The division in American policy toward Arab-Israeli diplomacy is symbolized by the Clinton Administration and Congress. Clinton and his team of "peace processors" encourage Israelis at every turn to make concessions. And why not? The short-term benefits of this policy are hard to dispute: glamorous signing ceremonies, Nobel Prize nominations, and a general sense of good feeling.
Far more striking is the what I call the miracle of Congress: the fact that both chambers have shown themselves, time and again, to be stalwart friends of Israel's long-term interests. Congress has pushed to move the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, reduced and conditioned American aid to the Palestinian Authority, and decried Palestinian actions. It has also supported policies elsewhere in the Middle East that are very much in Israel's interest – condemning the Syrian occupation of Lebanon, sending money to the Iraqi resistance, and restricting American trade with Iran.
Symbolic of this, in March 1999 the Senate voted 98-1 and the House voted 380-24 to discourage Yasir Arafat from unilaterally declaring a Palestinian state. It is a curious parlor game to estimate what the vote in Israel's parliament on this resolution would have been; would it even have passed with a simple majority? (April 8, 1999)
