to solve-the multitude of claimants on the Arab side. Against all evidence, she terms the Arabs "a distinct ethnic and religious" group, then implies they all share the Palestinian viewpoint. Plans for Peace makes no mention of the Syrian government and very little of the Iraqi, Jordanian, or Egyptian governments, as though these powerful bodies were mere bystanders in someone else's drama. This makes about as much sense as ignoring Hanoi in a study of the Vietnam War, or excluding Managua from an analysis of the El Salvador insurgency. The lesson is clear; before anything else, a theorist must immerse herself in the facts of a case study.
