blue-ribbon commissions should be analytic, not political

Submitted by Stuart Fagin (United States), Dec 13, 2006 at 23:48

Both the 9/11 commission and the Iraq Study Group exhibit a significant characteristic of what are popularly called "blue ribbon commissions". Although, the public face of these commissions is of groups of experts, devoid of partisan sentiment, carrying out a solely analytic function, in reality they willfully act to influence decision-making. In other words they act as political entities. Specifically, they depart from an analytic function when they (1) announce at the outset that they intend to present unanimous conclusions, (2) appear on numerous talk shows promoting their ideas, and (3) hold meetings, well after the presentation of their conclusions, with the intent of grading the administration on how well it has implemented its recommendation. The first point, the commitment to a unanimous opinion, bears discussion.

"MARGARET WARNER: Congressman Hamilton, do you think it (the commission's report) will be unanimous? LEE HAMILTON: Well, that's our goal. … I don't have any doubt at all that the commissioners want it to be solid unanimous. We all understand that if our recommendations are going to have any currency in this town that it cannot be recommendations that break along party lines. We're either going to have to have a unanimous report or something very close to it. I would make the prediction, however, that I think most of our recommendations will be unanimously supported. " (www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/terrorism/jan-june04/commissioon_6-16.html)

Such a commitment for any commission member, must, necessarily compete with his individual analytic judgments. Can it be that every commission member agrees on every aspect of the report? If so, how does that comport with the 9-11 commission admonishment against groupthink? If not, where are the dissents?

The 9-11 Commission and the ISG desire unanimity in their conclusions because the implied certainty gives these conclusions political force. The public sentiment for enacting their recommendations would surely be far less if they were not unanimous. But the present public confidence in these recommendations is misplaced because the unanimity is contrived, not genuine. These commissions desire to be, in effect, a "burning bush" (there is an impressive double entendre here), an unquestioned font of wisdom.

To use a medical analogy, if you had a significant medical condition, and so sought several opinions, would you wish the physicians to collude to present you with a unanimous conclusion? Or would you prefer to be presented with independent viewpoints so you may judge the degree of uncertainty? In the war against radical Islam we are being assaulted in a way we have never before experienced. (To plagiarize VDH, a war like no other.) We would benefit greatly from a mature public that was cognizant of the uncertainties attendant with any policy that deals with the threat, and a public that was more understanding of our political leadership.

Presidents should follow these guidelines with regard to blue-ribbon commissions: (1) Avoid them. They evolve into competing political power centers. (2) If a genuine analytic need exists for outside policy review, take the lead in composing the commission early on, before public sentiment takes these decisions out of your hands. In hindsight it is clear that the Bush administration (particularly, the usually sage Cheney) erred in resisting a 9-11 commission soon after the event. When public sentiment for a commission prevailed the administration was rendered with little influence regarding its composition. The Republican office-holders on the commission, Thompson, Gorton and Kean were all moderates from blue states and not particularly inclined to defend the administration. There was no balance to the partisanship of Ben-Veniste and Kerrey. Moreover, it was outrageous that Gorelick, an important figure in the Clinton administration's anti-terror efforts, sat on the commission, in effect, reviewing herself. (3) Attempt to staff the commissions with individuals with an analytic outlook rather than a political one. Specifically, seek genuine experts in the commission's area of responsibility rather than public figures with broad approval ratings. If the commission must be populated with some politicians have at least one individual who is a strong supporter of the administration policies to ensure these receive a reasonable advocacy within the commission deliberations. The ISG is composed of "realist" Republicans and Democrats with no enthusiasm for a victorious policy in Iraq. (4) Staff the commission with members who possess some degree of humility. (5) Discourage the notion that the commission will have failed in its mission if does not produce a unanimous opinion. Rather, the commission's reports should express consensus where it truly exists and dissenting opinions where it does not.

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