George W. Bush's efforts at Arab-Israeli diplomacy has differed dramatically from anything in the preceding half century. Here are some of Bush 43's radical changes:
- Opting for a Palestinian state: Not since 1947, or before the State of Israel came into existence, had the U.S. government proposed that creating a "Palestine" would solve the conflict.
- Deciding on the final status: Earlier presidents insisted that the parties directly involved had to decide on an acceptable resolution.
- Imposing a settlement: Not since 1977 had Washington proposed an international group (the "Quartet") for resolving Arab-Israeli issues.
- Tying actions to a timetable: Negotiators had rightly shied away from calendar-specific goals, as deadlines tend to slip by.
- Pushing aside tyrants: American negotiators hitherto accepted whichever Middle Eastern dictators they were served but the Bush administration (in addition to deposing leaders in Afghanistan and Iraq) decided (unsuccessfully) to push Yasir Arafat aside and replace him with his deputy, Mahmoud Abbas.
- Plunging the president into the negotiations: Until this administration, the president's aides did the heavy lifting before the president got involved.
- A personalized policy: In the past, a policy bubbled up from above, drawing on experience, debate, and consensus-building of many people, while the current approach reflects the president's highly personal vision.
In short, GWB's policies vis-à-vis Arab-Israeli diplomacy are egoistical and dangerous. (April 8, 2004)
