Interesting, but . . .

Submitted by Edward Halper (United States), May 29, 2007 at 14:27

An interesting thesis, but I wonder what the Soviets were planning. If they imagined a draw, there would not have been much of pretense to intervene. They must have supposed that the Arabs would lose, only not so quickly. And what about 1973, when the Soviets had their draw? That would have been a chance to intervene. Or did the decisive, and unprecedented, support Nixon gave to Israel stymie their plans again? In retrospect, it was odd, given the Soviets' involvement with the Arab states that they did not act more aggressively against Israel. And, then, why was Sadat willing to negotiate with Israel when Syria, also a Soviet client state, was not? Indeed, Sadat expelled Soviet advisers in July, 1972 claiming later that he did so to prepare for war. Would the Soviets have been holding him back in 1973, or was this all posturing? What makes the book's thesis suspect is subsequent events. Perhaps these loose ends are tied up in the book.

The value of the decisive 1967 victory has probably been exaggerated. It was strategically good, and it led to peace with Egypt. But Israel has been consistently blamed for the war in Europe and, worse, it remains stuck with an intransigent Arab population. Recently, Israeli leaders have tried to get Egypt and Jordan to take over the administration of Gaza and the West Bank--which would amount to a return, apart from important exceptions-to the status quo ante.

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