Cannot Dismiss Syria Altogether - With or Without al-Assad

Submitted by M. Tovey (United States), Oct 3, 2014 at 16:01

To a truth, the last assertion, '[i]f [al]-Assad is removed from power, I can almost guaranty that his replacement will be worse,' for every regime that underwent their own 'Arab upheaval,' all have found themselves compromised in one fashion or another, the distinction of al-Assad's being it is the most resilient, a peculiarity that has many stumped, especially the current American Administrative Chief Executive; or so we are led to believe.

That being said; what should be the focus versus what else is being missed as the loss of focus appears to be the issue?

For the immediate observations, Syria is in a shambles, whether one thinks al-Assad is at fault or otherwise; his overreaction to the initial rebellion has taken this regional scrap to a place al-Assad cannot recover intact from; and his outside patronage appears to understand that. Even if the ISIS/ISIL/IS threat is dealt with, Syria will never be the same, whether the current regime remains or not.

Elimination of countering political opposition as mentioned is indeed the mantra that is undercurrent in what is happening, as it has been for empire making from the ancient times. But which make empire building more difficult these days is that arms sales knows no allegiance except the prevailing currency exchange rate and more bang for the buck. ISIS/ISIL/IS solved its immediate requisitions for munitions by expropriating them; but this may have its limits.

What in the beginning was a difficulty of target confusion (from the White House-Islam is a religion of peace) to a belated response to a situation reeling out of control altogether, what is the ultimate targeting and sought after achievement in the attempts to quell the most potentially upsetting Arab conflict since the 1973 attacks against Israel? For some, dispelling ISIS/ISIL/IS's threat in the Fertile Crescent is a hard one to get any focus on. What is being missed here?

Actually, there is a possible motive in all of this; and ISIS/ISIL/IS has already made the point, not only in the Fertile Crescent, but around the world. We are already here and you appear to us to be impotent to stop it anytime soon. If a better coalition can be cobbled together to address the threat to the local regional issues, when that thins out, who else is arriving to pick up the pieces? By this time, al-Assad's weakened position may end up even more untenable and who remains to fill that vacuum – Erdoǧan? Hmmmm.

But let us interject a perspective made by others, that in the background are found compelling connections of interested parties (some suggest Iran; others Russia); and what elements of influences that those powers may bring to complicate and already confusing situation. Indeed, part of te issue the United States has a couple of years ago was the appearance of a waffling American Administration that said things were seriously Syrian, but a limited response that proved ineffective was the best that could be offered.

The question for the moment: do we or do we not intentionally or unintentionally assist al-Assad; and what do we do when that fails without a plan B? From a targeting perspective, al-Assad might appear inconsequential at this point and therein lays the conundrum; what if he does go and a new paradigm arrives to complicate things further, what does the world expect to happen then? Identify the real target and then recalculate the matrix for the intentions of a worldwide catastrophe, al-Assad notwithstanding.

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