Pappé, one of Israel's revisionist historians, synthesizes the work of his clique. Despite a consistent and pronounced anti-Israel bias (which isn't all that surprising: Israeli academics are about as alienated from their government as American academics from theirs), the results hold great interest.
Pappé repudiates the Zionist portrayal of a tiny, nascent Israeli state surrounded by enemies, winning its war of independence through pluck and courage. For him, the war was over "before even one shot had been fired." How so? Because the Yishuv had built a solid and effective state-like infrastructure over two decades. It had governing bodies, diplomats, military units, intelligence assets, and economic infrastructure. From a customs agency to a medical system, everything was in place and functioning. As a result, "When the hour struck on 15 May 1948, the Jewish community was ready." In contrast, the Palestinian leadership failed to use the mandatory period to prepare. Pappé points to two main failings. First, members of the elite, persistently looked out for number one, prompted much internecine fighting. Second, they invited the Arab rulers into Palestine, hoping these would carry their water. Of course, the kings and presidents had-then as now-their own interests which they pursued at the Palestinian expense.
Rather than a tightly integrated history, Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict consists of ten essays only loosely tied together. In combination, they constitute the new standard interpretation of Israel's emergence as a state.
