The Second Hamas-Israel War of Nov. 10-21 inspired a mighty debate over rights and wrongs, with each side appealing to the large undecided bloc (19 percent of Americans according to CNN/ORC, 38 percent according to Rasmussen). Is Israel a criminal state that has no right to exist, much less to deploy force? Or is it a modern liberal democracy with the rule of law that justifiably protects innocent civilians? Morality drives this debate.
To any sentient person, it is obvious that Israelis are 100-percent justified to protect themselves from wanton attacks. A cartoon from the Hizbullah War of 2006 symbolically showed a Palestinian terrorist shooting from behind a baby carriage at an Israeli soldier in front of a baby carriage.
 The clearest difference between the two sides. |
The tougher question is how to prevent further Hamas-Israel wars. Some background: If Israelis are 100-percent justified protecting themselves, their government also bears complete responsibility for creating this self-inflicted crisis. Specifically, it made two misguided unilateral withdrawals in 2005:
- From Gaza: Ariel Sharon won reelection as prime minister in Jan. 2003 in part by mocking a rival who called for the unilateral withdrawal of all Israeli residents and soldiers from Gaza; then, inexplicably, in Nov. 2003 he adopted this same policy and put it into effect in Aug. 2005. I dubbed this at that time, "one of the worst errors ever made by a democracy."
- From the Philadelphi Corridor: Under U.S. pressure, especially from U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Sharon signed an agreement in Sep. 2005, called "Agreed Arrangements,"* that withdrew Israeli forces from the Philadelphi Corridor, a 14-km long and 100-meter wide area between Gaza and Egypt. The hapless "European Union Border Assistance Mission at the Rafah Crossing Point" (EUBAM Rafah) took their place.
 The Philadelphi Corridor as it existed until November 2005. |
Trouble was, the Egyptian authorities had promised in their 1979 peace treaty with Israel (III:2) to prevent "acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, or violence" but in fact permitted massive smuggling of armaments to Gaza via tunnels. According to Doron Almog, a former head of Israel's Southern Command writing in early 2004, "smuggling has a strategic dimension" because it involves sufficient quantities of arms and materiel "to turn Gaza into launching pad for ever-deeper attacks against Israel proper."
Almog considered these policies "a dangerous gamble" by the Mubarak regime and a "profound strategic danger" that could "endanger the Israeli-Egyptian peace accord and threaten the stability of the whole region." He attributed the lax Egyptian attitude to a mix of anti-Zionist views among officialdom and a readiness to vent the Egyptian public's anti-Zionist sentiments.
Sharon arrogantly signed the "Agreed Arrangements," contrary to the strong opposition of Israel's security establishment. Of course, by removing this layer of Israeli protection, an "exponential increase" in the Gaza arsenal predictably followed, culminating in the Fajr-5 missiles that reached Tel Aviv this month.
To permit Israeli soldiers effectively to prevent armaments from reaching Gaza, David Eshel of Defense Update argued in 2009 for the IDF taking back the Philadelphi Corridor and increasing its size to "a fully sterile security line of about 1,000 meters," even though this would mean having to relocate about 50,000 Gaza residents. Interestingly, the Palestinian Authority's Ahmed Qurei privately endorsed similar steps in 2008.
 Israel's Maj. Gen. (res) Doron Almog foresaw today's problems in early 2004. |
In contrast, Michael Herzog, formerly a high-ranking official in Israel's defense ministry, tells me it is too late for Israel to take back the Philadelphi Corridor; that international pressure on Egypt to stop the flow of arms to Gaza is the solution. Likewise, former ambassador Dore Gold backs joint U.S.-Israel "arrangements" to keep out new weaponry.
I am skeptical about an effective American role, whether military or diplomatic; Israelis alone have the incentive to close down the arms transfers. Western governments should signal Hamas that they will encourage Jerusalem to respond to the next missile attack by retaking and enlarging the Philadelphi Corridor, thereby preventing further aggression, humanitarian tragedy, and political crises.
Mr. Pipes (www.DanielPipes.org) is president of the Middle East Forum. © 2012 by Daniel Pipes. All rights reserved.
* Full name: "Agreed Arrangements Regarding the Deployment of a Designated Force of Border Guards along the Border in the Rafah Area."
Jan. 3, 2013 update: One of the curious side-stories of the November hostilities is how the Israeli government kept provisioning Gaza, and even the enemy militiamen, with sustenance during the fighting. As Guy Bechor of the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya noted: "We represent the first instance in history of one side feeding and financing its enemy, even during a time of war between the two." For details, see the Israel Defense Forces paper, Civilian Assistance during Operation Pillar of Defense, Summary Report, 14-21 November 2012, plus analyses by Sarah Honig, Ruthie Blum, Ryan Jones, and Tzvi Fleischer.
 Picture & caption from the IDF paper with specifics about provisioning Gaza. |
Jan. 21, 2013 update: For a follow-up blog on this article, looking at relations across the Sinai border during the Morsi era, see "Morsi vs. Hamas, Hamas vs. Morsi."
Aug. 28, 2014 update: The Morsi era long over, it now appears that the Sisi government ruling Egypt is, for its own reasons, recreating the Philadelphi corrider by clearing a swath of land within its town of Rafah so as to control what goes in and out of Gaza.
Informed authority sources told Al-Monitor that the army's plan to establish a buffer zone will take two years to implement and will necessitate the razing of homes located about a kilometer (0.6 miles) inside the Rafah border. The plan also necessitates building a large barrier equipped with surveillance cameras and lights, and deploying ground sensors to abort any Palestinian attempts to dig tunnels or smuggle arms.
June 13, 2021 update: Victor Sharpe reminds us in "Why Israel must repossess the Philadelphi Corridor" that this small area remains key to the now-four Hamas wars on Israel.
Dec. 27, 2023 update: The legacy of the "Agreed Arrangements" and Israel's withdrawal from the Philadelphi Corridor lives on; Ariel Kahana points out that
Despite the prime minister, the defense minister, and other officials stressing in no uncertain terms that Israel will "eliminate" and "destroy" Hamas, there is still one major card that Israel does not currently intend to take from Hamas: the Philadelphia Axis, which runs along the border with between the Gaza Strip and Egypt.
Although under this route, which crosses the Gaza Strip from northwest to southeast, there is major smuggling going on, Israel currently has no plans to conquer the area, mainly because of opposition from Egypt.
Kahana doubts that Israeli intelligence knows what goes on there:
Through the tunnel system under the Philadelphi Route, massive amounts of arms have been delivered to Hamas. The extent of Egypt's knowing what was going on there may be revealed in the future. One thing is certain – the Israeli intelligence did not know the severity of the smuggling situation before the war.
Therefore, there is every reason to think that those who did not read the picture correctly before the war are also mistaken about it now. Contrary to the ruminations of the political and intelligence leadership that "nothing, or at most very little, currently comes in from Philadelphi" – it should be assumed that smuggling continues even these days.
He raises the specter of Egyptian collusion with Hamas:
Local news channels in Gaza knew to report this week that the Director of the Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate Abbas Kamel, spoke directly with Yahya Sinwar on a secured line, which passed through a tunnel from the Egyptian Rafah to the Gazan side of Rafah. If the tunnel landline is active, there is reason to suspect that other components in the tunnel are also active. After the Simchat Torah massacre [of Oct. 7], one can no longer keep their eyes shut.
If Israel will accede to Egyptian wishes and not retake the Philadelphi Corridor, it must take other steps.
Instead of absolute control over the route, as existed until the Disengagement Plan in 2005, the decision-makers must consider creative solutions. Putting the issue in Egyptian hands has resulted in our fighters having to deal with major military infrastructures and a plethora of arms. It is true that the Egyptians have cleared the area on their side, which is supposed to be the guarantee that tunnel traffic will stop. And yet, we also heard those explanations in the past, and the outcome is known.
A diplomatic official told Israel Hayom, "If we are not there, smuggling will resume. The Philadelphi Route requires special attention and we will also get to that, because it is a point that could become a vortex for smuggling activities."
Comment: The tragedy of the Philadelphi Corridor reinforces my preference for cool U.S.-Israel relations; when they are too warm, as in 2005, the Israelis accede to foolish American demands. For my analysis of this, see "The Solace of Poor U.S.-Israel Relations."
Dec. 28, 2023 update: Yoni Ben Menachem writes in "Securing the "Philadelphi Corridor": A Strategic Imperative for Israel":
Hamas heavily relies on the "Philadelphi Corridor" for weapons smuggling via underground tunnels. ... While Israel possesses intelligence on these tunnels, Egypt persists in denying their existence, claiming to have destroyed them years ago. Recent requests by Israel to have Egyptian military units relocate away from the Gaza Strip border for IDF control have been rebuffed by Egypt. ...
Reports from Gaza indicate that IDF forces attempted advances toward the corridor on December 23, 2023, but were repelled by Hamas. The Israeli Air Force also targeted Hamas positions along the corridor.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly declared Israel's intention to assert control over the "Philadelphi Corridor." Israel appears resolute in this decision, emphasizing its commitment to encircle the Gaza Strip completely.
Despite Egypt's opposition, it is anticipated that the country will eventually have to acquiesce to Israel's position.
Dec. 30, 2023 update: Asked at a press conference about this issue, Prime Minister Netanyahu replied that "The Philadelphi Corridor has to be in our hands, it has to be closed. It's clear that any other arrangement won't guarantee the disarmament that we want."
Dec. 31, 2023 update: Netanyahu's statement, replied Hussein Al-Sheikh, secretary-general of the PLO's Executive Committee,
is clear evidence of the decision to completely return the occupation and destroy the agreements with Egypt, and as we said previously, ending all agreements with the Palestine Liberation Organization.
Netanyahu's statement of the Israeli return to control the Philadelphia axis and the Rafah crossing on the Palestinian side and the creation of buffer zones and new security arrangements is clear evidence of the decision to completely return the occupation and destroy the... https://t.co/qApnSPK9ur
— حسين الشيخ Hussein AlSheikh (@HusseinSheikhpl) December 31, 2023
Jan. 13, 2024 update: Netanyahu cautiously returned to the Philadelphi Corridor topic: "We will not end the war without closing this loophole. If we end the war without this, we will not be able to know that we have isolated Gaza. There are several options for how to close it. We have not yet made a decision."
Jan. 21, 2024 update: Eran Lerman offers wise advice for the Israeli government on this topic: Proceed
carefully and in close coordination with the Egyptian military as regards the achievement of full operational control of the so-called "Philadelphi Corridor." Such control will ultimately serve the interests of Egypt as well, but the obvious sensitivity and the need to avoid friction requires further work to secure mutual understanding. Israel after all gave its consent again and again in the last decade to the deployment of significant Egyptian forces in Sinai, well above the levels allowed under the Military Annex of the 1979 Peace Treaty. It is thus entitled to a similar Egyptian recognition of the IDF's operational needs.
Jan. 23, 2024 update: Egypt's government responded harshly to Netanyahu, as reported in the Times of Israel: "It must be strictly emphasized that any Israeli move in this direction will lead to a serious threat to Egyptian-Israeli relations," Diaa Rashwan, head of Egypt's State Information Service, said in an online statement.
Rashwan asserted the Egyptian border with Gaza was secure and railed at Israeli accusations that weapons were being smuggled from Egypt into the Strip, calling them "allegations and lies." He accused the Israeli government of seeking to escape from "its successive failures in achieving its declared goals for the war" against Hamas, which Israel launched in response to the terror group's deadly October 7 onslaught.
"The conclusion is that these false allegations do not serve the [Israel-Egypt] peace treaty that Egypt respects, and it demands that the Israeli side to show its respect for it also, and to stop making statements that would strain bilateral relations in light of the current inflammatory conditions," he said.
"Egypt calls on everyone who talks about its failure to protect its borders to stop making these allegations, in light of the fact that it has a strong army capable of protecting its borders with all efficiency and discipline."
Jan. 31, 2024 update: Eyal Zisser, vice rector of Tel Aviv University, believes a compromise can be found:
"the problem of the Egyptians is not that Israel is striking Hamas, but the Egyptian fear regarding the fleeing of Palestinians into the heart of Sinai; they want to prevent this. In Rafah today, there are masses of refugees, and the Egyptian fear is that an Israeli military operation in Rafah will drive them into Sinai," he said.
He added that if Israel coordinates its military operation with Egypt and ensures that Gazans do not flee into Sinai, the Egyptians will likely not oppose it, being satisfied with publicly condemning Israel.
"The Egyptian statements are theatrical, for the sake of public opinion in Egypt. Egypt does not sympathize with Hamas's plight. But for the Egyptians, the escape of refugees into the heart of Sinai is a red line because it is a danger to stability in Egypt. Therefore, on this issue, they are definitely serious. And as mentioned, a solution can be found that meets the needs of Israel and the concerns of Egypt."
Feb. 2, 2024 update: Nadav Shragai ties the anti-Israel sentiments among Egyptians to Sisi's caution and therefore Israel's not taking Philadelphia.
caution, out of a desire not to antagonize Egypt, is what led to the Israeli decision at the beginning of the war to avoid taking control of Rafah and the Philadelphi Corridor. Israel is now being extremely careful to show deference to Egypt and el-Sissi and is fully aware of the sensitivities surrounding the Philadelphi Corridor. In retrospect, this consideration might turn out to have been a mistake. If Israel does not manage to reach an effective arrangement, which will block off smuggling cross the corridor for years to come – then sooner or later, the vast influx of weapons into the Gaza Strip will be renewed in precisely the same manner that it was done right under Israel's nose for many years.
June 1, 2024 update: From a Times of Israel news report:
The Israel Defense Forces on Friday released footage showing Hamas smuggling tunnels and rocket launchers discovered by troops along the Gaza-Egypt border. ... Along the so-called Philadelphi Corridor, adjacent to Rafah, the IDF has located so far some 20 tunnels that cross into Egypt. Another 82 tunnel shafts leading into the tunnels have been located in the corridor area. Hamas has been known to use such tunnels to smuggle weapons into Gaza.
