For two decades after 1969, Israel had a terrible time preventing attacks from Lebanon. For many years, this was because it was the only one of them to lack a strong central authority. When deadly missiles or terrorists came across the border, no one quite knew to blame. Into this anarchy, the Begin government placed Israeli soldiers at the south of the country, starting in 1978 and then more so in 1982.
Then, since about 1990, the main problem for Israel has been that there is a number to call, but it has a Damascus area code. The Syrian domination of Lebanon – with some 35,000 uniformed troops and uncounted intelligence agents – implies that getting anything done in that country requires approval from Hafiz al-Assad, one of the toughest, meanest, and canniest rulers in the Middle East.
Israeli soldiers are still guarding southern Lebanon, keeping out the missiles and terrorists with reasonable efficacy but themselves getting badly harmed. Understandably fed up with this situation, in which their soldiers often serve as sitting ducks targeted by their enemies, especially those of Hezbollah, Israelis want out. They hope that reaching a comprehensive agreement with Syria will achieve this.
But Assad benefits from the anarchy in Lebanon and will undoubtedly keep Israel off-balance there. Hoping for Assad's benevolence is a hopeless undertaking. (April 8, 2000)
